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Beginning in the late nineteenth century Woodrow Wilson (1887) proposed the 
idea that government can be divided into two broad functions: politics and 
administration. While the debate remains about the extent to which these functions of 
government are actually separated, Wilson contributed a critical part of how we think 
about public administration: that there are in fact different dimensions to government. 
These different dimensions are no doubt related in varying degrees (Svara, 2014), but 
where literature has been lacking is in teasing out the complexity of government by trying 
to understand the different dimensions, specifically how they relate to each other. To 
better understand these relations, the following dissertation looks at two dimensions of 
government that are theoretically and practically designed to change to meet the needs of 
their communities. Specifically, I ask: how is the policy-making function of government 
related to the administrative/organizational function in multilevel systems of 
government? Here, I examine the extent to which these two different types of change are 
driven by the same factors. Due to the interwoven nature of our federalist system, I 
further examine how these functions relate both over time and at all levels of 
government, and in two different cases: one where change begins at the federal 
government level and diffuses downward, and one where change begins at the local level 
and diffuses upward.  
Using both logistic and qualitative comparative analyses (QCAs), I ultimately 
conclude that change is not just change. Policy and organizational change are largely 
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driven by different factors; however, how these two dimensions of government differ is 







CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION. 
Harkening back to the late 1800s, we public administration scholars have thought 
of government as having two very broad functions: politics and administration. Woodrow 
Wilson (1887) sparked a debate about the nature of the relationship between politics and 
administration when he essentially argued that these two functions of government were 
insulated from each other, where politics is an expression of the will of the state and 
administration is the execution of that will. This idea became known as the politics-
administration dichotomy and whether it exists is still a debate (Demir, 2014). Mostly 
beginning in the mid-1900s, studies began to show that politics and administration were 
not very insulated. A trend described and feared by Mosher (1967), studies have shown, 
that both dimensions of government are in fact wound in the other (e.g. Landsberg, 2007; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). The outcome is an interwoven system where political 
processes and performance are affected by the norms and values of the administrators 
(Ballam, 2011; Shafritz, et al., 2004).  
The dichotomy debate emphasizes that government has different dimensions to it. 
Further, the interwoven nature of government shown by the dichotomy studies reflects 
the complexity of government. Together, this means that we know that the different 
functions of government are related, but it leaves us with questions as to how. The 
research presented here is centered on thinking about this how. In this research, I look at 
the nature of the interwoven system of government, specifically how the different 
functions of government relate to each other in instances of change.  
Organizational change is a particularly ripe area to study this relation. In terms of 
the functions of government, policy adoptions and changes in the organizational 
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structures reflect two different dimensions of government, and are two ways that a 
government can address an issue. Further, we know that all organizations change. They 
all undergo, to some extent, an “alteration and transformation of the form so as to survive 
better in the environment” (Hage, 1980, pg. 262). Decades of study have emphasized that 
organizations are constantly in motion, responding to internal and external pressures to 
change (Child and Kiesler, 1981; Hall and Tolbert, 2005). This protean nature of 
organizations is exacerbated by the fact that organizations do not exist in isolation, but in 
a web of other organizations. Consequently, fully understanding how and why 
organizations change requires looking at organizations individually and collectively 
(Battilana and Casciaro, 2012).  
Ultimately, I pose the research question: how is the policy-making function of 
government related to the organizational/structural function in multilevel systems? Here, 
I assess the extent to which these two different forms of change are motivated and 
enabled by the same factors. Specifically, I look at how different levels of government 
innovate over time in terms of policy adoptions and in terms of changing their 
organizational activities. Further, because the motivations for change vary depending on 
origin, I examine how these functions relate in two different scenarios: in a case where 
change begins at the federal government level and diffuses downward, and where change 
begins at the local level and diffuses upward. The goal was to better articulate how these 
functions relate by understanding how each changes, and to assess 1) if these change 
processes look different overall, 2) if these change processes look different across the 
levels of government, and 3) if these processes look different over time.  
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Policy and Organizational Change in Systems. Because organizations exist in 
populations of other organizations, the complexity of government is exacerbated. Not 
only can organizations adapt their operations and strategies to match those of other 
organizations that have been deemed the norm or most effective (e.g. Dimaggio and 
Powell, 1983), but so also can the values and goals of one organization be adopted by 
another (e.g. Jun and Weare, 2012). Thus, part of understanding the relationship between 
these different dimensions of government demands understanding the relationships 
among organizations, or understanding how the system of organizations functions on the 
whole.  
This interplay of organizations exists horizontally (relationships among 
organizations operating on a similar level, such as state governments) and vertically 
across organizations (relationships that exist within a top-down hierarchy). Overall, these 
organizations exist in a federalist, multilevel system. Multilevel systems refer to 
interacting authority structures (e.g. Piattoni, 2009), such as the United States federalist 
structure of government. Here, power and authority are shared between national, state, 
and local governments, where the different powers and authorities are defined by the U.S. 
Constitution and each level of government has some degree of autonomy (Riker, 1964). 
Thus, organizations within a federalist structure exist on different levels of authority, 
resembling a hierarchy of organizations. Such a structure leads us to presume that 
changes in these organizations often “emerge from the interaction of multiple centers of 
authority” (V. Ostrom, 1994, pg. 17). This has two key implications. First, policy and 
organizational changes can occur anywhere in a system of organizations. Second, 
organizations in a system of organizations make decisions with access to “diverse 
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methods of problem solving” that result from having interactions with organizations of 
varying resources, capabilities, and knowledge. So, organizations make decisions, like 
whether to adopt a policy, in the context of each other; and the changes made may not 
only originate from any place within this web of interactions, but may be driven or 
inhibited by different factors among the different levels (V. Ostrom, 1994). So, the 
factors driving change at a local level can affect change at a state level (or vice versa) 
(Boushey, 2012). Thus, the interplay between the policy-making and structural 
dimensions of government likely varies organization to organization and even across 
levels of government. 
Contributions. This research has multiple contributions. First, we know a lot about policy 
and structural innovative behaviors of organizations, but not a lot about how they relate, 
such as what factors make them innovate in terms of policy compared to structural 
changes. This research begins to better understand the complexities of government by 
looking at these two dimensions of government, these two avenues of change, to 
understand more about how government works and how problems are addressed. 
Second, I assess the drivers of these different dimensions of government in 
different contexts. Looking at the different dimensions across levels of government in 
both top-down and bottom-up scenarios further allows us to realistically understand how 
government works and innovates, because it enables us to understand not only how 
policy-making and structural changes relate, but also how these relations vary in different 
scenarios, offering more context.  
In addition to furthering our understanding of the complexity of government, 
assessing these dimensions within a system of organizations also enables a contribution 
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to policy and federalism literatures. Knowledge regarding the diffusion of policy 
adoptions across levels of organizations (e.g. from local to state) is less abundant than 
diffusion across organizations on the same level (e.g. from state to state). Further, vertical 
diffusion of policy adoptions is significantly less developed than vertical diffusion of 
policy implementations. This, coupled with the changing nature of federalism, with 
shifting balances of power (V. Ostrom, 1994), will give a deeper understanding into how 
the different levels work together. 
Methods. The policy and organizational dynamic was examined in the context of the U.S. 
public health system. Here, policy change is operationalized as an adoption of a bill or 
ordinance, while organizational change is conceptualized as changes in the types of 
activities performed to address the health issue at stake. This allows for two different 
types of government innovations to be comparatively studied. To examine these changes 
in a system of organizations, two different initiatives were selected: one bottom-up 
initiative (a local policy adoption that diffused upward) and a top-down initiative (a 
federal policy initiative that diffused downward). The bottom-up case is the trans-fat 
restrictions and the top-down case is HIV/AIDs prevention. These will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
In this study I employed two separate methods: a logistic regression assessment of 
how the different levels of government change over time in regard to policy and 
organizational changes, and a series of qualitative comparative analyses (QCAs) to 
identify the patterns of internal and external factors that drive the different types of 
change for state and local governments. Both organizational and policy change types 
were studied with regard to an intervention year. The intervention year is defined as the 
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year that a particular initiative was first established. For example, in the top-down case, 
the CDC launched its efforts with HIV prevention in 2010, so 2010 is the intervention 
year in this scenario. Thus, I assessed the policy-making and structural changes that 
occurred post-intervention for each level of government to determine how they co-
occurred (if at all). 
In sum, I find that when it comes to public organizations, change is not just 
change. Policy and organizational change are largely driven by different factors, but 
crucially, that there are instances in which these enablers of innovation align. Moreover, 
the nature of how these two different types of innovations differ varies by both level of 













CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
The relationship between policy and organizational change was examined in the 
context of the U.S. public health system. Public health in the U.S. is defined as “what we 
as a society do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy” 
(WHO, 1998). This field is a “particularly good” area in which to study questions of 
change and federalism because it is “extraordinarily intergovernmental”, with health 
knowing no jurisdictional boundaries (Carol and Weissert, 2008). This makes the 
complexity of government very visible. Overall, three primary levels of organizations in 
the U.S. exist to meet public health goals: federal, state, and local public health agencies. 
Together, these organizations are the backbone of the public health system, with each 
level having its own responsibilities that are unique to that level; yet the success of 
improving public health at one level is reliant on the efforts and activities of entities at the 
other level(s) (Turnock and Atchison, 2002). This structure reflects the federalist nature 
of our government, where power, authority, and decision-making are not held centrally 
by one authority, but instead are divided amongst the levels. This has not only 
successfully limited the powers of the federal government as intended by the Framers 
(Turnock and Atchison, 2002), but it has also created a structure that is collaborative 
(CDC, 2013; Salinsky, 2010). Thus, identifying the differences among the roles, 
responsibilities, and powers of the different public health levels is critical to 
understanding how they interact with each other in practice (CDC, 2017).  
As seen below in their figure, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) (2017) categorizes the essential functions of public health as assurance, policy 
development, and assessment, where essential functions range from providing care, to 
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monitoring and investigating, to informing and mobilizing communities. However, these 
tasks manifest in different ways across the levels.  
 
Figure 1: Public Health Essential Functions 
 
Federal Level. The federal government is responsible for policy development, surveying 
population needs, supporting health research, providing resources, technical assistance, 
and finances to other organizations, providing protection from health threats and 
supporting global health initiatives (Institute of Medicine committee for the Study of the 
Future of Public Health, 1988). These functions are primarily located within the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which divides these responsibilities 
among its six primary organizational units: (1) CDC (2) the National Institutes of Health; 
(3) the Food and Drug Administration; (4) the Health Resources and Services 
Administration; (5) the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration; and (6) 
the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (Institute of Medicine committee 
for the Study of the Future of Public Health, 1988).  The CDC is of primary interest in 
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this study, as it is the main assessment and epidemiological hub for the country, and, 
unlike the other units, directly serves both individuals and state and local health 
departments (Institute of Medicine committee for the Study of the Future of Public 
Health, 1988). The CDC (2011) states its purpose as: 
● “Ensuring all levels of government have the capabilities to provide essential 
public health services  
● Acting when health threats may span more than one state, a region, or the entire 
nation  
● Acting where the solutions may be beyond the jurisdiction of individual states  
● Acting to assist the states when they lack the expertise or resources to effectively 
respond in a public health emergency (e.g., a disaster, bioterrorism, or an 
emerging disease)  
● Facilitating the formulation of public health goals (in collaboration with state and 
local governments and other relevant stakeholders).” 
Overall, federal activities can be categorized in two ways: those that are performed 
directly by the federal government (e.g. policy-making, resource development, and 
financing) and those that are contracted out, such as to state and local governments, who 
conduct the largest portion of the federal government’s “health business” (Institute of 
Medicine committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health, 1988). Thus, the 
federal government often takes a more supervisory, goal-setting, and assistance role when 
it comes to public health. Its relationships among the levels of government are illustrated 
below in Figure 2. The arrows indicate relationships within this system. 
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State and Local Levels. The nature of state and local public health departments varies 
considerably across the U.S. Traditionally and legally, states are the primary authorities 
for health, largely dictating the efforts of their state and local efforts. Federal efforts can 
be influential, but autonomy of public health decisions begin at the state level (Salinsky, 
2010). For this reason, states are considered the “principal” governmental body 
responsible for public health in the U.S. (Institute of Medicine committee for the Study of 
the Future of Public Health, 1988). In total there are 55 state health agencies (the 50 
states plus the District of Columbia and territories), all conducting a wider range of 
activities than the federal government. These activities include: 
● Collecting and analyzing data 
● Carrying out federal mandates 
● Conducting inspections 
● Setting standards and policies 
● Screening for diseases and conditions  
● Treating diseases  
● Providing technical assistance and training  
● Providing laboratory services  
● Conducting epidemiology and surveillance activities (CDC, 2013; Institute of 
Medicine committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health, 1988). 
 
However, these functions are the responsibility of both state and local health 
departments (LHDs) (CDC, 2013), if local levels are present (Rhode Island and Hawaii, 
for example, do not have local health departments). Whether the state or local health 
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departments carry out these activities varies state to state. The variation in state-local 
relationships can be classified into one of three primary types: completely decentralized 
(LHDs are led by local governments), mixed (some LHDs are led by the state, while 
others are led by their local governments), or centralized (all LHDs in the state are parts 
of the state government) (Salinsky, 2010).  
Despite the variation, state health departments typically manage the activities of their 
LHDs by providing funding, setting standards for performance, collecting data, providing 
laboratory services, preparedness and response to public health emergencies, regulation 
of healthcare providers, administration of federal public health programs, and 
implementing certain programs, like surveillance, (Salinsky, 2010). LHDs are often 
considered the “front line” of the U.S. public health system, being the primary 
mechanism for health service delivery (CDC, 2013). The activities of LHDs, depending 
on their relationship to their state department, can be a result of their own initiative or a 
delegation of state authority (Institute of Medicine committee for the Study of the Future 
of Public Health, 1988). Large health departments typically have a much broader range of 
activities than smaller LHDs, but overall the services provided by LHDs are the most 
population specific and narrow in scope. These include clinical prevention, medical 





Figure 2. Federalism Relationships 
 
 
Despite these separated roles, the local, state, and federal governments exist in an 
interconnected system of relationships, and these roles and functions have evolved over 
time. The past two decades saw a transformation of public health, where the more 
“proximal” levels of government (the more local levels of government) as opposed to a 
national or state government were seen as the most appropriate health organizations to 
address public health burdens (Fairchild, et al., 2010). Consequently, local governments 
largely assumed most of the burden of addressing public health issues (Turnock and 
Atchison, 2002), having more “direct operational” responsibility for many activities, 
while the broader, collective goal setting and resource allocating functions rest at the 
higher levels, which seek to act as a “unifying force” across all the local levels (Turnock 
and Atchison, 2002). 
Changing and Innovating in Public Health. Within the public health setting, the 
complexity of government is prominent with innovations not only being made both in 
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terms of policy and organizational structural changes, but also in how the relationship 
between those types of innovations varies across levels of government and over time. 
Throughout history, how the different levels of government have changed to meet public 
health needs have shifted, largely tied to changes in both disease type and prevalence. 
Broadly, public health originated as a practice that was environmental and social in 
nature, where the major diseases of the time (infectious diseases) were attributed to the 
unsanitary conditions of the poor and influx of immigrants. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, the Industrial Revolution brought with it a scientific revolution (Fairchild, et al., 
2010). Medicinal and technological advancements soared, and the role of public health 
began to change from one that focused on the environmental conditions in which people 
lived, to the issuance of “magic pills” and vaccines. Importantly, these hallmark creations 
were able to help eradicate many infectious diseases of the times; however, with changes 
in land use and transportation, coupled with medicinal advancements, a tide of chronic 
diseases rose to replace infectious diseases as the major killers (Fairchild, et al., 2010; 
Isett, et al., 2015). Such diseases are not fought by “magic pills” and vaccines, a fact 
recognized by many public health leaders, who are seeking to change how we do public 
health once again (Fairchild, et al., 2010). These changes in how we do public health beg 
the question of how the government has adjusted its strategy to managing public health 
issues. Historically, government has done this both organizationally and in terms of 
policy. 
Organizational Change. Organizationally, health departments provide certain 
services for a community (Turnock and Atchison, 2002). Government organizations have 
largely adjusted their activities and services provided to meet rising health issues. The 
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responses to these factors are most evident in the activities in which they engage and their 
funding patterns. For example, during the reign of infectious diseases, public health 
leaders and departments chiefly focused on environmental solutions to relieving disease 
burdens, finding ways to affect where people lived to prevent the spread of diseases, 
including activities such as improving sewage systems and providing cleaner water 
(Fairchild, et al., 2010). Public health departments changed their health strategies once 
the scientific revolution reached full swing to meet society’s new expectations of 
behavior for health departments (North, 1990). The primary activities and services of 
health departments switched to a more individualistic approach revolving around 
distributing medication and vaccines (Fairchild, et al. 2010). As infectious diseases were 
replaced by chronic diseases, public health departments faced substantial resistance. 
Harkening back to the role of health departments of the nineteenth century, beginning 
about two decades ago, major U.S. cities have recently attempted to address chronic 
diseases by broadening their scope of activities to include individual lifestyles (Isett, et 
al., 2015). Yet, they have found resistance in the form of legal battles and public protests 
over the appropriate purview of health departments (Colgrove, 2011), forcing many 
health departments to act without the “authority, mandates, and capacity” (Turnock and 
Atchison, 2002).  
Policy-Making. Health departments at all three levels have also responded to 
changing societal landscapes by adopting policies. The passage of policy to address an 
issue is important to elected officials as it is a visible government action to address a 
problem and can thus meet (at least to some degree) a responsibility to constituents 
(Kernell, et al., 2016; Stone, 2002; Weissert and Scheller, 2008). Whether motivated for 
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reelection purposes or personal goals, elected officials pursue policy action to accomplish 
their objectives (Stone, 2002). Despite varying processes for policy-making, each level of 
government is responsible and capable of passing policies to meet the needs of their 
jurisdictions. Generally, as the leading diseases traded places over time, so typically did 
policies to address them. However, how government has responded to public health 
changes over the years has varied much depending on the level of government (e.g. 
national compared to state governments).  
The federal government’s activity in health policy has been described as broad 
and ambiguous (e.g. Oliver, 2006; Shipan and Volden, 2006; Weissert and Scheller, 
2008). Balla (2001) and Kettl (2016) described this as a result of policy “devolution”, 
where social, welfare, and health policy-making responsibility has fallen to more local 
levels. Oliver (2006) and Weissert and Scheller (2008) argued that the federal 
government becomes most active in terms of policies primarily when it concerns the 
nation as a whole, not specific to one locale or subset of states. For example, the federal 
government takes on the primary role of encouraging and rationing flu shots each year 
(Barr, 2013).  
Also, the national government is also significantly less active in policy-making 
than more local governments (excluding amendments or edits to existing policies) 
(Weissert and Scheller, 2008). Research has suggested a few reasons as to why this might 
be. First, states often have a smaller and less complex political environment than a federal 
government (Oliver, 2006), making the legislative process more navigable. For example, 
Weissert and Scheller (2008) found that health policies passed by the federal government 
were often a result of opportunism. Opportunism can occur when a perceived problem, 
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solution, and process are brought together in a “window of opportunity”, where 
individuals or organizations advance an idea or innovation (Kingdon, 1984). Such 
“windows” can arise from shifts in the national mood, anticipation of and reaction to 
elections, interest group pressure, and the ideological preferences and priorities of key 
officials (Kingdon, 1984; Polsby, 1984). Therefore, if states and local governments face 
less complexity (Kernell, et al., 2016; Kettl, 2016), then state and local governments may 
be more active in passing health policies because the “windows” appear more often.  
Second, states and local governments have a more intimate and proximal 
relationship to their jurisdictions, where needs and solutions are more readily defined and 
anticipated than at the federal government level (Kettl, 2016; Scheberle, 1997). This is 
augmented by the fact that certain issues evolve and change over time, requiring the 
efforts of local governments to recognize and address these issues (Scheberle, 1997). For 
these reasons, problems have been framed more and more as local issues, thereby 
demanding local solutions, or at least local government involvement (Scheberle, 1997). 
Given that recent decades have chronic diseases to mostly blame for our death tolls, 
affecting lifestyles through policy passage may make more sense on a more local level, 
where government is more proximal to the problems unique to its jurisdiction (e.g. 
Colgrove, 2011). Each local or state government is then likely to be able to prioritize its 
needs on its own political agenda (Kettl, 2016).  
The government has adjusted its approach to public health both organizationally 
and in terms of policy-making. Importantly, how government changes varies based on the 
level of government. For this study, I am focusing in on two scenarios of change: HIV 
prevention and trans-fat bans. 
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Interventions. The interventions for this study are public health initiatives that were either 
the first of its kind or have been considered the most recently significant effort to 
improve or advance public health. One top-down and one bottom-up case were selected 
for analysis. The two different cases described below are examples where significant 
public health improvements were made. Analysis of these cases lends insight into how 
the different organizations made that change occur.  
Top-Down Change. For the top-down approach, I selected the CDC’s Winnable 
Battles as the initiative starting from the federal level. With this initiative the CDC 
identified six areas where progress could be made quickly (within a few years), beginning 
in 2010. These include tobacco; nutrition, physical activity, food safety, and obesity; 
healthcare associated infections; motor vehicle injuries; teen pregnancy; and HIV. 
According to the CDC (2016), these priorities have large-scale impacts and have 
evidence-based support for implementation. From these initiatives, I directed attention to 
HIV prevention. In 2010, the CDC tasked state and local governments to “implement and 
support the National HIV/AIDS Strategy; reduce the number of new HIV infections in 
the US; implement comprehensive prevention with positives and ensure linkage to 
continuity of care; implement prevention with high-risk negatives; improve data 
monitoring ad dissemination; and reduce HIV-related disparities” (CDC, 2015). Thus, 
there are a variety of policies that the jurisdictions could adopt. 
I chose HIV for a few reasons. First, these are initiatives that can be found in the 
data at the local, state, and federal levels. Second, because this research is trying to 
understand the conditions under which how change diffuses from different directions 
(top-down or bottom-up), it is important to have success cases. As seen below in Table 1, 
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these health issues saw significant improvement since the inception of Winnable Battles. 
This table demonstrates that significant strides have been made to reduce HIV prevalence 
in the United States. This prompts us to ask certain questions: what was done differently? 
Who took initiative and what changes were made to meet these CDC targets? Beginning 
in and extending past 2010, state and local health departments were examined for 
responding to Winnable Battles. In terms of policy, I examined how many (if any) 
policies were passed that dealt specifically with HIV after 2010. Organizationally, I 
examined and tracked if there were any changes made to HIV screening and treatment 
services provided by the health department at each level of government after 2010. 
 
 
Table 1: 2015 CDC HIV Progress Report 
 









    
Reduce the number of HIV 







Increase the percent of HIV-
infected persons who are 
aware of their HIV infection 













Bottom-Up Change. Looking at change from local jurisdictions, I selected one 
initiative from major cities that had nationwide impacts - the trans-fat ban that was 
kickstarted by Philadelphia and New York City in late 2006/early 2007. Sparking local 
and national attention, this ban in New York City alone has led to a 6% decline in 
hospital admissions for heart attacks. In the coming years, a variety of cities and counties 
across the country would move to pass similar bans (Colgrove, 2011). In 2008, the 
United States had its first statewide restriction (California), while other states would soon 
pass less comprehensive restrictions (e.g. Colorado passed restrictions for its public 
schools). Finally, in 2013, the FDA announced national restrictions on the use of trans-fat 
to be in full in effect by the end of 2018. Policy changes in this case are trans-fat 
restrictions that were adopted by the government entity. Organizational/structural 
changes are those made in how the respective health departments provided cardiovascular 
disease screening treatments or coronary heart disease treatment services to their 
jurisdictions. These diseases were selected as the type of service changes a health 
department could make because trans-fats (partially hydrogenated oils) have long been 









CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW. 
Changes in organizational structures and policy adoptions represent an 
innovativeness of government (Borins, 2014). Despite skepticism about whether large 
government agencies can embrace change, innovation in the public sector persists. Even 
in the face of obstacles, political backlash, and crises, the public sector continues to 
innovate (Borins, 2014). The complexity of government is seen in the mix of factors that 
contribute to its innovativeness, as there are a variety of factors that influence change and 
there is not one best way to structure a government to ensure innovativeness (Lee and 
Whitford, 2012).  
Barriers and Facilitators of Change and Innovation within Organizations.  
There is a deep repository on the internal components of organizations that can 
facilitate or hinder an organization’s ability to innovate, such as by adopting a new policy 
or making structural changes. To be able to explain how a government innovates in terms 
of policy or structural changes, it is critical to identify those factors that facilitate 
innovation, obstruct innovation, and enable the organization to overcome those obstacles 
(Mohr, 1969).  
Institutional Factors. The structure of the organization determines the extent to which 
the organization adjusts to environmental changes (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). For this 
reason, innovativeness in organizations has been described as being mostly influenced by 
structural determinants (Greenhalgh, et al., 2004). Organizations are by nature 
conservative, as their very structures present systemic obstacles to change (Kaufman, 
1971). The relevant aspects of the organization’s structure include its size (Hannan and 
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Freeman, 1984; Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981), complexity (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984), specialization (Rosengren, 1967), degree of centralization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967), and routines (Aggarwal, et al., 2017). Each of these concepts affects how 
organizations function, and thus how they are able to adapt to their environment, 
innovate, and respond to environmental changes. 
Structure: Size, Complexity, Specialization, and Routinization. The effects of size on an 
organization’s performance and ability to adjust to change is a complex relationship. As 
such, the existing research on the connection between size and organizational 
performance or change is mixed. This is largely to a result of two factors. First, the effect 
of size on organizations is contingent on other factors that more directly affect 
performance (Hall and Tolbert, 2005). For example, an organization’s size can contribute 
to its resource capacity, where larger organizations tend to have more resources and are 
therefore more likely to enter into new markets (Haveman, 1993) and have more highly 
developed internal labor markets (Van Buren, 1992). On the other hand, if size is not 
managed appropriately, the large size of the organization may cause it to be more 
bureaucratic, inhibiting market involvement (Haveman, 1993) and adding to its 
complexity (Van Buren, 1992).  
Second, Kimberley (1976) noted that size can be measured in a number of 
different ways, and these different measures have not always had consistent findings 
regarding their effects on organizations (Hall and Tolbert, 2005). Size is, however, most 
commonly conceptualized in two ways: the size of the jurisdiction served (e.g. Turnock, 
et al., 1974; Nelson and Svara, 2011) and the size of the organization’s workforce (e.g. 
Damanpour, 1992; Lee and Whitford, 2012). Size as a measure of jurisdiction size has 
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been found to be one of the most consistent predictors of performance (Mays, et al., 
2006). Though the relationship may peak after a certain population size (Mays, et al., 
2006; Turnock, et al., 1998), organizations having larger jurisdictions tend to outperform 
smaller jurisdictions, likely due to a higher amount of available resources that are able to 
be contributed to a particular task (Mays, et al., 2006) and to the technical efficiencies 
gained through economies of scale and scope (Oakerson, 1999). 
Classic literature, such as that of Hannan and Freeman (1984) and Kimberly 
(1976), suggests that the benefits of having a larger workforce within an organization are 
due to the increased capacity of the organization to perform, having larger margins of 
error to withstand environmental disturbances and shocks (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
Kimberly (1976) additionally claims that the larger the organization in terms of 
employees, the greater the capacity of the organization to conduct more activities and 
have a wide variety of personnel, which results in a workforce that has an expanded 
knowledge and skill base (Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981). Thus, perhaps the mixed 
findings regarding size are a result of the effects of size on other structural variables (Hall 
and Tolbert, 2005). 
Complexity. Research has also shown that increasing the size of an organization increases 
its complexity. Complexity is commonly defined as the extent to which the organization 
is professionalized and diversified in terms of its occupations (Hage and Aiken, 1968). 
For a few key reasons, complexity has been found to be negatively related to change in 
organizations. First, more complex organizations tend to be the larger organizations, 
which tend to have large spans of control (Blau, 1968, 1973). Having a smaller span of 
control is important as it enables an organization to be more manageable. Here, the chain 
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of command and decision-making authority are clear (Barnard, 1938), and there are 
transparent lines of information, resources, and communication flows across the 
hierarchy (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Second, according to Hannan and Freeman 
(1984), low complexity enables the organization to deal with both change and external 
shocks more easily because one “unit can change its structure without requiring 
adjustment by the other units” (pg. 162), thereby increasing the speed of response to 
change and external threats (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).  
In a federalist system, the interdependency of governments adds to the complexity 
(Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). The interplay extends both horizontally and vertically, 
adding both to the number of connections one single entity has, as well as the 
responsibility or duty that comes with the relationship (e.g. providing funding to a local 
government) (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). This increases the scope of activities and 
duties required of an organization, which leads to a need for more coordination and 
control (Alter and Hage, 1993). Further, for public organizations, as complexity 
increases, so too does their likelihood of linking with nongovernmental entities, such as 
nonprofits (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994).  
Specialization. One mechanism of dealing with complexity is the extent to which the 
organization is specialized, or the extent to which the organization is able to handle a 
wide variety of tasks or services (Dooley, 1997; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Rosengren, 
1967). Like size, the effects of specialization on organizational functions and outcomes 
remains largely mixed and multifaceted. Related to innovation, Kimberly and Evanisko 
(1981) found that the more specialized the organization (defined as number of specialties 
in the organization), the higher its rates of innovation. More recently, Feldman and 
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Audretsch (1998) claimed that while this may be true, specialization had a weaker effect 
on innovation than did the mere diversity of “complementary” activities within and 
across firms. 
Mixed findings are also found with regard to specialization and its effect on 
managing uncertainty. For example, Mays, et al. (2010) point to an advantage in only 
providing a limited number of services – that efforts and resources are highly 
concentrated, thus enabling the organization to better address resource dependencies in 
their jurisdictions. However, providing a wider variety of services has been shown to 
enable organizations to adjust to environmental variabilities and uncertainties (Kastelic, 
1974; Perrow, 1970; Rosengren, 1970). This is likely due to economies of scope 
(Mukherjee, Santerre, and Zhang, 2010) and the fact that having a broader scope enables 
the organization to appeal to and develop relationships with more actors in the 
environment (Kastelic, 1974). Aligning with Thomson (1967), having a greater number 
of relationships with other actors and organizations in the environment can better the 
ability of the organization to anticipate environmental changes (Kastelic, 1974), and 
therefore respond more efficiently. 
However, as is the case with centralization, the effects of specialization on 
organizational performance is mediated by its environment (Carroll, 1985; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1983). Aligning with the work of Mukherjee, et al. (2012), the extent that an 
organization “ought” to be specialized is at least partially dictated by the environment in 
which it exists. Organizationally, this could mean that the services offered by a health 
department are those that address a need in the community served. 
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Routines. Finally, the concept of routines has been increasingly included as a key variable 
affecting organizational performance, adaptation, and capabilities (Aggarwal, Posen, and 
Workiewic, 2017; Winter, 2003). According to Nelson and Winter (1982), routines are 
the “continuity in the behavioral patterns” (pg. 96), having little variability (Perrow, 
1970), and potentially reflecting leadership efforts at coordinating individuals toward a 
goal or a bottom-up process of learning (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Miner, Ciuchta, and 
Gong, 2008; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Routines are commonly discussed regarding 
organizational performance and change in that one of the easiest ways to change is 
through adopting new routines that have been identified as legitimate by other 
organizations (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004). Yet, routines are often seen as 
inhibitors to organizational change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), as they are tied to the 
beliefs of individuals; and as ACF scholars have illustrated (e.g. Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993), these habits and beliefs are difficult to change, requiring more 
discontinuous, non-incremental change to force a reassessment of habits and beliefs.  
Authority and Power Relations. Another set of institutional factors that affect innovation 
is how authority and decision making are distributed among members (Damanpour and 
Schneider, 2006; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Scott and Mitchell, 1976). Traditionally, 
decision making authority takes place along a hierarchy, with authority increasing further 
up the hierarchy (Weber, 1946). Per Knott and Miller (1987), government hierarchies 
typically concentrate most of their power in the offices of elected officials, with authority 
distributed among members of the office (e.g. a city council or state executive board). 
However, organizations will vary how they distribute authority, and this variation affects 
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receptivity to change. How authority and decision making are distributed can be captured 
by understanding the extent to which an organization is centralized. 
Centralization. The effect of centralization on an organization’s innovativeness has been 
found to have mixed effects on its ability to change and innovate. Some research has 
shown that the greater the extent to which the organization is centralized, the lower the 
rates of innovation adoption (Damanpour, 1991). However, earlier work by Lawrence 
and Lorsch (1967) suggests that this is true for the number of proposals of innovations, 
but not necessarily for innovation adoptions. It is evident that the relationship between 
centralization and performance or innovativeness is multifaceted, being reliant on the 
environment in which the organization exists (Downs, 1967; Udy, 1965). Research has 
also shown that organizations in large urban areas with great geographic dispersion and 
diverse activities can struggle to operate effectively (Knott and Miller, 1987; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967).  
For health departments in particular, Mukherjee, et al. (2010) found that 
organizations in urban environments provided services more efficiently when the 
organization was more decentralized. This aligns with classic works in organization 
theory that argue whether an organization performed better under centralized or 
decentralized structures was dependent on the stability of the external environment 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) and complexity of the organization (Udy, 1965). More 
complex and differentiated organizations, due to the need for regulating internal 
relationships and managing factions, have a greater need for routinization and 
standardization (Udy, 1965). Thus, unstable environments tend to be more conducive to 
decentralized structures, because rapidly changing external environments necessitate a 
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higher level of interaction with the organization’s members, requiring the organization to 
rely on more informal processes and structures to manage such interactions (Downs, 
1967). This can hinder an organization’s ability to innovate (Kastelic, 1967) and implies 
that centralized structures, without informal, horizontal communication flows will have 
both coordination and knowledge sharing difficulties (Tsai, 2002). According to Nohria 
and Gulati (1996), these difficulties that come from centralized structures are unlikely to 
provide the organization with enough slack to be innovative, or are the result of the 
inability of centralized structures to respond most appropriately to specific needs without 
affecting other units too extensively (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).  
Resources. The resources that an organization has determine its capability to act (Mays, 
et al., 2006) and not having the appropriate resources presents a major obstacle for 
organizational change (Gersick, 1991). The most basic resources to an organization are 
its personnel and funding sources (Hall and Tolbert, 2005; Mays, 2006). Regarding 
employees, the findings have not been consistent. Organizations with greater numbers of 
FTEs have been shown to be less effective than those organizations with a smaller FTE 
workforce (Lee and Whitford, 2012), and specific to health, are more likely to struggle to 
perform basic health functions (Mays, et al., 2006) and have lower rates of innovation 
(Damanpour, 1992). Blau (1970) suggests that such difficulties are a product of 
communication and coordination difficulties that arise with a larger number of employees 
to organize. Conversely, organizations with larger FTEs have been found to not only be 
more innovative (Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981), but also to have stronger financial 
capabilities (Judge, 1994) and more open attitudes toward innovation (Damanpour and 
Schneider, 2009). So, the effect of FTE resources is contingent on other factors.  
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In terms of funding, both the locus of funding and financial investments matter for 
organizational performance and innovative behavior. Financial resources are one of the 
more robust predictors of organizational performance (Gordon, Gorzoff, and Richards, 
1997; Lee and Whitford, 2012; Provan and Milward, 1995), with slack resources often 
encouraging more innovative behavior (Nohria and Ghulati, 1996). However, the 
influence of funding is not uniform. Regarding locus of funding, organizations tend to be 
more sensitive to changes in funding from more local sources than higher levels of 
funding, such as the federal government (Mukherjee, Santerre, and Zhang, 2010). This is 
likely due to more local sources of funding allowing for more flexibility in how the 
funding is used. Regarding financial investments, an organization’s expenditures are also 
relevant for its capacity in being able to function and adapt to changes in the 
environment. An organization can more easily adopt and adapt to change when it has 
already invested resources and effort in that particular issue, likely already having 
established a niche, authority, and knowledge on the given issue (Shipan and Volden, 
2006).  
Given that government has different dimensions to it, and there are a variety of 
factors that enable innovation, I ask the following research questions (RQ): 
RQ 1: Will structural components will matter more for organizational change than policy 
change? 




RQ 1b: Will fs/QCA patterns will consistently include decentralized organizations as a 
contributing factor to change? 
RQ 1c: Will those jurisdictions with existing efforts in the health issue in question be 
more likely to adopt a relevant policy and organizational change post intervention? 
RQ 1d: Will policy and organizational change both be more likely in less centralized 
vertical relationships? 
RQ 1e: Will policy and organizational change both be more dependent on large amounts 
of resources (FTEs)? 
RQ 2: Will external components, like having a need for change, matter more for policy 
change than organizational change? 
Change in a Multilevel System.  
As stated above, organizations do not exist in isolation. Particularly in a federalist 
system, the change and adoption decisions of organizations is often contingent on the 
decisions of other organizations. Therefore, it is important to at least briefly describe how 
organizations influence each other’s decisions in order to better understand and 
contextualize any innovative behavior (Battilana and Casciaro, 2012). How organizations 
affect adoption decisions is captured by diffusion, isomorphism, and federalism 
literatures. 
Horizontal Mechanisms of Change. For decades, scholars have noted a diffusion of 
ideas across organizations (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Shipan and Volden 2008). 
Rogers (1983) defined diffusion as the “process by which an innovation is communicated 
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through certain channels over time among the members of a social system (pg. 5). The 
“normative” starting point is the idea that autonomous entities work as policy laboratories 
in which new ideas are developed and spread across the country (Gilardi and Fuglister, 
2008), thereby permitting the spread of best practices (Fuglister, 2011). 
Diffusion and Isomorphism Mechanisms. Building from the observation of Walker 
(1969) that some states tend to be leaders in innovation adoptions, Berry and Berry 
(1990) identified five mechanisms of diffusion that drive states to innovate: coercion, 
normative, mimesis, learning, and competition. Here, scholars have largely built on the 
seminal works of DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991), who identified three different 
factors that drive organizations to become more isomorphic over time: coercive, mimetic, 
and normative pressures. 
In situations of coercion, organizations may adopt a policy due to pressure from 
other organizations or actors who either control critical resources (Bridges and Villemez, 
1991) or have authority over the organization (Provan, 1987). Here, rules for conforming 
may be set with either rewards or sanctions to incentivize certain actions (Fligstein, 
1985), such as through grants or financial assistance (Derthick, 1970). This is different 
from an alternative normative pressure, where organizations may also adopt a policy 
when certain adoptions become the norm (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002). This 
is especially relevant for public organizations (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004; Jun and 
Weare, 2012), who rely on being politically legitimate in the eyes of their constituents 
and fellow organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004; 
Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Still, an organization may also innovate to mimic other 
organizations (Berry and Berry, 1990) or learn what ideas to adopt on the basis of 
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successful and failed innovations of others (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Volden, 2016; 
Volden and Shipan, 2008). 
Given that a variety of factors in a federalist system affect innovation adoption 
decisions, I ask: 
RQ 3: Will policy and organizational changes be driven by different motivations to 
change/innovate? 
Diffusion over Time. Recall that Rogers (1983) defined diffusion as “the process by 
which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
members of a social system” (pg. 5, emphasis mine). According to Berry and Berry 
(2014), the mechanisms described above (learning, coercion, normative pressures, 
mimesis, and competition) do not have uniform effects over time, where the rate of 
diffusion varies. For example, the onset of an innovation is likely to have few adopters, 
but a significant increase in adopters as the results of the adoption are realized by early 
adopters. Eventually, the rate of adoptions slows, primarily leaving only late adopters to 
innovate. The key assumption is that because these entities interact with each other, as the 
number of adopters increases, so too does the probability of adoptions for other entities 
(Berry and Berry, 2014). However, depending on their status quo and timing of adoption, 
leading and “lagging” organizations face different motivations for adopting a new policy 
at different points in time (Kennedy and Fiss, 2009; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).  
Given that the effects of factors that influence innovation adoption are not 
uniform over time, I ask: 
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RQ 4: Will the factors that drive adoption for policy and organizational change vary over 
time? 
Vertical Mechanisms of Policy Change. The vast majority of this literature on how 
policy adoptions diffuse is among horizontal relations of organizations, such as one state 
government influencing another state government. However, we do know that there 
exists another relationship among organizations – a vertical, hierarchical relationship 
among organizations across different levels of government.1 Federalism brings with it a 
natural tendency toward change due to the evolving and sometimes dependent 
relationships among organizations in the different levels (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; 
Scheberle, 1997). Thus, changes in one level of an organization would expectedly bring 
about change in other levels. Literature has pointed to two vertical change adoption 
diffusion mechanisms: change via bottom-up and top-down scenarios.  
Bottom-Up Change. The literature provides both explicit and implicit reasons for why 
bottom-up innovation diffusion can and does occur. These include the structure of the 
U.S. federalist system, local political agendas and values, and local fiscal concerns. 
Regarding structure, the very design of the federalist structure has bottom up tendencies 
(Balla, 2001; Kettl, 2016; and Sugiyama, 2011). As discussed by Sugiyama (2011), such 
tendencies affect how citizens interact with their government, as a decentralized structure 
                                                             
1 Though we have recognitions of such vertical diffusion effects (e.g. Kollman, Miller, and Page, 1998; 
Welch and Thompson, 1980), this type of diffusion is much less developed in terms of theory. Few studies 
explicitly examine the vertical diffusion of decision adoptions. Importantly, top-down and bottom-up 
diffusion theories have been formed, but these mostly exist within the policy implementation literature (e.g. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980). Because adoption is distinct from implementation, implementation 
theories will thus be intentionally excluded from this discussion. 
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allows for a competitive policy environment where “citizens have learned to make 
demands for their social and economic rights”. 
Balla (2001) and Kettl (2016) refer to the concept of “devolution”, where lower 
levels of government are given more leeway and opportunity to develop and implement 
innovative solutions to problems. Kettl (2016) explicitly argues that this is because more 
of the work of the federal government is being carried out by local entities. Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993) add that with recent national financial uncertainty, the federal 
government is also less willing to “assume the burden for problems” (pg. 219), leaving 
much of the work for state and local governments. Here, local or state governments may 
serve as experiments for the federal government (Mossberger 1999; Weissert and 
Scheller 2008), where the success or failures of lower levels provide learning 
opportunities for a higher level of government. So, being “laboratories for democracy” 
for the federal government (Brandeis, 1932), the federalist structure can be a 
“marketplace of ideas” (Oates, 1999). 
With respect to political agendas and values, Gamkhar and Pickerill (2012) argue 
that local governments may just simply take the lead (Kettl, 2016; Gamkhar and Pickerill, 
2012), being incentivized by the federal government (Kettl, 2016; Kollman, Miller, and 
Page, 1998; Welch and Thompson, 1980), or, in being concerned about “federal debt, 
partisan politics, and legislative gridlock”, local governments do not rely on federal 
efforts to impact their communities (Gamkhar and Pickerill, 2012). Also, many local or 
state efforts can rise in opposition to federal initiatives (Engel, 2006; Gamkhar and 
Pickerill, 2012; Nicholson-Crotty, 2012; Reich and Barth, 2012).  
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Adoption decisions in a bottom-up context, then, are primarily based on two 
factors: learning (Brandeis, 1932; Shipan and Volden, 2006), if the issue was already on 
the legislative agenda (Shipan and Volden, 2006), and collectivity of action both 
informing higher level governments of salient issues and pressuring those governments to 
act (Fisher, 2012; V. Ostrom, 1994). 
Top-Down Change. As with bottom-up diffusion, there are multiple reasons to expect a 
top-down change across levels. First, and perhaps most obviously, higher levels have 
formal and informal authority to mandate certain actions or incentivize state and local 
governments to adopt certain policies (Clark and Whitford, 2011; Gramkhar and 
Pickerill, 2012; Siguyama, 2011). Second, Vincent Ostrom (1994) argues that when local 
jurisdictions are unable to mobilize the appropriate resources, higher levels of 
government may be more capable of providing a solution. Third, higher levels of 
government may also be involved when local efforts become engrossed in conflict or 
legal disputes (e.g. Colgrove, 2011). Fourth, the attention of the federal government to an 
issue can stimulate top-down diffusion (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Boushey, 2012; 
Clouser, McCann, Shipan, and Volden, 2015) by focusing attention on issues that are 
most relevant (Boushey, 2012), therefore guiding the agendas of local politicians and 
giving entrepreneurs an opportunity to influence agenda setting (Mintrom 1997). 
From this existing research, I ask: 




RQ 5a: Will the fs/QCA patterns regarding policy change will be stronger for top-down 
change (patterns with higher unique coverages), while patterns regarding organizational 
change be stronger for bottom-up change (patterns with higher unique coverages)? 
Further, because the levels of government perform different tasks with regard to 
health, I finally ask: 
RQ 6: Will level of government be matter for whether the change is a policy or 
organizational change?   
RQ 6a: Will local level governments be more likely to make organizational changes, 
while state governments are more likely to make policy changes? 
RQ 6b: Will fs/QCA patterns regarding policy change be stronger for states (patterns 
with higher unique coverages), while fs/QCA patterns for administration services change 











CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY. 
The purpose of this research is to understand how public policy changes relate to 
organizational changes in multilevel systems, looking specifically at how (if at all) 
organizational change processes are similar or different than policy change processes. As 
stated above, government is complex and there is not one best way to structure (Lee and 
Whitford, 2012). So, to best capture the complexity of government and to tease out when 
the government innovates in terms of policy as opposed to organizationally, the 
methodology for this research was selected in order to account for the nuance and 
context-specific nature of change. The structure of the methodology consists of two main 
sections: Top-Down and Bottom-Up cases. Within each of these scenarios, the 
relationship between the policymaking and structural dimensions of government is 
examined using two methods. The first employs a logistic regression technique that 
assesses the processes of policy and organizational change over time and across different 
levels of government. The second addresses the question of “under what conditions does 
change occur”. Using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), this analytical component 
assesses if the conditions under which change occurred varied for top-down and bottom-
up change. This allows for more nuance into the relationships identified by the logits by 
enabling us to find the different patterns in how the groups of variables relate to each 
other. The analytical outline is shown below in Figure 3 and described in the subsections 
below. Because the two analyses use the same data and variables, I first present 
information on data collecting procedures and subsequent coding. I follow this up with 





                  Figure 3: Analysis Outline. 
 
 
Data Sources and Collection.  
Within each top-down and bottom-up case study, the two different analyses for 
understanding the different dimensions of government use the same data. There are three 
units of analysis for this study: federal, state, and local health departments. For these 
three levels, both policymaking and organizational structure data were collected. For 
policymaking, data was manually collected from each government’s website. For each 
entity, I pulled all relevant ordinances that dealt with the health issue at hand that had 
passed through the legislative body. For states, this body was the legislative branch of the 
state government. For cities and counties, this body was the city/county council. In a few 
cases, the board of health (or equivalent group) had authority to pass laws for the 
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In multilevel systems, policy innovations can be the result of different types of 
relationships among organizations (Scheberle, 1997), though here, my interest is in 
voluntary compliance, where the adoption of policies or a change in structure is not 
mandated by another organization. On a local level, because jurisdictions can be 
governed by a city, county, or both, I made an assumption regarding the policies 
governing an area: if a jurisdiction was covered by the effects of either a county or major 
city in the county, then the other, likely being fully or mostly covered by the other’s 
ruling, has less incentive to pass a similar policy. Thus, if the organization in the dataset 
was a city health department who had not passed a certain health policy, but the county in 
which the city existed had passed the health policy, then I considered that city to have 
“passed” a health policy because that jurisdiction was already covered (or largely 
covered). I conducted a sensitivity analysis where I removed this assumption and then 
performed the logit analyses. The results largely held. Appendix A shows the results of 
this analysis.  
I created specific criteria for what was deemed a relevant policy. For the top-
down case of HIV prevention, HIV policies were considered those that met two criteria: 
1) the policy dealt only with HIV, targeting the disease specifically. For example, a 
policy passed that addressed HIV alongside other STDs was excluded from analysis. One 
exception to this rule was if an amendment was made to an existing ordinance that added 
HIV to a list of other diseases covered by a particular law; and 2) the policy made 
substantial changes to how HIV services were carried out, conducted, etc. In other words, 
policies/amendments passed that were non-substantial in nature (e.g. a word change) 
were not considered HIV policies.  
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Organizationally, while the federal data was manually collected from the CDC 
website and publications, both the state and local data came from a series of surveys. The 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) gathered state level data 
for four different time periods: 2007, 2010, 2012, and 2016. The local data was collected 
from the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) in five 
different years: 2005, 2008, 2010, 2013, and 2016. The ASTHO and NACCHO data 
provide information on the structure, functions, operations, and finances of each 
organization. Table 1 below shows the details of the survey responses. For feasibility 
purposes, the sample size for the fs/QCA analyses will be limited to large sized cities. 
Though there is no consistent measure of a “large” city, this study will consider a large 
city to have a minimum of 400,000 individuals in the health department’s jurisdiction, a 
minimum population that the Big City Health Coalition (BCHC) set for BCHC 
membership. This reduces the sample size of local health departments to roughly 160 for 






















2007 100 50 48 
2010 100 50 50 
2012 96 50 48 
2016 98 50 49 
Local Survey    
2005 80 2,300  161 
2008 83 2,332  159 
2010 82 2,107  160 
2013 79 2,532 157 
2016 76 2,533 159 
*ASTHO data includes territories and DC. This table reflects 





Variables for Analysis.  
Table 3 below outlines each variable, providing descriptions and coding 
specifications2. Importantly, the nature of the logit and QCA analyses vary greatly and 
thus often required very different coding schemes. Regarding policy adoptions, the logit 
                                                             
2 Importantly, from the vast literature on change and innovation that spans different disciplines and sub-
disciplines, the variables used in this research intentionally exclude those not traditionally and commonly 
used in organization theory, such as political factors (e.g. political party), and those due to data 
limitations, such as advocacy and interest groups.  
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dependent variable and QCA outcome are binary indicating whether policies were 
adopted post-intervention year. For organizational changes (activities performed), the 
dependent variable and QCA outcome are also binary, telling whether changes were 
made regarding HIV or cardiovascular disease screening/coronary heart disease 
treatment. Data across all years for units of state and local governments were coded based 
on whether the department performed the activity itself, contracted out the activity, or did 
not perform it at all. For HIV, changes could have been made regarding screening and/or 
treatment, while for coronary heart disease, changes could have been made regarding 
treatment. Each health department was observed to see any changes across these 
categories (directly performed, contracted out, or did not perform). So, just as a switch 
from not performing a health activity to directly performing was considered a change, so 
to was directly performing to not performing at all. The rationale for this coding is that 
there could be a multitude of reasons for why an organization could make the change that 
it does. Thus, because the data did not lend to an understanding of why each organization 
changed the way that it did, I considered any change to be an organizational innovation, 
being as agnostic as possible and making no assumptions about rationale.  
For the top-down case of HIV prevention, the activities observed were how the 
department performed HIV screenings and treatment services. For the bottom-up case of 
trans-fat restrictions, the activities observed were coronary heart disease treatment 
services. Coronary heart disease, a primary purpose the trans-fat bans, can be treated in a 
variety of ways (Stewart, Manmathan, Wilkinson, 2017) and can directly improve 
symptoms and reduce worsening of condition (www.mayoclinic.org). Because federal 
government data is manually collected on the different activities, it does not cleanly fall 
42 
 
into one of these categories. As such, the CDC’s financial investment in various activities 
will act as a proxy for their efforts across various health initiatives. With the federal 
government being only one case, the changes at this level are described separately. 
The logit independent variables and QCA conditions were derived from the 
literature review. Thus, the variables that affect organizational change are its structural 
characteristics (as determined by its centralization and specialization) and its resources 
(as measured by its per capita expenditures and personnel). Centralization determines the 
locus of decision-making and control for state and local governments. Centralized 
governments are those where the states retain direct control over the activities and 
decisions of the local health departments in the states; and decentralized governments are 
those where the states and local governments are largely independent of each other, being 
able to make their own decisions (Salinsky 2010). Specialization refers to how many 
activities the government performs, measuring the extent of their focus on a variety of 
health issues. Per capita expenditures are used as a proxy for resource capacity. Because 
revenues were not able to be gathered for all of the organizations from the surveys, it was 
assumed that the total amount of health expenditures were generally indicative of what 
the organization was able to spend. Finally, personnel were used as a measure of the 
organization’s resources (e.g. Mays, 2006), as they are critical to carrying out the 
functions and goals of the organization. 
In addition, I controlled for “need” for innovation and existing efforts to address 
that need. For the top-down case, need is operationalized as HIV diagnoses for every 
100,000 people; and for the bottom-up case, this is operationalized as the number of 
deaths caused by coronary heart disease for every 100,000 people. To control for the 
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agenda of each organization (recent activity addressing either HIV or coronary heart 
disease), I created a dummy variable indicating whether the organization had made policy 
or organizational changes in the decade prior to the intervention. Finally, for the logit 
analyses, I controlled for whether the government had passed a policy (for policy change) 
or had made a health service/activity change (organizational change) prior to the 
intervention year. For the QCAs, this variable was not included. QCA does not “control” 
for variables like regression methods (Ragin, 2008), and it is most appropriate to include 
only those variables, or conditions, in the analysis that occur or exist in the same period. 
The logit independent variables are a mix of both binary dummy variables and 
count variables. Count variables include the disease prevalence, total FTE, and per capita 
health expenditures from each government. Binary variables include the centralized or 
decentralized decision-making relationship between states and local health departments 
(whether local health departments are a unit of state government or local government), 
and whether there are previous policy efforts for a particular health issue. Regarding the 
unit of government, due to limited sample sizes (e.g. only 50 states), mostly at a state 
level, data were merged into one dataset, and analyses included this dummy variable 
indicating whether the organization was a state or local entity. This made all analyses 
more robust and reliable. For the centralization variable, though not necessarily reflecting 
how one organization operates and makes decisions, this variable is critical for 
understanding how health decisions are made (Salinsky, 2010) 
The nature of QCA (described in more detail below) demands that all conditions 
are coded between 0 and 1. The condition centralization, like with the logit, is binary, 
being a unit of the state government or not; and, also like the logit, the degree of 
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specialization is coded as the percentage of the total activities that the government 
performs itself. These conditions did not have to be recoded differently than the 
independent variables in the logit analyses. The conditions that above were described as 
count variables (FTE, per capita expenditures, and disease prevalence), however, had to 
be recoded on the 0-1 scale. To recode these conditions for analysis, the raw data was 
categorized into quartiles and the top half of the quartiles were coded as 1, and the 
bottom half of the quartiles were coded as 0. These are also described below in Table 3. 















Table 3: Variable Descriptions 














Was there a 
change in disease 
service provided? 
 
Binary Variable – 
Coded 1 if changes in 
services were made 
post-intervention 
year and 0 for no 
changes. 
 
Coded 1 for a 
change and 0 for no 










to address the 
disease? 
 
Binary Variable – 
Coded 1 if changes in 
policies were passed 
post-intervention 
year and 0 for no 
policies passed. 
 
Coded as 1 if a 
policy passed post-
intervention year 
and 0 for no 
passage of a policy 
 
    












local or state 
government? 
Binary Variable – 
Coded 1 for local and 
0 for state 
government. 
N/A – analyses run 






How many HIV 





Count Variable – 
Number of HIV 
diagnoses per 




Coded 1 if the 
jurisdiction was in 
the top two 
quartiles of disease 
prevalence in the 
sample and coded 








Death Rate^  
 
What is the death 
rate per 100k of 
due to coronary 
heart disease?  
 
Count Variable – 
Number of coronary 
heart disease deaths 
per 100,000 people in 
jurisdiction. 
 
Coded 1 if the 
jurisdiction was in 
the top two 
quartiles of disease 
prevalence in the 
sample and coded 














Binary variable – 
Coded 1 for yes and 
0 for no. 
 






Has an activity 
change recently 





Binary variable – 
Coded 1 for yes and 










between a state 
and its local 
governments? 
 
Binary variable – 
coded 1 if local 
health department is 
a unit of the state 
health department 
and 0 if not. 
  
 
Coded 1 if local 
health department 
is a unit of the state 
health department 
and 0 if not. 
 
Specialization What proportion 





Coded as percentage 




percentage of total 
activities that the 
organization 
performs itself. 
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Count Variable – 
Number of FTEs 
 
Coded 1 if the 
jurisdiction was in 
the top two 
quartiles of FTEs in 
the sample, and 











Count Variable – Per 
capita expenditures 
from most recently 
completed fiscal year 
 
Coded 1 if the 
jurisdiction was in 
the top two 
quartiles of per 
capita health 
expenditures in the 
sample, and coded 
as 0 if in the bottom 
two quartiles. 
* Performed: organization performs directly or contracts out; **Not relevant for 
trans-fat restrictions; ^Not relevant for HIV case; ^^Not relevant for analysis of 















Table 4: Local Data Descriptives 
Conditions for 
Scaling 

















 2008 23% 36 
 2010 31% 49 
 2013 29% 45 















 2008 49% 159 
 2010 49% 160 
 2013 48% 157 









 2008 507  141 
 2010 489 153 
 2013 419  154 











 2008 $92.3 141 
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Table 4: Continued 
 2010 $78.1 153 
 2013 $ 71.9 154 
 2016 $ 62.3 
 
133 
HIV Diagnoses 2005 255 161 
 2008 248 159 
 2010 221 160 
 2013 187 157 










 2008 243 159 
 2010 220 160 
 2013 192 157 

























202 8% 36 
 2011-
2017 





14 9% 14 
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 2008 87 27 158 
 2010 91 26 158 
 2013 93 31 154 












 2008 37 22 158 
 2010 42 36 154 
 2013 41 22 153 














 2008 46 11 156 
 2010 39 10 154 
 2013 37 3 151 




Table 5: State Data Descriptives 
Conditions for 
Scaling 

































 2010  2,249 46 
 2012 2,020 47 
 2016 1,989  49 






 2010 $216.2 46 
 2012 $581.1 48 









 2010 46% 50 
 2012 42% 47 
 2016 42% 49 








Table 5: Continued 
 2010 842 50 
 2012 818 47 









 2010 220 50 
 2012 204 47 


































 2010 62 - 50 
 2012 64 80 47 












 2010 56 - 50 
 2012 31 71 48 















Table 5: Continued 
 2010 8 - 50 
 2012 8 17 48 


















    
- HIV Policies 1998-
2010 
168 78 39 
 2011-
2017 














*2007 ASTHO does not provide data on FTE allocations 
**2010 survey does not have “contracted out” option, only an “other”  
^2007 Total expenditure data not available 
 
Analyses.  
Within the top-down and bottom-up scenarios, policy and organizational changes 
are examined using two main analyses: logit modeling and QCA. Both methods use the 
variables/conditions described above. 
Analysis 1: How Do Policy and Organizational Changes Occur and Diffuse over 
Time? Using panel data, I tracked how policy and structural changes diffuse horizontally 
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and vertically across levels of government. Over time, I assessed differences in the 
factors that drive policy and structural changes.  
To do this, I tested a series of models to account for the distribution of my data. 
The dependent variables in this study, whether policies were passed and whether service 
changes were made regarding HIV and coronary heart disease, are binary variables. 
Being binary, the most appropriate and simplest model for analysis is a logit model. Logit 
modelling is a form of regression that models binary dependent variables. Here, the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the odds and can stretch from negative to 
positive infinity, but its probability stays between 0 and 1 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).  
Robustness Checks. However, these dependent variables, namely the policy change 
variable accounting for whether policies have been passed, have an excess number of 
zeros, or a vast number of jurisdictions that never passed a policy post-intervention. This 
gives my distribution a long right tail. Because of the large number of zeros and resulting 
over-dispersion, I employed models that account for this distribution, as a means of 
seeing how well the results of my logit models are upheld. These results can be found in 
Appendix A. 
For these analyses, I began each analysis by first conducting models meant to 
account for such dispersion. As recommended (stats.idre.ucla.edu), I first ran zero-
inflated models to account for the extra zeros in my data. The goal of zero-inflated 
models is to account for excess zero counts in the dependent variable. In total, two 
different types of zeros are estimated: the true zeros in the data and the excess zeros. This 
method thus has two parts: a Poisson count model and a logit model to predict the excess 
zeros. This model should be used when the conditional variance is not much greater than 
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the mean (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Negative binomial regression is specifically used 
when there is over-dispersed count data, or when the conditional variance is greater than 
the conditional mean. This method is a generalization of Poisson regression (having a 
similar mean structure), with the difference being that there is an extra parameter to 
model over-dispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). To test for model fit, a significant z 
score for the zero-inflated model indicates that the zero-inflated negative binomial model 
was preferred to an ordinary negative binomial. If an ordinary negative binomial model 
was run, then the next step was to look at the chi-square statistic. An insignificant chi-
square indicated that a normal Poisson model was most appropriate (stats.idre.ucla.edu). 
Table 6 below shows the results of these robustness tests and the method for each model. 
Ultimately, these tests suggested that in all but one case, an ordinary Poisson model was 
most appropriate to run, with one case holding that a negative binomial regression model 
ought to be used. Importantly, across all models (zero-inflated negative binomial, 
negative binomial regression, and Poisson models) all results presented in the following 
section were upheld, indicating a consistency of the data. Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix shows the differences between these models and the main Logit models 
described above. 
 
Table 6: Robustness Check Model Specifications 
 Models 










Analysis 2: Under What Conditions Does Change Occur for Policy and 
Organizational Dimensions of Government? This analysis was conducted using a 
series of qualitative comparative analyses (QCAs). The QCAs determined the conditions 
under which change occurred after top-down and bottom-up health initiatives were first 
established. As with any kind of change (individual or inter-organizational change), it is 
important to understand why organizations are innovative and the conditions that enable 
them to innovate, such as by adopting policies or adjusting organizational strategies. 
QCA techniques belong to the so-called set-theoretic methods family. Set-
theoretic methods are distinct from other methods in that they examine phenomena using 
sets, looking for relations among the components of sets. Relying on Boolean algebra and 
set theory, QCA examines the relationships of variables (called conditions) in a given set 
of conditions among a variety of cases. Across these cases, QCA is not interested in the 
correlations of individual conditions, as in regression, but rather on the relationships 
among the conditions in each of the cases. Thus, the method identifies how these 
different conditions in the sets combine to form multiple causal configurations that 
produce an outcome. QCA is an appropriate method for this research because, consistent 
with the complexity of government, it pays attention to various pathways that can lead to 
a single outcome. 
Table 7 presents two different configurations that led to a passage of policy in a 
sample population. The first result holds that the presence of condition A and the absence 
of condition B and the absence of condition C and the presence of condition D contribute 
to a passage of policy. However, the sets of conditions across the cases combined in 
another pattern to also lead to the same outcome. The second solution holds that the 
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absence of A and the presence of B and the absence of C and the presence of D contribute 
to a passage of policy. Overall, both configurations are well represented across our cases 
(as seen in the solution consistency) and explain a passage of policy well (as indicated by 
the solution coverage). Individually, though, the two different combinations are not 
equal. Typically, we look at the unique coverage scores to indicate which configuration 
best explains the outcome (a passage of policy). This example shows that the first 
combination has a unique coverage score of 0.23, which is higher than the 0.17 coverage 
score of the second combination. Therefore, the first solution is considered the stronger 



















   A  *    ~B   *   ~C    * 
    
D   0.29 0.23 0.89 
       
 ~A    *      B    *   ~C    * 
    
D   0.19 0.17 1.00 
Solution coverage:        0.69 
 











This method is similar to regression techniques, like the logit above, in that QCA 
works by determining whether different variables (conditions) lead to variability in a 
dependent variable (outcome). However, the method differs fundamentally from 
regression analyses. Primarily, in regression, we isolate the effects of independent 
variables on a dependent variable while holding constant the average value of the other 
independent variables; but in QCA, we assess the combinations of all the conditions 
simultaneously in a particular set of conditions that consistently appear or do not appear 
together that lead to a specific outcome. Thus, a QCA never assumes that the effect of 
one condition is the same across all cases, rather it is the presence or absence of that 
condition in conjunction with the other conditions among the different cases that leads to 
an outcome. This allows the researcher to gain a more nuanced look into why and how 
change occurs because we can evaluate all of the different possible combinations of 
conditions that lead to a top-down or bottom-up change (Ragin, 1987).  
However, the different combinations of conditions are not equally strong in 
leading to the outcome of interest (passing a policy). Two components of QCA output 
indicate goodness of fit: solution consistency and solution coverage. The strength of the 
combinations is determined by the QCA’s solution consistency, equivalent to 
regression’s p-value. Consistency indicates the proportion of cases with the causal 
conditions that have the outcome of interest. The solution coverage, however, determines 
how well the set of conditions explain the outcome of interest, similar to an R^2 value in 
regression (Thygeson, et al. 2012). This is the proportion of cases exhibiting the outcome 
that can be explained by the combinations of conditions. Given that its focus on finding 
multiple pathways to an outcome, QCA calculates both the total coverage and 
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consistency scores for all pathways, as well as unique coverage and consistency for each 
path. For example, Table 7 above presents an example fs/QCA output. 
Performing an Fs/QCA. Centered on sets of conditions, an application of QCA 
techniques begins with the operationalization and calibration of sets. This early step is 
driven by a theoretical understanding of the conditions relevant to the outcome of interest 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Each condition is numerically coded to the extent to 
which it belongs in a given set of conditions that explain the outcome. A condition’s 
membership in a given set can be dichotomous, meaning the variable is in the set or it is 
not (referred to as a crisp set), or the condition exists in degrees of membership (known 
as a fuzzy set) (Ragin, 1987). Crisp sets have conditions coded as either 0 (not in the set) 
or 1 (in the set), while fuzzy sets have conditions that that are coded as values between 0 
and 1, inclusive (Ragin, 2008). For example, a crisp set could be an organization that has 
a male leader (coded as 1) or it does not (coded as 0); a fuzzy set could be the proportion 
of activities that an organization directly performs itself out of its total activities, giving 
the condition a value between 0 and 1. Table 8 below indicates Ragin’s (2000) 








Table 8: Set Membership Codes 
1.00 = fully in 
   0.80 = mostly in 
              0.60 = more in than out 
              0.40 = more out than in 
     0.20 = mostly out 
 0.00 = fully out 
Source: Ragin (2008) 
 
 
After the conditions are coded, truth tables are created for each case based on the 
coding of each condition. The truth table shows the possible combinations of the presence 
or absence of each condition (Marr, 2012). All truth tables for this analysis are in 
Appendices B and C. Once the truth table is created, decisions are made regarding 
thresholds for patterns. The first threshold to select is the frequency threshold. This 
threshold sets the standard for the number of cases with at least 0.5 membership in each 
configuration of conditions. I selected the recommended threshold of 1 case for all of the 
QCAs conducted. The second threshold to select is the consistency threshold, which is 
the proportion of cases that exhibit a particular pattern of conditions. For all of the QCAs 
selected in this research, I selected the recommended minimum threshold of 0.75 (Ragin, 
2008). The final step is to test for necessary and sufficient conditions. Necessary 
conditions are those conditions that are always present when the outcome occurs. 
Sufficient conditions that explain the outcome are those where the outcome always 
occurs if the condition is present, even if the outcome occurs under different conditions 
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(Manuel and Verissimo, 2016). This provides more nuance into the relationships between 
the conditions and the outcome.  
Fs/QCA in This Study. Two different sets of QCAs will be run for each year post 
intervention year. For example, Winnable Battles was established in 2010; so, the sets of 
QCAs will be conducted for each year of data following 2010. For local health 
departments and state health departments, all of the data is from the associated surveys, 
providing total sample sizes of roughly 2,000 LHDs and all 50 states. Because the federal 
government represents only one case, a QCA cannot be performed on this level alone. I 
will attempt to compensate for this limitation by manually observing changes in federal 













Table 9: Fs/QCA Analyses 

































Fs/QCA Limitations and Robustness Checks. Although Ragin (1987) initially intended 
this method to be for small and medium sample sizes, some scholars argue that QCA is 
appropriate for large sample sizes if theoretical arguments are expressed in set-theoretic 
terms (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). As such, QCA is being used more frequently as 
a method for medium and large samples (e.g. Fiss 2011; Ragin and Fiss 2008; Vis 2012). 
A critical challenge for using fs/QCA for large-n analyses is that with a large sample, the 
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researcher loses the ability to be “case-oriented”, meaning that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to discuss specific cases of successful condition configurations. This suggests 
that measurement errors in coding of cases are more likely (Fiss, Sharapov, and 
Cronqvist, 2013). However, other scholars have suggested that such limitations can be 
adjusted for with robustness checks (e.g. Skaaning, 2011). Skaaning (2011) suggests that 
the robustness of the analysis can be determined by adjusting the consistency and 
frequency thresholds and coding calibrations and re-running the analyses to check for 
uniformity of results. The threshold is important because it indicates how consistently a 
specific combination leads to the outcome of interest. Because no hard threshold has been 
established for QCA, the analyses here will be conducted using a threshold of roughly 
0.75. The robustness check will use higher thresholds (0.8 and 0.9) to see if patterns hold. 
Emmenegger, Schraff, and Walter (2014) additionally propose that the random deletion 
of “shares of cases” acts as a sufficient check as well. The results largely held, with the 
only exception being a reduced number of configurations identified. This indicates a 










CHAPTER 5: TOP-DOWN CHANGE RESULTS 
With this study I sought to better understand how the different dimensions of 
government relate to each other by analyzing how public policy changes are similar to 
organizational changes in multilevel systems. To answer this question, I used two 
different analyses: logistic regression models and QCA. Both analyses were conducted 
identically for a case of top-down change and bottom-up change. This chapter is thus 
divided into two main sections: the top-down scenario and bottom-up scenario. The 
following discussion chapter reconciles the findings of both. 
Overall, in assessing government complexity in the top-down case, I find that the 
two different functions of government are largely distinct, meaning whether a 
government innovates in terms of policy or activity changes is determined by different 
factors. So, it is likely that different contexts and scenarios make one form of innovations 
more feasible or plausible. These results are described in more detail below in the 
subsections regarding each analysis. 
Descriptive Results.  
The descriptive results provide indication that both policy and organizational 
(activities performed) changes were made across state and local levels of government 
after the intervention. Policies were passed post-intervention by both state and local 
governments who had activity prior to the intervention and those who did not; and 
organizationally, there were jumps in services provided around post-intervention years at 
both levels of government. However, policy and organizational innovations did not 
always simultaneously occur. 
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The top-down case of HIV prevention was initiated by the CDC program 
Winnable Battles in 2010. States overall were more active in passing policies in this 
scenario, as not even 10% of local governments passed policies post-intervention, with a 
fairly even distribution of policies passed over the years post-2010. Organizationally, the 
number of state and local governments performing activities with to HIV screening and 
treatment services varied (Tables 4 and 5). However, despite the varying levels of 
government, the trends for changes made organizationally were similar across both state 
and local levels. For organizational activities regarding HIV, the activities of state and 
local governments are opposite than those of policy changes. Local governments were 
much more active in performing HIV screening and treatment activities. This aligns with 
what we know about the roles of state and local health departments, where local health 
departments are more connected to their communities, playing more of a front-line and 
direct role with the services that they provide (CDC, 2013). Despite the fact that LHDs 
are more active in the services they provide, both state and local governments exhibited 
similar descriptive trends, where beginning in 2010 (the start of Winnable Battles 
initiative), more of both state and local governments directly performed HIV screenings 
and treatment services. With the exception of HIV treatment services provided by states, 
this increase in the number of governments providing HIV services largely held in the 
years following 2010.  
Because this research was attempting to capture and understand the complexity of 
government, I cross-tabulated the data to understand how these two types of innovations 
co-occurred. Table 10 shows crosstabs of the top-down case. The results illustrate that 
often times when a jurisdiction did pass a policy, there was no change in services 
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adopted; and likewise, when an administration change to HIV was adopted, there was not 
always a policy adopted by that same jurisdiction. On a surface level, this suggests that 
policy and organizational change are not necessarily stemming from each other. Table 11 
adds to this story by showing how policy adoptions and organizational changes are 
significantly different than each other. Thus, like the crosstabs showed, organizations that 
adopt policy changes are not necessarily those that adopt organizational changes. This 
also potentially indicates that organizational and policy changes do not necessarily co-
occur. This begs the question addressed by the following analyses: how do policy change 
and organizational change differ? Who is adopting one compared to the other? What 













Table 10: Top-Down CrossTabs 
HIV Policies 
Passed 
Changes in HIV Screenings and Treatments Performed Total 
 0 1 2 3  
0 230 96 21 2 349 
1 21 3 2 2 28 
2 5 6 1 0 12 
3 1 0 1 0 2 
4 2 0 0 0 2 
5 0 1 0 0 1 
6 0 1 0 0 1 
8 0 0 1 0 1 
10 0 1 0 0 1 
17 1 0 0 0 1 
25 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 261 108 26 4 399 
 
Table 11: HIV Top-Down T-Test 




0.35 0.02 0.48 0.30 – 0.40 
HIV Policy Adoption 0.15 0.02 0.36 0.12 – 0.19 
Difference 0.19 0.03 0.59 0.14 – 0.25 







Logit Modelling Results.  
Following the descriptive results, I conducted logit analyses to understand the 
factors that drive policy and organizational innovations, and I had two main groups of 
models: top-down policy change and top-down activity change. In each of these 
categories, I ran an overall analysis (looking at all policy changes or all activity changes 
over all post-intervention years combined) and analyses for each individual year of data 
post-intervention year for comparison of change over time. Two overarching findings 
appeared from the logits: 1) policy and organizational changes are not always driven by 
the same factors; and 2) the factors that drive policy and organizational changes vary over 
time, though they do not become more uniform. 
Policy Change. Top-down policy change was driven by two characteristics (Table 12): 
centralization and FTEs. The significance of FTEs (p<.01) suggests that responding to 
top-down initiatives requires some form of capacity to actually adjust, such as having the 
required personnel. Regarding centralization, the results showed that state and local 
governments in decentralized relationships were significantly more likely to pass HIV 
policies after the 2010 CDC intervention. Over time, this effect became stronger, not 
being significant until 2016, indicating no generalizable difference between centralized 
and decentralized relationships early on; but organizations in decentralized relationships 
were more likely be able to respond to federal initiatives politically in later years. 
Interestingly, the effect of the current legislative agenda was not indicative of 
whether a policy was passed post-intervention. So, state and local governments with and 
without HIV on their recent legislative agendas were both responding to the top-down 
call for attention to HIV. Also, top-down policy change was not driven by level of 
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government. In other words, a federal initiative was not significantly influenced by the 
adopting organization being either a state or local government. The coefficient on 
government type was negative in 2013, but positive in 2016, indicating that state 
governments were more likely to be adopting HIV policies in early years, and local 
governments in later years; but these variables were insignificant. So, overall, top-down 
policy responses are not necessarily driven by one level of government. Further, need 
was not predictive of policy adoptions. Governments were responding to the initiative 
regardless of whether they had a high HIV prevalence. These findings could speak to the 
authoritative nature of top-down change, able to penetrate multiple levels of government, 
regardless of agenda and need. (Kettl, 2016; Ostrom,V., 1994).3 
 
Table 12: HIV Policies Passed 
 All Years 2013 2016 
        
Centralization       -0.63*   -0.23         -2.08** 
Local Government       -0.40   -1.09  0.39 
Specialization       -0.31   -1.46  2.43 
HIV Diagnoses Per 100k        0.00    0.01  0.02 
FTE         0.00**        0.00*          0.00* 
Per Capita Health Expenditures        0.00        0.01 -0.00 
Policies Passed Pre-Intervention        1.10   1.03  1.52 
Constant       -2.12*      -1.06   -4.37* 
    
Observations 308 170 138 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
                                                             
3 The results of the sensitivity analysis where the assumption regarding policy adoptions being counted 
for both cities and counties in the dataset was excluded can be found in Appendix A. The results aligned 
well with Table 12, with level of government being added as a significant factor. 
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Organizational Change. Similar to policy change was the effect of centralization. 
Organizations in decentralized relationships were more likely to adopt HIV policies post 
intervention. This may be due to a lowered span of control, and therefore lowered 
complexity, enabling more decentralized organizations to be innovative than those with 
more bureaucracy in place. Like above, this effect also got stronger over time. 
However, unlike policy change, trends in organizational change are largely 
different than policy changes in that these relevant structural factors vary depending on 
level of government. This is not surprising given that these service changes are actual 
changes made to the structure and operations of governments; and it aligns with existing 
theory that change, especially for lower levels of government, are highly dependent on 
institutional factors (Clouser, et al., 2015). Changes in HIV services were significantly 
affected by whether the government had made HIV service changes in recent years prior 
to the intervention (p<.05) (Table 13). This could make HIV innovations less disruptive 
to routines, as previous changes may not have been routinized to a point where inertia to 
change was strong (Rainey and Fernandez, 2006). The significance of this variable fades 
over time, potentially suggesting that those governments where HIV was already on the 
legislative agenda were able to adopt changes faster than those without HIV already in 
focus. This could make it easier to enact change (Kettl, 2016; Shipan and Volden, 2006). 
This weakening effect over time of HIV prevalence and the political agenda likely 
indicates other rationales and enablers for change, such as mimesis or learning of 
effective strategies to address an issue (e.g. Berry and Berry, 1990). 
Also, different than policy change, level of government mattered. For top-down 
organizational changes made to HIV services provided, state governments largely led the 
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charge (p<.001). Across the individual years after the intervention, this variable gained 
significance, though it remained negative, indicating that state governments increased the 
likelihood of HIV services changes, especially in later years. Also, institutional factors 
mattered for organizational changes across all years. Results show that those 
organizations where state and local governments had decentralized relationships were 
more likely to make changes to HIV services (p<.05). This makes sense given what we 
know about centralization and innovation. Existing research has demonstrated that the 
more centralized the organization, the lower the rates of innovation adoption 
(Damanpour, 1991). Udy (1965) argued that this is the case in part to the environments in 
which organizations exist, where varying environments and conditions necessitate 
targeted action. Thus, if a state has decentralized relationships with its local governments, 
which exist in different environments, then innovative behavior could be more likely 
because each locale can respond in ways most appropriate to them. Further, having very 
centralized decision-making between a state and its many local governments increases 
span of control. This can affect how complex the decision-making process becomes, 









Table 13: HIV Screening and Treatment Changes 
 All Years 2013 2016 
        
Centralization       -0.43*     -0.35         -0.61 
Local Government       -1.20***     -0.64      -2.30*** 
Specialization       -0.34      0.47          0.02 
HIV Diagnoses per 100k        0.02      0.03         -0.01 
FTE       -0.00     -0.00          0.00 
Per Capita Expenditures       -0.00     -0.00         -0.01 
Changes Made Pre-Intervention        0.54*     0.90**          0.19 
Constant        0.18     -0.55          0.89 
    
Observations        318 175 143 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Fs/QCA Results.  
In this analysis, I followed up the logit analyses by asking the following 
questions: under what conditions does change occur and are these conditions the same for 
organizational and policy change? For the top-down case, no necessary conditions were 
found. The results presented below show only sufficient patterns of conditions, 
confirming the notion that conditions are context driven and patterns matter. For the top-
down case, HIV prevention, I conducted a QCA with the outcome of whether any policy 
adoption occurred after the Winnable Battles HIV initiative for both states and local 
governments. Multiple QCAs were conducted. First, I ran a QCA for the post-
intervention time period as a whole, with the outcome of interest being whether an HIV 
policy was passed at any point between 2011 and 2017. Second, I followed this analysis 
with one QCA for the first half of that time period (2011 to 2013) and the second half of 
that time period (2014 to 2017). 
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Policy Change. For HIV policy adoptions, patterns of adoptions were identified for state 
but not local governments. This means that local HIV policy adoptions were more 
sporadic, following less of a pattern. This lack of consistent patterns of adoptions on a 
local level is not surprising, as local change is often unpredictable, as there are many 
different political venues for change to occur (Boushey, 2012). In this case, it could 
additionally be that state level HIV efforts were deemed sufficient and local governments 
directed their agendas elsewhere.  
Across all years combined, two different patterns of conditions emerged for states 
who passed an HIV policy (Table 14). Of these, one had the highest unique coverage, 
indicating the strongest pattern (unique coverage score of 0.15). This pattern shows that 
states that passed HIV policies had very decentralized relationships with their local health 
departments (centralization), had a high number of full-time employees, had a relatively 
high amount of yearly per capita expenditures, and had a relatively high HIV prevalence 
in the state. This means that those state governments that adopted HIV policies had a 
need and also the resources to address that need. Further, being in a decentralized 
relationship with their local governments, means that they cannot necessarily rely on 
local governments to make the change. Thus, a high HIV prevalence indicates a need, but 
if they want to adequately address that need, they may need to make the policy change 









































































































    


























































































































Across all patterns, a few notable trends exist. First, a high HIV prevalence 
contributed to a passage of policy in both patterns. This suggests that for top-down 
change, having a need for a change has a major (though not necessary) role in whether 
the organization responds. The only variable consistent across both patterns was 
centralization, where decentralized state and local relations led to a passage of policy. 
This is likely due to the lowered span of control or complexity that can come from 
decentralized control, where adapting to change may be easier (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984). Otherwise, the varying presence and absence of the other conditions emphasizes 
the point that organizations of a variety of structures regarding centralization and 
resources innovate politically. Importantly, given the low solution coverage (0.21), I 
interpret these results cautiously, as this indicates that other patterns exist that are not 
found in my cases.  
When we break out the changes made into the two different data time periods 
(Tables 14a), we see the above patterns fluctuate a little bit, but importantly, only patterns 
of early adopters could be identified. Later adopters, adopters between 2014 and 2017, 
showed no consistent pattern, so none were identified. This somewhat aligns with the 
diffusion models (Berry and Berry, 2014) that describe an increase in adoptions that 
ultimately tapers off. So, it is likely that many states responded quickly to the federal call 
for change, with inconsistent patterns of laggards behind them. The pattern of those states 
that responded early is as follows:  those states that passed an HIV policy between 2010 
and 2013 were those states that had decentralized decision-making structures with their 
local governments, performed a narrow range of public health activities, had a small 
number of full-time employees, a relatively low number of health expenditures, and a 
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high HIV prevalence. The period of early adoptions emphasized that having adequate 
resources to make changes was not necessary to respond to a federal call for change, 
perhaps indicating that responding to a federal call for change could be enough impetus, 
as suggested by Baumgartner and Jones (2009) and Shipan, and Volden (2015). 






















































































































































































































We can see some consistencies in the breakout years to the overall policy 
adoptions patterns in Table 14. State policy adoptions occurred when there was a need 
(HIV prevalence). However, this need was paired with organizations having varying 
amounts of resources, indicating that having resources at the disposal of the government 
was not necessarily critical to them passing policies. Finally, the passing of policies 
occurs in different structures, with varying degrees of span of control and specializations. 
Overall, below the federal level, change can be unpredictable (Boushey, 2012), especially 
in health where the roles of responsibilities are often interdependent and not always 
defined.  
These policy patterns in the top-down case demonstrate two key findings: 1) that 
at least in terms of policy, local policy adoptions are more sporadic than state policy 
adoptions; and 2) that while a variety of structures contribute to a passage of policy, need 
and decentralization mattered most consistently. 
Organizational Change. In the analysis on organizational change, I examined whether 
there was a change in how HIV screenings and treatment services were provided. As with 
above, QCA analyses were run on two fronts: overall change, where the outcome variable 
reflected a change in services across all years; and change as reflected in individual 
groups of years post-intervention. Overall, a few trends are worth noting before QCA 
specifics are discussed. First, the lack of consistent patterns found in the analysis of 
policymaking change at the local level was not found in the assessment of organizational 
change. Second, the patterns that lead to organizational change in local levels are not 
similar to the patterns identified at the state levels, meaning that the factors that lead to 
organizational changes vary depending on level of government. Third, in this scenario, 
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need for change (e.g. a high HIV prevalence) was present in every pattern for local 
government adoption. So, those jurisdictions that responded to the CDC were those that 
actually had a reason to innovate. 
          Both state and local governments had changes in how (or if) they provided HIV 
services (Tables 5 and 6). Of the nearly 80% of states that changed how they provided 
HIV services to their jurisdictions, five different patterns of statewide conditions emerged 
as contributing factors to organizational change. As seen below in Table 15, one pattern 
had the highest unique coverage (0.17), indicating the most relevant configuration of 
conditions. This pattern holds that those states that adjusted their HIV service strategies 
were those that had decentralized relationships with their local governments, performed a 
small range of activities, had a relatively low per capita and number of FTEs, and HIV 
prevalence was irrelevant to the outcome. Among the roughly 54% of local governments 
who adopted HIV changes, the strongest configuration on the local level (Table 16) also 
had decentralized relationships with their respective state governments and high HIV 
prevalence, but different than states, had high amounts of resources (FTE and per capita 
expenditures). So local governments passing organizational changes had both a need to 
address, but also adequate resources to enable them to meet that need. Also, being in 
decentralized relationships with the state governments could mean that local governments 
who have a need for change (e.g. a high HIV prevalence) are able to make a decision to 
change independent of the state (centralization). This may enable a flexibility to adjust 
their routines and resources that they have to address the need without having to go 
navigate bureaucracy. So, while the logit models demonstrated that structural factors 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Top-Down Change: By Years. Looking at how patterns evolve over the years can offer 
more nuance into how and why organizations change. Descriptively, despite local 
governments being more on the forefront of providing services to their communities, top-
down change structurally was more common among states. For the 2010-2012 time 
period, almost half of the states made changes with how they provided HIV screening 
and treatment services (43%). Over half (67%) made changes between 2013 and 2016. 
For local governments, however, 43% made changes between 2010 and 2013, and 38% 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Between the sets of patterns for states (Tables 15a and 15b), there were no 
obvious changes in structure or conditions that affect adoption over time. Both years have 
adopters with both high and low HIV prevalence and high and low amounts of resources 
at their disposal to make those changes. This could indicate that the CDC’s authority 
drives innovation even when a need or resources (e.g. Mays, 2006) are not present. 
However, the patterns of early adopters of organizational changes for states include the 
same pattern of early adopters for policy changes. For understanding about how these 
types of innovations relate, this means that while generally policy and organizational 
changes are driven by different factors, there are instances where they align.  
Regarding local governments, patterns for these year breakouts were identified 
only for 2010-2013. Thus, as with the bottom-up case, local government organizational 
changes are generally made more whimsically, with no consistent structures contributing 
to change. The early identification of patterns indicates that the early adopters of change 
were representative of a certain type or structure of organizations, with later adopters 
representing more a variety of organizations making changes. This could speak to the 
learning mechanism of diffusion, where local organizations began learning from early 
adopters, and so the greater variety of organizations adopting increases. According to the 
results (Table 16a), two different patterns emerged for those local governments that 
passed organizational HIV changes. These patterns were of equal strength. Overall, local 
government patterns demonstrated that change demands a need (high HIV prevalence), is 
not necessarily contingent on resources (expenditures), and can occur in different types of 
structures (centralized vs. decentralized).  
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Overall, different patterns existed for state and local governments. Interestingly, 
unlike local governments, changing HIV strategies for states was not always preceded by 
a high HIV prevalence. In fact, the strongest state pattern held that the HIV prevalence 
was irrelevant to whether organizational changes were made. Thus, the motivation for 
change may be stemming from more than just a need, but rather influences that could be 
authoritative or normative in nature (e.g. Berry and Berry, 1990). Further, local 
government patterns more often included high numbers of FTEs and per capita 
expenditures. This may therefore suggest that for states to change structurally, it requires 
more resources, especially if the activity is not one of the few already performed by the 














































































































































































































































































Across state and local governments, however, we do see that while those in 
centralized and decentralized relationships both adjusted their HIV services, indicating 
that change can occur in a variety of structures. Yet, the strongest patterns upheld the role 
of decentralized relationships contributing to change, as well as performing a narrow 
range of activities. This is likely due to a decreased amount of bureaucracy tied to a 
larger and more complex system of decision-making processes to enact a change 
internally (Blau, 1968; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). These patterns do not align with 
the patterns of early policy or organizational adopters for states. 
Top-Down Discussion.  
The descriptive results, logit analyses, and QCAs give us three main findings. 
These are shown below in Figure 4. First, the factors that drive policy and organizational 
change are not the same. FTEs, level of government, and the role of the agenda 
distinguished between the two change types. Importantly, while primarily differences 
were found, there was one case where policy and organizational innovations had identical 
QCA patterns of conditions. This means that there is in fact some overlap among the 
factors in certain contexts. Here, that context was for early state adopters to a top-down 
initiative and could speak to the role of authority of a federal initiative.  
Second, need for change presented an interesting result. A need for change did not 
affect either policy or organizational changes in the logit models. However, the QCAs 
added some nuance to these findings, especially in running state analyses separate from 
local analyses. Two findings regarding need appeared: 1) every local government pattern 
included high HIV prevalence. States were more varied. This demonstrates some 
distinction between level of government as states, maybe reacting to the authority of the 
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CDC, responded regardless of prevalence, whereas the lower level governments 
responded only when there was a need. This could suggest that the vertical diffusion 
effects fluctuate as ideas spread down the levels of government; 2) the results showed 
that the presence of a need for change (for states) was not always present for 
organizational/structural change, like it was for policy change. This means that between 
policy and organizational change, having a need for change matters more for policy, a 
much more visible response to an issue (Kettl, 2016) than structural changes, potentially 
suggesting that organizational changes are motivated by some mechanism other than 
need. Answering the research question that policy changes would be more sensitive to a 
need for change, it is likely that policy was driven by a need as policy can often be a very 
visible response to constituents, neighboring governments, etc. (Kettl, 2016), and the 
connection between a need and a visible response could be explained by a political desire 
to appear active in addressing the issue.  
Third, policy and organizational changes look different for each level of 
government. In the top-down case, there are two main conclusions regarding level of 
government: 1) local government adoptions are generally more whimsical and sporadic 
than state adoptions; and 2) that the differences between policy and organizational 
changes vary depending on level of government. Descriptively, we were able to see 
policy and activity/service changes made at each level, though state governments were 
more active in responding in terms of policy than local governments, and local 
governments were more active in changing their activities than state governments. The 
QCA results took these findings a step further, showing us that while both of these levels 
of government are making changes organizationally and in terms of policy, the conditions 
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that enabled each to change varies. Notably, local government service changes had 
patterns whereas local policy adoptions did not, and state patterns of both policy and 
service change adoptions existed. Across the patterns that were found, the strongest state 
patterns for policy and organizational changes had similarities of patterns regarding 
certain conditions like HIV prevalence, but the presence of resources and varying 
structures were different across local and state patterns, meaning that not only do the 
processes vary across levels of government, but for each level, the process of changing in 
terms of policy compared to organizational structure varies.  
 
 




Overall Findings:                    
1) the different functions of 
government can largely be 
differentiated, but not entirely; 
2) level of government matters; 
3) time matters
Descriptives: policy and 
organizational innovations 
both occurred though not 
always at the same time
Logit: Policy and 
organizational changes 
were driven by 
different factors
QCAs: local government 
patterns more sporadic 
than states and factors like 




CHAPTER 6: BOTTOM-UP CHANGE RESULTS 
Complexity of government was tested in a different scenario – the bottom-up case 
of trans-fat restrictions. As with the top-down case, the two different functions of 
government can be separated by what drives them to innovate; but here, no instance of an 
identical or very similar patterns exists. I also find that level of government matters, 
timing of innovation adoption matters, and need once again plays an interesting role. 
Descriptive Results.  
The bottom-up case, trans-fat restrictions, demonstrated some differences between 
organizational and policy change, and, similar to the top-down case, differences between 
state and local governments. Starting at the local level, different cities (about 14% of 
sample) adopted a trans-fat restriction to some extent, including city-wide bans (e.g. New 
York City) and school district bans (e.g. Miami-Dade County). Cities were the first to 
ban trans-fats citywide, with most policy efforts being adopted within the first two years 
of the first trans-fat ban (Table 8). After the first full state adoption (California in 2008), 
no other states passed full statewide restrictions, though others have partial restrictions 
(e.g. Colorado). Importantly, all state laws here that were passed before California’s 
statewide restrictions did not target trans-fats, rather they included trans-fats among other 
nutritional standards. Thus, state policy activities restricting trans-fats were largely after 
trans-fats made their way onto local political agendas. Moving up toward the federal 
level, a national trans-fat ban was announced by the FDA in 2013, taking full effect in 
2018. After 2012, we saw no further state activity on the restricting of trans-fats state-
wide. On the policymaking side of this bottom-up case study, trans-fat restrictions 
primarily diffused upward in a temporal order: local - state - federal.   
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Organizationally, the number of state and local governments performing activities 
with regard to coronary heart disease treatment varied (Tables 5 and 6). However, despite 
the varying levels of government, the trends for changes made organizationally were 
similar across both state and local levels. Regarding cardiovascular and coronary heart 
disease activities, two broad findings emerge. First, local health departments are much 
more active in providing activities than states. However, this is not surprising given that 
the more local the government, the more involved they tend to be in providing services. 
Second, there are similar patterns between local and state government adjustments to 
their heart disease activities. Between the data years of 2005 and 2008, more local and 
state health departments began conducting these activities more directly. Interestingly, 
after 2008, the number of local health departments who directly performed and 
contracted out these activities began decreasing again back to where it was in 2005, and 
after 2010, the number of states providing heart disease services also returned to the 
number of states prior to 2010. Descriptively, this has two potential explanations: that 
local health initiatives held less of a lasting impact, at least structurally, than the federal 
HIV initiative; or that trans-fat bans were believed to be a very effective method of 
reducing heart disease and therefore maintaining activity on providing services was less 
necessary. Federally the CDC’s focus on cardiovascular disease has generally been rising 
over the years, with a big jump between 2013 and 2016 (a difference of $106 million). 
This is not surprising given that the national ban would be in full swing by 2018, likely 
demanding research into viable trans-fat alternatives and outcomes, and federal attention 
to coronary heart disease was increasing, as seen in the budget changes. Consequently, 
heightened federal activity may have decreased local activity, as federal activity may 
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have made local governments feel that the issue was being addressed elsewhere, thereby 
freeing up space on their agendas.  
As with top-down change, I cross-tabulated the data to see how policy and 
structural changes co-occur (Table 17). Overall, more jurisdictions passed trans-fat bans 
without making changes in the activities performed. This suggests that the policy 
innovations are not always reflected in organizational efforts, and that differences in the 
two dimensions of government exist. So, either policy and organizational changes do not 
respond to the same external stimuli (like an intervention), or whatever change happened 
first (whether a trans-fat restriction or a change in heart disease services provided), the 
other was deemed unnecessary. It is thus not surprising that the t-test revealed that the 
means of policy and organizational adoptions were significantly different (Table 18). As 
with the top-down case, this suggests that organizational change and policy change are 
not simultaneously adopted. How, then, do these innovation processes differ? The logit 
and QCA analyses below seek to inform this. 
 




Changes in Coronary Heart Disease Treatments 
Performed 
Total 
 0 1 2  
0 542 197 10 749 
1 15 6 0 21 





Table 18: Bottom-Up T-Test 
Variable Mean SE SD 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Coronary Heart Disease 
Activity/Service Change 
0.28 0.02 0.49 0.25 – 0.32 
Trans-Fat Restriction Adoption 0.03 0.01 0.18 0.02 – 0.04 
Difference    -0.24 0.02 0.51  0.22 – -0.29 
Ho: mean (Heart Disease Service Change – Trans-fat 
Restriction Adoption) = 0 




Logit Modelling Results.  
In this first analysis for bottom-up change, I sought to understand how policy 
adoptions and structural/activity changes occur and how these vary over time. I find, as 
with the top-down case, that policy-making and organizational changes are driven by 
different factors. The results are presented below in Table 18. 
Policy Change. Similar to the top-down case, centralization mattered for whether a trans-
fat ban or restriction was adopted. Decentralized governments were significantly more 
likely to pass a trans-fat ban than centralized governments (p<.05). As with above, this is 
likely due to more independent governments having less complexity and lowered spans 
of control, enhancing the ability to be innovative. However, unlike the top-down case, 
need does matter in the bottom-up scenario. Governments with high rates of coronary 
heart disease deaths were more likely to adopt trans-fat restrictions (p<.01). 
Regarding the role of legislative agendas, this variable was not included in the 
bottom-up case for two reasons. First, trans-fat restrictions were passed legislatively for 
the first time in 2007, so there were no previous trans-fat restrictions to account for. 
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Second, a legislative search showed that no jurisdictions in this sample had passed 
coronary heart disease policies in the recent years prior to 2007, suggesting that trans-fat 
restrictions were a fairly new policy idea, unlikely to have been affected by whether 
coronary heart disease was on the legislative agenda. Therefore, local governments may 
in fact be a “marketplace of ideas” (Oates, 1999), where these ideas are “tested” for 
efficacy and/or political acceptance (Brandeis, 1932; Kettl, 2016).4 
 
Table 19: Trans-Fat Restrictions Passed 
 2008 
 
Centralization    -1.21* 
Local Government    0.18 
Specialization   -0.15 
Coronary Deaths       0.01** 
FTE   0.00 
Constant      -4.71** 
  
Observations 184 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Organizational Change. The second set of logit analyses conducted examined activity 
changes made, which in this case are changes in how coronary heart disease treatments 
are performed. Looking at Table 19 below, like top-down organizational change, 
structural factors mattered for whether activity changes were made. This was the case for 
policy changes, but here, a different structural variable mattered. Since the first trans-fat 
                                                             
4 The results of the sensitivity analysis where the assumption regarding policy adoptions being counted 
for both cities and counties in the dataset was excluded can be found in Appendix A. The results largely 
aligned well with Table 19. 
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restrictions were set, there was an increase in governments both contracting out and 
directly performing treatments themselves (Tables 4 and 5). Structurally, those 
governments that performed a wider variety of public health activities were more likely 
to adopt coronary heart disease changes (p<.01), aligning with existing theory that makes 
a connection between specialization and innovative behavior (e.g. Kastelic, 1974; 
Perrow, 1970). This effect was strongest early on (2013) before tapering off. 
The second factor that mattered for bottom-up organizational change was level of 
government. This is similar to above in that level of government mattered, but it matters 
in the opposite way. Whereas above, state governments were more likely to make 
changes to HIV screening and treatment services, in the bottom-up case, local 
governments were more likely. So, level of government matters, but it is mediated to an 
extent by direction. Level of government only mattered in this case in the early years of 
the trans-fat attention, aligning with the descriptive statistics in Tables 4 and 5 above. 
This is likely due to local governments leading the charge in combating coronary heart 
disease, with more states catching on in later years, potentially assessing its efficacy 
(Boushey, 2012; V. Ostrom, 1994). So, we see horizontal diffusion of changes made 
before vertical diffusion changes. This is expected is local levels are indeed “laboratories 








Table 20: Coronary Heart Disease Treatments  
 





        
Centralization        0.04      -0.07      -0.20       0.54 
Local Government        1.18**       1.07*       0.86       0.73 
Specialization      2.69***       3.42**       2.86*       2.09 
Coronary Deaths per 100k        0.00      -0.00       0.00       0.00 
FTE       -0.00       0.00      -0.00      -0.00 
Constant     -3.77***      -3.70**      -3.34**      -3.38** 
 
    
Observations 554 189 196 169 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05    
 
 
Fs/QCA Results.  
As stated above, the purpose of this final analysis for bottom-up change is to gather more 
nuance into policy and structural changes. Specifically, I asked the following questions: 
under what conditions does change occur and are these conditions the same for 
organizational and policy change? As with top-down change, no necessary conditions 
were found, only sufficient patterns of conditions.  
Policy Change. As with top-down policy change, no viable trends were identified for 
local governments; however, different than for top-down change, no patterns were 
identified for state governments either. The consistency thresholds from the QCAs were 
too low, indicating that while we did have governments pass trans-fat restrictions, the 
patterns of conditions identified were not consistent enough across the organizations who 
did pass policies to where reliable patterns could be identified. With top-down change, 
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state patterns of adoption were found, but with no patterns being identified with bottom-
up change. This finding speaks to the differences in top-down and bottom-up change, 
where the diffusion of bottom-up adoptions is more sporadic than top-down adoptions. 
Organizational Change. Here, I examined the patterns of conditions that contributed to 
changes in how heart disease services were provided in the bottom-up case. As with 
above, QCA analyses were run on two fronts: overall change, where the outcome variable 
reflected a change in services across all years, and change as reflected in individual 
groups of years post-intervention. A few general findings are important to note before 
QCA specifics are discussed. First, there were no state patterns identified regarding 
changes made to how heart disease services were performed, only local patterns. Second, 
despite the fact that patterns existed for local levels, local governments had few 
similarities to organizational changes in the top-down case, meaning that the factors that 
lead to organizational changes vary depending on context. 
Local government adoptions of organizational changes were driven by several 
different patterns. As seen below in Table 21, a variety of structural configurations exist 
that can lead to organizational/structural changes; however, the strongest pattern (unique 
coverage of 0.09) has a high number of per capita expenditures, has a decentralized 
relationship with its state government, and has a relatively high rate of coronary heart 
disease deaths. Across all patterns, we see no obvious patterns among conditions, 
suggesting that a variety of local governments with different structures and needs were 
adopting organizational changes. This is different than the top-down scenario where both 
a high need (disease rate) was present in every configuration, and, in the strongest 
pattern, the resources to meet that need. This likely emphasizes differences in how local 
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governments respond to changes originating from a different level, as with local 
(horizontal diffusion) change, local governments were adopting without a strong need for 
change or many resources to meet those needs. So, while authority may have been a 
factor in adopting (V. Ostrom, 1994), the QCA patterns showed that those responding to 
top-down initiatives were those who also had a need. Across local governments, 
initiatives beginning at the local level may come with more normative expectations for 
conformity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which may be why we see need as less of a 












































































































































































































































































































































































Organizational Change: By Years. Assessing patterns in individual year groups showed 
that for any one group of years there were fewer consistent patterns. Unlike top-down 
change, local governments had patterns of organizational change adoptions, but these 
patterns were only identified for certain years. As described above, this is due to a lack of 
consistent types and structures of government responding to the intervention. This is 
likely due to the stochasticity of more local changes, where they can be sporadic 
(Boushey, 2012). Among the three bottom-up groups of years (2008-2010, 2011-2013, 
and 2014-2016), local patterns were only consistent enough to be identified for the last 
group of years surveyed. The later pattern of adopters yielded the following 
configuration: organizational changes between 2014 and 2016 occurred for local 
governments in very centralized relationships with their states, performing large ranges of 
public health activities, have a small number of FTEs, have a small number of per capita 
health expenditures, and have a high rate of coronary heart disease. Ultimately, we saw 
above in table 21 that a variety of local governments (with varying amounts of resources, 
needs, and structures) were adopting with no consistent patterns. But later adopters are 
characterized by having very centralized structures in conjunction with the other 
variables. So, it could be that being in centralized relationships prohibited faster 
adoptions, likely due to increased complexity and span of control as suggested by Blau 
(1968), even though they had a need; or, it could be that these organizations, before 
affecting other organizations in the centralized system waited until there was more proof 




























































































































































































































Bottom-Up Discussion.  
The descriptive, logit, and QCA analyses of the relationship between the policy-
making and organizational structural components of government revealed four key 
findings. First, and similar to the top-down case, policy and organizational changes were 
driven by different factors, though a different set of factors than above: need, 
specialization, centralization, and level of government.  However, different than the top-
down case, those governments (both state and local) that had a large number of coronary 
heart disease deaths were more likely to pass trans-fat restrictions (policy innovations) 
not activity innovations. The organizational QCAs demonstrated that need was often an 
important condition in contributing to a structure/activity change, but not consistently 
until later years. This leads to the second key finding of the bottom-up case: that the 
factors that drive innovation vary across time and that there are differences in early 
compared to later adopters of organizational innovations.  
Third, and also like the top-down case, state and local governments respond 
differently to bottom-up initiatives. This was evident in the logit models where level of 
government was significant for organizational change, but not policy change. The QCAs 
added some nuance to these findings: the bottom-up changes were only identified when 
they were organizational, but even still, were only identified for local governments. The 
lack of identifiable state QCA patterns demonstrates that the bottom-up nature of change 
is sporadic for both policy-making and structural change adoptions, likely growing more 




Fourth, need emerged as an interesting factor, but in a different way than top-
down. For the logit analyses, need arose as a significant effect for the first time, but only 
for policy change, not organizational activity changes. As Kettl (2016) claimed, policy 
changes are often more visible responses to an issue; thus, those organizations having a 
high disease prevalence were more likely to respond in this way than less visible 
responses like activity changes. To meet a need then, policy diffuses upward more easily 
than organizational changes. The QCA analyses revealed more insight into the role of 
need. 
Unlike in the top-down case, local innovations were not as consistently driven by 
more than a need to adopt, with patterns including low disease prevalence or having 
disease prevalence be irrelevant to the outcome. For local governments, where the change 
initiated, the presence of a need was less important, meaning that other motivating factors 
were at play. These could be intergovernmental motivations, such mimesis or norms 
being established as suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983); or it could be that the 
influence of structure and resources that enable change are stronger factors than a need.  
Overall, different than top-down cases, the bottom-up case did not bring with it an 
authority. Instead, the bottom-up case presented a scenario where local efforts brought 
not only attention to an issue, but efforts to address the issue. The findings that teased out 
















Overall Findings:                    
1) the different functions of 
government can largely be 
differentiated; 2) level of 
government matters; 3) time 
matters
Descriptives: 1) policy and 
organizational innovations 
both occurred though not 
always at the same time; 2) 
Logit: Policy and 
organizational changes 
were driven by 
different factors
QCAs: 1) only local 
governments had patterns; 
2) need mattered late 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION. 
The goal of this research was to tease out the complexities of government by 
understanding the relationship between two key dimensions of government - the policy-
making and organizational/structural components. I did this by examining how policy and 
organizational changes occur, specifically testing what factors drive each form of change. 
So, if a government chooses to innovate, when does it choose to innovate in terms of 
policy and when does it choose to innovate in terms of adjusting its structure? The 
answer is that it depends. When the government chooses to innovate in terms of policy, 
the contexts and drivers of those innovation decisions are largely different than when the 
government the government innovates in terms of its structure. These different 
dimensions of government, then, are fairly distinct, at least in terms of their change 
processes, though not always. Thus, the extent to which they are separate is highly 
contingent on context; and the fact that it is contingent on context means that certain 
forms of innovation are at times more feasible or attractive for governments, and not 
necessarily both forms at a given time. Theoretically, this is important because it suggests 
that innovation in the public sector is both a product of what the government wants to do 
and what the government is able to do.  
To get to this conclusion, I looked at three different phenomena: 1) if the factors 
that affect change in one process affect change in another, 2) if these change processes 
look different across levels of government, and 3) if these change processes look different 
over time. In sum, I found that all three (with some important caveats) were found to be 
true: that policy and organizational changes are driven by different factors; that how 
policy and organizational change differ is contingent on level of government; and that the 
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differences between policy and organizational changes fluctuate over time. Importantly, 
by testing these three phenomena, a critical caveat emerged - these relationships among 
the factors that drive policy and organizational changes vary depending on whether that 
change was top-down or bottom-up. A summary of the results is presented below in 
Table 22 and are elaborated upon below. 
Finding 1: Driving Policy and Organizational Change.  
The factors that drive policy change are not the same factors that drive 
organizational structural changes. Both the logit analyses and QCAs emphasized this 
finding. Importantly, how these dimensions of government differed varied depending on 
whether the change was top-down or bottom-up, and, as the QCAs showed, whether the 
government was an early or late adopter (to be discussed more below). As described 
above, this means that it is likely that different contexts and scenarios make one form of 
innovations more possible or attractive, and not governments having a range of 
innovation types to pursue. 
Need. Need presented an interesting motivation for change. The presence of a need for 
change sometimes influenced policy and organizational change, but other times, policy 
and organizational change were driven by either a low relative prevalence of disease or 
the disease prevalence was irrelevant to the outcome. This means that innovations in 
government across both local and state levels were motivated by more than just a need. 
Thus, in vertical diffusion contexts, inter-organizational effects are present just like in 
horizontal diffusion contexts. 
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Importantly, the role of need was very contingent on context. Generally, in the 
QCA patterns where state and local governments were assessed separately, disease 
prevalence mattered in every instance of policy change. In organizational change, disease 
prevalence was more varied, particularly among local governments, indicating that all 
innovations are not driven by a need for change, but also by other factors, such as other 
diffusion mechanisms (e.g. norms).  
Looking at state and local governments together in the logit models, the role of 
need was significant for policy change, but not for organizational change, but only in the 
bottom-up case. A key question then, is across all governments, why did need only 
appear in the bottom-up case and why not for organizational change? We know 
theoretically that organizations change and innovate for a variety of reasons (e.g. norms, 
mimesis, learning), particularly those in a federalist system where their efforts and goals 
are interwoven with those of other organizations (V. Ostrom, 1994). We also know that 
the nature of top-down and bottom-up change is different, as one brings a sense of 
authority (top-down) and the other brings opportunities for learning about salient issues 
and effective solutions (bottom-up) (e.g. Kettl, 2016; Sugiyama, 2011). In the bottom-up 
case, where diffusion is typically a result of learning from local jurisdictions, we saw 
where need was a significant effect. Theoretically this makes sense, as those states that 
had a high disease prevalence were likely those that were paying attention to states on a 
local level, to see if the actions taken there were effective at meeting their needs on a 
higher level.  
Further, regarding the differences between policy and organizational change, need 
was likely only significant in policy change because policy changes are very visible 
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(Kettl, 2016). Hence, if there was a need to be met, because policymakers are elected 
officials and can have ulterior motives (e.g. reelection) (Kettl, 2016), adopting a very 
visible response to a need is likely an attractive means of meeting that need. 
Interestingly, the interaction of need and context over time further emphasized 
differences between policy and organizational change. When the QCAs were conducted 
for individual groups of years, the prevalence of need contributing to change was present 
in the early years of policy adoptions in the top-down case, but in the later years of 
organizational change in the bottom-up case. This could speak to the differences in origin 
of change; and/or this could be a product of differences in perceived effects of the two 
types of innovations. For example, it could be that early adopters with a need for change 
are more likely to adopt policy changes, whereas later adopters with a need for change, 
either do not adopt organizational changes first, or the efficacy of the organizational 
changes take longer to diffuse than policy changes.  
Finding 2: Level of Government.  
Understanding the complexity of government means that level of government 
must be taken into account as the results of this study highlight that how the different 
dimensions of government relate to each other depends on the level of government being 
observed (RQ 6). From the logit analyses, we have two main findings. First, level of 
government mattered for organizational activity changes but not for policy adoptions. 
Second, we see that level of government mattered for organizational changes in both top-
down and bottom-up cases, but in opposing ways (partially confirming RQ 6a). States 
were more likely to make activity/structure changes in the top-down case, and local 
governments were more likely to make activity/structure changes in the bottom-up case. 
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This has two potential explanations: 1) it could be that the level of government closest to 
the intervention is the one who is most likely to adopt organizational changes; or 2) it 
could also be that between the two types of innovations, organizational changes are the 
ones most contingent on level of government than policy adoptions.  
The QCAs were able to shed more light on how level of government affected 
innovation decisions. As described above, when no patterns of innovation were found, it 
meant that there was no consistency of patterns and that adoption decisions were more 
sporadic. For local governments, no patterns were identified in the top-down case for 
policy adoptions. In the bottom-up case, no patterns were identified for state governments 
for either policy or organizational changes (confirming RQ 6b). On one hand, this does 
signify differences between policy and structural innovations as overall, patterns 
regarding policy change were overall much more sporadic. On the other hand, it also 
speaks to how the different levels of government react to interventions. In the top-down 
case, state governments and not local governments had patterns for policy adoption, 
likely because they are closer to the source of the intervention and had identifiable 
patterns for policy change, meaning that there was some organization and consistency of 
adopters. Both levels of government had patterns for activity/structure change. 
Contrarily, in the bottom-up case, local governments and not state governments had 
identifiable patterns for both policy and organizational changes, while state governments 
had patterns for neither. These differences in when patterns were identifiable and when 
they were not, potentially speak to the nature of how these two dimensions of 
government relate for the different levels of government. Local governments still had 
consistent and organized patterns of activity/structure adoptions in the top-down case 
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(even when they did not have policy changes); whereas states were not able to have any 
activity/structure or policy change patterns in the bottom-up case. Thus, it appears that 
local governments had different motivations or capabilities to change organizationally, as 
they still responded in this way even when they did not respond with policy adoptions. 
This partially confirms RQ 5a, as patterns for policy and organizational change were 
determined not just by direction, but also by level of government. 
These results suggest that these two dimensions of government are not always 
related, and governments can choose whether they respond to stimuli or interventions 
organizationally or in terms of policy, because as seen in this case, it is not always both; 
and local governments opted to respond more cohesively organizationally, whereas states 
only did so in one scenario (the top-down case).  
Finding 3: Change over Time.  
Though the data did not lend to specific comparison as to whether one type of 
change preceded the other, we can see patterns of each over time, and are able to compare 
not just differences in how they operate, but in the prominence of each type of change as 
years pass after an intervention. Specifically, the results show that the relationship 
between the policy-making and more structural dimensions of government varies for 
early compared to late adopters. The effect of time was seen most prominently in the 
QCAs, as from the logit models no convergence of driving factors policy and 
organizational change emerged over time. From the QCAs, we can see that the processes 
of policy and organizational change varied over time. This finding partially confirms RQ 
4 that factors that drive policy and organizational adoptions will change over time. 
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For example, in the top down case, only early adopters were identified (for state 
governments making policy and organizational changes); but in the bottom-up case, only 
late adopters were identified (for local governments making organizational changes). The 
authority that comes with a top-down initiative likely explains why we had patterns of 
early adopters, as the presence of pattern means there was some consistency of behavior 
among organizations. So, there was consistent adoptions of HIV policies in the early 
years after the launch of the CDC initiative, but more sporadic adoptions in later years. 
The learning that typically stems from bottom-up adoptions likely takes time to prove 
that a measure or effort is effective, likely explaining why early patterns were not 
identified (no consistent government efforts), but later patterns were (when there was 
consistency of activities). Importantly, the lack of patterns across both state and local 
governments makes direct comparisons of policy and organizational change more 
challenging; yet the findings here still suggest that the processes for each vary over time. 
So, the complexity of government is likely exacerbated when we think about how its 
dimensions relate over time. 
Finding 4: Origin of Change.  
In a federalist system, the nature of government is inherently interdependent and 
interwoven (V. Ostrom, 1994). As such, change or impetus for change can occur 
anywhere within that system. In this study, origin of change proved to be perhaps the 
most telling factor that distinguished these two dimensions of government. The logit and 
QCA analyses demonstrated that policy change and organizational change were driven by 
different factors, but the parameters in which these differences existed were mediated by 
the origin of the change itself. These findings strongly support RQ 5, as the factors that 
113 
 
differentiated policy and organizational change were different in dissimilar ways 
depending on whether the intervention was top-down or bottom-up. So, for understanding 
government better, it is not as simple as saying there is a difference between two different 
processes of change; rather, as Svara (2008) discussed, research ought to better define the 
parameters of the relationship between the different dimensions of government; and these 
results suggest that looking at top-down and bottom-up contexts when talking about 
government and its complexity is crucial. 
Table 22: Results Summary 
Research Questions Results 
RQ 1: Will structural components 
will matter more for organizational 
change than policy change? 
No. Centralization mattered for both 
policy and  organizational changes, 
and other factors like FTE mattered 
for policy adoptions. 
RQ 1a: Will organizational change, 
more than policy change, be driven 
by highly specialized organizations? 
Context Dependent. The effect of 
specialization was significant but 
only in the bottom-up case. 
RQ 1b: Will fs/QCA patterns will 
consistently include decentralized 
organizations as a contributing factor 
to change? 
Context Dependent. The effect of 
centralization was contingent on 
level of government and diffusion 
direction. Decentralization was a 
consistent factor, more so than 
centralization, but centralization 
often contributed to innovative 
behavior. 
RQ 1c: Will those jurisdictions with 
existing efforts in the health issue in 
question be more likely to adopt a 
relevant policy and organizational 
change post intervention? 
Context Dependent. The agenda of 
governments was significant only for 
top-down organizational change. 
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Table 22: Continued 
RQ 1d: Will policy and 
organizational change both be more 
likely in less centralized vertical 
relationships? 
Yes. Decentralization was a 
significant factor in both top-down  
organizational  changes and bottom-
up policy adoptions. 
RQ 1e: Will policy and 
organizational change both be more 
dependent on large amounts of 
resources (FTEs)? 
Context Dependent. Resources 
were a significant factor for top-
down policy change, but among the 
QCAs, the presence of resources was 
dispersed across different contexts. 
RQ 2: Will external components, like 
having a need for change, matter 
more for policy change than 
organizational change? 
Context Dependent. Need was a 
significant factor for whether a 
trans-fat restriction was adopted but 
not HIV policies. 
RQ 3: Will policy and organizational 
changes be driven by different 
motivations to change/innovate? 
Yes. The effects of certain factors 
like a need for change, legislative 
agenda, and level of government 
differentiated policy and  
organizational adoptions. 
RQ 4: Will the factors that drive 
adoption for policy and 
organizational change vary over 
time? 
Context Dependent. The effects 
that drove policy and  organizational 
change fluctuated over time; 
however, for local governments, 
some similarities exist between early 
adopters of policy and organizational 
change, indicating that early 
adopters may be motivated in similar 






Table 22: Continued 
RQ 5: Will the factors that drive 
policy and organizational change 
vary based on diffusion direction? 
Yes. While there were few 
differences from the Logit analyses 
in the factors that drove adoptions of 
policy and organizational changes, 
the patterns identified in the QCA 
analyses demonstrated differences in 
the conditions that enable policy and 
organizational change. 
RQ 5a: Will the fs/QCA patterns 
regarding policy change will be 
stronger for top-down change 
(patterns with higher unique 
coverages), while patterns regarding 
organizational change be stronger for 
bottom-up change (patterns with 
higher unique coverages)? 
Context Dependent. Patterns of 
policy change were not necessarily 
stronger, but were identified more 
easily for state governments than for 
local governments for both top-down 
and policy change.   
RQ 6: Will level of government be 
matter for whether the change is a 
policy or organizational change?   
Yes. Level of government was only 
significant in one logit model, but in 
the QCAs, state patterns were more 
easily identified for both policy and  
organizational change and these 
patterns differed from those of local 
governments. 
RQ 6a: Will local level governments 
be more likely to make organizational 
changes, while state governments are 
more likely to make policy changes? 
Context Dependent. Level of 
government was only significant for 
bottom-up organizational changes, 
but state governments were more 
likely to make top-down  
organizational changes. 
RQ 6b: Will fs/QCA patterns 
regarding policy change be stronger 
for states (patterns with higher unique 
coverages), while fs/QCA patterns 
for administration services change be 
stronger (patterns with higher unique 
coverages) for local governments? 
Context Dependent. While QCA 
findings did reveal that in the top-
down case no local patterns of policy 
adoptions existed (only state 
patterns), policy and  organizational 
changes patterns were identified for 





Government is complex. It has different functions that can be broadly described 
as falling into one of two categories: politics and administration (Wilson, 1887). Yet, as 
decades of research have established, these two categories are far from being isolated 
parts of government (e.g. Overeem, 2008; Svara, 2014). The debate on the extent to 
which these are embedded presents to us the idea that we have broad dimensions of 
government without much understanding as to how the different dimensions of 
government are similar or dissimilar. Looking at two primary dimensions of government, 
I examined how the change processes of policy adoptions and structural/organizational 
changes are related. In other words, when government chooses to innovate, what factors 
lead to a policy innovation compared to a structural innovation?  
With the results largely suggesting that these two dimensions of government 
distinct because they are driven by different factors, we have two broad, overarching 
conclusions. First, the broad dimensions of government are on some foundational level 
different from each other. While there was an instance of where policy-making and 
structural change processes aligned, this research largely pointed to the fact that these two 
dimensions of government are driven by different factors. If these dimensions were 
similar, then we would expect to see the processes of change be similar to each other. 
This would indicate that there is somewhat of a flow from one change to another, without 
having to have different sets of resources or contexts; but this is not what we find.  
A critical caveat to this conclusion is that how policy-making and structural 
change processes occur depends a lot of context, such as bottom-up and top-down 
scenarios and level of government. Such findings beg the question of whether the 
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differences between these two dimensions of government are driven by a true difference 
in processes between the two or if the role of context is that strong, specifically with 
regard to the level of government and diffusion direction as described above. Because of 
this, any future studies examining the dichotomy must specify and understand the level of 
government and origin of change. Especially given that so many of the issues our 
government tackles, like health, are not bound to one jurisdiction, these two broad 
functions of government need to be studied in multilevel systems, as the interplay may 
not be limited to just one level.  
Second, the findings suggest that change is not just change. Theoretically, when 
we talk about how and why organizations change, we need to be explicit about what kind 
of change, recognizing that advancing knowledge on the motivations and drivers of 
change does not apply to any and all forms of change. This is similar to some scholarship 
that has differentiated among types of innovations, for example, technological vs. 
administrative innovations (Damanpour, 2004; Kimberley and Evanisko, 1981); but the 
findings of research takes this a step further by arguing that it is not just type of 
innovation in terms of function, but rather type of innovation in terms of what part of 
government is innovating. These results underscore that governments do not always 
innovate in multiple ways, such as by both policy and structurally; and sometimes, in 
different contexts, one is more preferable and/or feasible than the other.  
This research makes significant headway in parsing out some of the complexities 
of government by helping us understand not only how the different dimensions of 
government relate, but the parameters of that relationship. The factors that drive 
innovation in terms of policymaking are different than those that drive innovative 
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behavior in terms of the organization’s structure; but, finding a case where those factors 
identical means that there are instances were a government may be able to innovate in 
either way or both. This ultimately indicates that a government does not merely innovate, 
but how it innovates depends on what factors are at play. This allows us better understand 
how government works because it begins to differentiate its different dimensions beyond 
just function, and more based on how they relate and work together.  Future studies 
should further tease out this decision-making process. 
Second, and related to the first, this research furthers what we know on policy and 
organizational change, especially with regard to diffusion. While we know a lot about 
vertical diffusion, the vast majority of this literature is centered on policy 
implementation. By applying this foundation to how we think about policy adoption 
diffusion and organizational change diffusion (isomorphism) across levels, we learned 
that level of government matters and those long-established mechanisms of change as 
identified by Berry and Berry (e.g. 1990) and DiMaggio and Powell (e.g. 1983) vary both 
over time and across levels of government.  
In sum, the different dimensions of government is an “inevitable” balancing act 
between policy-makers and administrators, the two most central groups of individuals in 
public administration (Tahmasebi and Musavi, 2011; Waldo, 1987). Thus, understanding 
the relationship between the two is important to our identity as public administration 
scholars (Svara, 2008), as it affects how we define the various facets of government. We 
need to know how they are similar, how they are different, and how they work together 




Limitations and Future Directions. As with all studies, this study has its limitations. 
Multiple limitations exist. First, the nature of the analysis requires a manipulation of 
variable coding. This poses a risk of losing data by having to recode and reframe certain 
variables. Second, across the fs/QCA results, coverage scores were not very high, 
indicating other viable patterns may exist that were not observed in the data. Third, the 
organizational data were from surveys implemented every 3-4 years, with changes in 
what variables were included and how they were measured. This had three consequences: 
1) it led to some variables needing to be excluded from analysis (like expenditures on a 
state level) because they were not in the survey; it meant that some administration 
changes, like FTE allocations and finding allocations could not be tracked over time, so 
only organizational activity changes were used as a proxy for administration; and 3), the 
periodic survey implementation means that the closest estimation to when an 
organizational change occurred was at the time of the survey, not offering us a chance to 
see the exact year a change was made. Thus, a direct temporal comparison of when an 
organizational change and when a policy was adopted was not feasible. Fourth, it is 
recognized that policy-making functions exist beyond just ordinances. Original manual 
data collection ensued regarding changes in policy, implementation, and regulations. 
However, collection of regulations and changes in implementation proved difficult as it 
relied on the responsiveness of government staff and/or the availability of the information 
on government websites. The inconsistent findings of each locale led to the conclusion 
that an accurate picture of regulation and implementation pictures was not obtained and 
therefore led to their exclusion from being considered as a policy-making activity. 
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Regarding future directions, the findings of this paper beg additional questions. 
First, because the nature of this data did not lend itself to establishing temporal order, 
additional studies, likely a case study approach ought to further tease out the relationship 
between the policy-making and structural dimensions, by determining which process 
follows the other. Second, the results of this study emphasized that the factors that drove 
policy and organizational change varied over time. Future studies need to look at this 
sequence of change to not only help us understand the complexity of government, but to 
also deepen the literature on how which diffusion mechanisms motivate change as time 
passes. Third, the QCAs demonstrated that change can be made when there is not a need 
(e.g. having a low HIV prevalence). Future studies need to further examine those entities 
with strong needs for change compared to those who do not to see how their motivations, 
















APPENDIX A: SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
 
Table A1: HIV Policies Passed  
Zero Inflated Comparison 
 
Negative 




      
Centralization         -1.02**   -0.63* 
Local Government 0.14      -0.40 
Specialization         -1.24      -0.31 
HIV Diagnoses 0.00       0.00 
FTE 0.00      0.00** 
Per Capita Expenditures           0.01 0.00 
Policies Passed Pre-Intervention           2.32*** 1.10 
Constant     -2.50**   -2.12* 
Observations 299 308 




















Table A2: Trans-Fat Restrictions Passed  







Centralization -1.04 -1.21 
Local Government 0.13  0.18 
Specialization  -0.15  -0.15 
Coronary Deaths      0.01**       0.01** 
FTE  0.00  0.00 
Constant       -4.21***       -4.71*** 
Observations 184 184 
























           
Central      -0.63* 
  
  -0.78*   -0.23 
 
-0.34    -2.08**     -4.35** 
Local       -0.40   -1.71*   -1.09     -2.40**  0.41     -1.39 
Special  -0.31 -1.61   -1.46 -2.48  2.43 1.07 
HIV Prev   0.00  0.01    0.01 0.01  0.02 0.06 
FTE        0.00**        0.00***      0.00*   0.00*   0.00*     0.00** 
Per Cap       0.00  0.00      0.01 0.00 -0.00     -0.00 
PrePolicies        1.10  0.67   1.03 0.71  1.52 0.84 
Constant      -2.12* -1.34    -1.06 -0.39   -4.37*  -3.71* 
       
Obs 308 308 170 170 138 138 







































Centralization   -1.21* 
 
-1.31 
Local Government  0.18 -0.23 
Specialization   -0.15 0.96 
Coronary Deaths       0.01** 0.01* 
FTE   0.00 0.00 
Constant      -4.71**    -4.25** 
   
Observations 184 184 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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APPENDIX B: TOP-DOWN TRUTH TABLES 
Table B1: Truth Table 
Local Policy Changes All Years 
LHD 
All HIV 






1 0 0 0.39 0.5  1 
2 0 . 0.53 0.5 0 0 
3 0 . 0.47 0 0 1 
4 0 1 0.41 0.5 1 1 
5 1 . 0.62 0 1 0 
6 0 1 0.61 0 1 1 
7 0 0 0.11 0.5 0 0 
8 0 1 0.51 0 1 1 
9 0 0 0.58 0 0 0 
10  0 0.74 0 1 0 
11 0 0 0.42 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0.52 0.5 0 0 
13 0 1 0.45 0 1 1 
14 0 . 0.60 0 0 0 
15 0 1 0.55 0 1 0 
16 0 1 0.42 0 1 0 
17 0 0 0.15 0.5 1 0 
18 0 1 0.65 0 1 1 
19 0 0 0.58 0 1 0 
20 1 1 0.40 0 1 0 
21 0 . 0.54 0 1 0 
22 0 0 0.34 0 0 0 
23 0 .  0.5 1 0 
24 0 . 0.60 0 1 0 
25 0 0 0.35 0 1 0 
26 0 0 0.36 0.5 0 0 
27 1 0 0.40 0 1 0 
28 0 0 0.35 0 1 1 
29 0 1 0.52 0 0 0 
30 0 0 0.71 0 0 0 
31 0 . 0.42 0 0 0 
32 0 . 0.34 0 0 1 
33 0 0 0.47 0 0 0 
34 0 . 0.36 0.5 1 0 
35 0 . 0.31 0 0 0 
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Table B1: Continued 
36 0 0 0.09 0 1 0 
37 0 1 0.54 0.5 0 1 
38 0 0 0.49 1 1 0 
39  1 0.54 1 1 0 
40 0 1 0.68 1 1 1 
41 0 1 0.54 1 1 0 
42 0 1 0.49 1 1 0 
43 0 1 0.67 1 1 0 
44 0 1 0.60 1 1 0 
45 0 1 0.60 1 1 1 
46 0 0 0.53 1 0 0 
47 0 1 0.56 1 1 1 
48 0 1 0.62 1 1 1 
49 0 0 0.61 1 1 0 
50 0 0 0.39 1 1 0 
51 0 0 0.21 0.5 1 1 
52 0 0 0.52 0 1 0 
53 0 1 0.44 0 1 1 
54 0 0 0.51 0 0 0 
55 1 1 0.38  1 1 
56 0 1 0.64 0 1 1 
57  0 0.40 0 1 0 
58 0 1 0.48 0.5 1 0 
59 0 1 0.55 0 1 1 
60 0 1 0.59 0.5 1 1 
61 0 0 0.11 0 1 0 
62 0 . 0.62 0.5 1 1 
63 0 0 0.55 0 0 0 
64 0 0 0.52 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0.31 0 0 0 
66 1 0 0.44 0 1 1 
67 0 0 0.65 0 0 1 
68 0 0 0.54 0.5 1 1 
69 0 1 0.76 0 0 0 
70 0 . 0.45 0 1 1 
71 0 1 0.62 0 1 1 
72 0 . 0.59 0 1 0 
73 0 . 0.49 1 0 0 
74 0 0 0.54 0 0 0 
75 0 1 0.33 0 1 0 
76 0 0 0.79 0  0 
77 0 1 0.59 0 1 1 
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Table B1: Continued 
78 0 . 0.51 0.5 1 1 
79  0 0.68 0 1 0 
80 0 1 0.26 1 1 0 
81 0 0 0.51 0 1 1 
82 0 0 0.21 0 1 1 
83 0 1 0.76 0.5 1 1 
84 0 1 0.44 0 0 1 
85 0 1 0.87 0 0 1 
86 0 0 0.44 0.5 0 0 
87 0 1 0.06 0 1 0 
88 0 0 0.11 0.5 0 0 
89 1 1 0.66 0 1 1 
90 0 0 0.27 0.5 0 0 
91 0 1 0.62 0 0 1 
92 0 1 0.60 0 0 0 
93 0 1 0.42 0 0 1 
94 0 0 0.41 0.5 0 0 
95 0 0 0.25 0.5 0 0 
96 0 0 0.64 0 0 0 
97 0 . 0.64 0 0 1 
98 1 0 0.28 0.5 0 0 
99 0 1 0.46 0 0 0 
100 0 1 0.54 0 0 0 
101 0 . 0.61 0 0 1 
102 0 1 0.54 0.5 1 0 
103 0 . 0.58 0 0 1 
104 0 0 0.69 0.5 1 0 
105 1 0 0.40 0.5 1 0 
106 0 0 0.34 0.5 0 0 
107 0 0 0.42 0.5 0 0 
108 0 1 0.62 0 1 0 
109 0 0 0.46 0 1 0 
110 0 1 0.54 1 0 0 
111 1 . 0.58 0.5 1 0 
112 0 1 0.53 0 0 0 
113 0 0 0.39 0 0 0 
114 0 0 0.21 0 0 0 
115 0 1 0.66 0 1 1 
116 0 . 0.55 0.5 0 0 
117 0 0 0.54 0 0 0 
118 1 1 0.72 0 1 1 































Table B1: Continued 
120 0 0 0.45 1 0 0 
121 0 1 0.60 0 1 1 
122 0 1 0.36 0 1 1 
123 0 0 0.31 0 1 0 
124 0 1 0.64 0 0 0 
125 0 1 0.45 0.5 1 0 
126 0 . 0.46 0 0 1 
127 0 0 0.35 0 0 0 
128 0 1 0.54 0 0 1 
129 1 . 0.32 0  1 
130 0 0 0.26 0 0 0 
131 0 1 0.62 0.5 1 1 
132 0 0 0.54 0 0 0 
133 0 1 0.45 0 0 1 
134 0 1 0.29 0 0 1 
135 0 0 0.36 0.5 0 0 
136 0 0 0.14 0.5 1 0 
137 0 1 0.15 0.5 1 0 
138 0 0 0.21 0.5 0 0 
139 0 0 0.31 0 0 0 
140 0 1 0.88 0 1 1 
141 0 . 0.60 0 0 1 
142 0 0 0.71 0 0 1 
143 0 1 0.91 0 0 1 
144 0 0 0.78 0  1 
145 0 1 0.54 0 0 0 
146 0 1 0.40 0.5 1 0 
147 0 1 0.59 0 0 0 
148 1 1 0.58 0 0 1 
149 0 1 0.53 0.5 0 1 
150 0 1 0.58 1 0 0 
151  0 0.62 0 0 1 
152 1 1 0.31 0 0 0 
153 0 1 0.74 0 1 1 
154 0 0 0.48 0 0 0 
155 0 0 0.51 0.5 0 1 
156 0 0 0.75 0 1 0 
157 0 0 0.59 0 0 0 
158 0 1 0.56 0 0 1 
159 0 0 0.40 0.5 0 0 
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Table B1a: Truth Table 
Local Policy Changes 2010-2013 
LHD 
Policy 




1 0 0.08 0 1 1 1 
2 0 0.55 0.5 1 0 0 
3 0 0.56 0 1 0 1 
4 0 0.39 0.5 1 1 1 
5 0 0.66 0 1 1 1 
6 0 0.51 0 1 1 1 
7 0 0.20 0.5 0 0 0 
8 0 0.53 0 1 1 1 
9 0 0.56 1 1 0 1 
10  0.44 1 1 1 0 
11 0 0.40 0.5 0 0 0 
12 0 0.47 0 0 0 0 
13  0.71 0 0 1 0 
14 0 0.32 0.5 0 1 0 
15 0 0.39 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0.45 0.5 0 0 0 
17 0 0.54 0 1 1 1 
18 0 0.31 0.5 0 1 0 
19 0 0.43 0 0 0 0 
20 0 0.16 0.5 0 0 0 
21 0 0.62 0 1 1 1 
22 0 0.57 0 1 0 1 
23 1 0.31 0 1 1 0 
24 0 0.64 0 0 1 0 
25 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 
26 0 0.20 0 0 0 0 
27 0 0.37 0.5 0 0 0 
28 0 0.55 0 1 1 1 
29 0  0 0 1 1 
30 0 0.57 0 1 1 1 
31 0 0.46 0 1 1 1 
32 0 0.43 0 1 0 0 
33 0 0.62 0 1 1 1 
34 0 0.57 0 1 0 0 
35 0 0.56 0 1 1 0 
36 0 0.53 0 1 1 1 
37 0 0.30 0 0 0 1 
38 0 0.59 0 1 0 1 
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Table B1a: Continued 
39 0 0.62 1 1 1 1 
40 0 0.47 0 0 0  
41 0 0.49 0 1 0 1 
42 0 0.05 0 0 1 0 
43 0 0.46 0.5 1 0 1 
44 0 0.53 1 1 1 0 
45 0 0.51 1 1 1 1 
46 0 0.25 0.5 0 0 0 
47 0 0.48 0 1 0 1 
48 0 0.47 0 0 0 1 
49 1 0.11  1 1 1 
50 0 0.51 0 1 1 1 
51  0.41 0 0 1 0 
52 0 0.34 0.5 1 1 0 
53 0 0.55 0 0 1 1 
54 0 0.55 1 1 1 1 
55 0 0.64 0.5 1 1 1 
56 0 0.11 0 0 1 0 
57 0 0.53 0 0 0 0 
58 0 0.64 0.5 1 1 1 
59 0 0.48 0 0 0 0 
60  0.31 0 0 0  
61 1 0.46 0 0 1  
62 0 0.62 0 0 0 1 
63 0 0.57 0 1 1 1 
64 0 0.47 0.5 0 0 1 
65 0 0.76 0 1 0 1 
66 0 0.39 1 0 1 0 
67 0 0.52 0 0 1 1 
68 0 0.62 0 1 1 1 
69 0 0.44 0 1 1 1 
70 0 0.61 0 0 0 0 
71 0 0.51 0 0 0 1 
72 0 0.32 0 1 1 0 
73 0 0.76 0 1 1 1 
74 0 0.52 0 1 1 1 
75 0 0.56 0.5 1 0 1 
76 0 0.53 0.5 1 1 1 
77  0.64 0 0 1 0 
78 0 0.43 0 0 1 1 
79 0 0.36 0 0 0 1 
80 0 0.68 0 0 0  
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Table B1a: Continued 
81 0 0.44 0.5 0 0 0 
82 0 0.34 0 1 1 1 
83 0 0.47 0 0 0  
84 0 0.61 0 1 1 1 
85 0 0.38 0 0 0 1 
86 0 0.17 0.5 0 0  
87 0 0.60 0 1 0 1 
88 0 0.31 0.5 0 0 0 
89 0 0.40 0.5 0 0 0 
90 0 0.21 0.5 0 0 0 
91 0 0.60 0 1 0 1 
92 0 0.61 0 0 0 1 
93 0 0.52 0.5 0 1  
94 0 0.51 0 1 0 1 
95 0 0.54 0 1 0 1 
96 0 0.70 1 1 1 1 
97 0 0.46 1 0 0 0 
98 0 0.56 0 0 1  
99 1 0.68 0.5 1 1 1 
100 0 0.01 0 0 0  
101 0 0.66 1 1 1 1 
102 0 0.64 1 1 1 1 
103 0 0.23 0 0 0 0 
104 0 0.74 0 1 1 1 
105 0 0.59 0.5 0 0 0 
106 0 0.53 0 1 1  
107 0 0.51 1 0 1 0 
108 0 0.53 1 0 0 0 
109 0 0.59 0 1 1 1 
110 0 0.54 0.5 0 1  
111 0 0.51 1 0 0 0 
112 0 0.22 0.5 0 1  
113 0 0.40 1 0 0 0 
114 0 0.38 0.5 0 0  
115 0 0.57 1 1 1  
116 0 0.49 0.5 0 1  
117 0 0.47 0.5 0 0 1 
118 0 0.46 0 1 0 1 
119 0 0.31 0 0 1 0 
120 0 0.16 0 1 0 0 
121 0 0.49 0.5 1 1  
122 0 0.64 0 0 0 1 
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Table B1a: Continued 
123 1 0.87 0 1 1 1 
124 0 0.33 0 0 1 1 
125 0 0.17 0 1 0 1 
126 0 0.45 0 0 0  
127 0 0.54 1 0 1 0 
128 0 0.37 0 0 0  
129 0 0.52 0 1 0 1 
130 0 0.37 0.5 0 0 0 
131 0 0.44 0.5 0 1 0 
132 0 0.61 0.5 1 1 1 
133 0 0.20 0.5 0 0 0 
134 0 0.45 0 0 0 1 
135 0 0.55 0 1 1 1 
136 0 0.46 0 1 0  
137 0 0.38 0 0 0  
138 0 0.85 0 1 0 1 
139 0 0.55 0 0 0 1 
140 0 0.56 0 1 0 1 
141 0 0.47 0.5 1 1 0 
142 0 0.71 0 0 0 0 
143 0 0.53 0 1 0 0 
144 0 0.68 0 1 0 1 
145 0 0.47 0.5 1 1  
146 0 0.01 0 0 1  
147  0.63 0 0 0 1 
148 1 0.34 0 1 0 1 
149  0.51 0.5 0 0 0 
150 0 0.49 1 1 1 1 
151 0 0.74 0 1 1 1 
152 0 0.44 0 0 0 0 
153 0 0.53 0.5 0 0 1 
154 0 0.51 0 0 1 0 
155 0 0.62 0 1 1 1 
156 0 0.53 0 1 0  








Table B1b: Truth Table 






100k Special Central 
Per Capita 
Expend 
1 0 0  0.39 0.5 1 
2 0  0 0.53 0.5 0 
3 0  0 0.47 0 1 
4 0 1 1 0.41 0.5 1 
5 1  1 0.62 0 0 
6 0 1 1 0.61 0 1 
7 0 0 0 0.11 0.5 0 
8 0 1 1 0.51 0 1 
9 0 0 0 0.58 0 0 
10  0 1 0.74 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0.42 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0.52 0.5 0 
13 0 1 1 0.45 0 1 
14 0  0 0.60 0 0 
15 0 1 1 0.55 0 0 
16 0 1 1 0.42 0 0 
17 0 0 1 0.15 0.5 0 
18 0 1 1 0.65 0 1 
19 0 0 1 0.58 0 0 
20 0 1 1 0.40 0 0 
21 0  1 0.54 0 0 
22 0 0 0 0.34 0 0 
23 0  1  0.5 0 
24 0  1 0.60 0 0 
25 0 0  0.35 0 0 
26 0 0 0 0.36 0.5 0 
27 1 0 1 0.40 0 0 
28 0 0 1 0.35 0 1 
29 0 1 0 0.52 0 0 
30 0 0 0 0.71 0 0 
31 0  0 0.42 0 0 
32 0  0 0.34 0 1 
33 0 0 0 0.47 0 0 
34 0  1 0.36 0.5 0 
35 0  0 0.31 0 0 
36 0 0 1 0.09 0 0 




Table B1b: Continued 
38 0 0 1 0.49 1 0 
39  1 1 0.54 1 0 
40 0 1 1 0.68 1 1 
41 0 1 1 0.54 1 0 
42 0 1 1 0.49 1 0 
43 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 
44 0 1 1 0.60 1 0 
45 0 1 1 0.60 1 1 
46 0 0 0 0.53 1 0 
47 0 1 1 0.56 1 1 
48 0 1 1 0.62 1 1 
49 0 0 1 0.61 1 0 
50 0 0 1 0.39 1 0 
51 0 0 1 0.21 0.5 1 
52 0 0 1 0.52 0 0 
53 0 1 1 0.44 0 1 
54 0 0 0 0.51 0 0 
55 0 1  0.38  1 
56 0 1 1 0.64 0 1 
57  0 1 0.40 0 0 
58 0 1 1 0.48 0.5 0 
59 0 1 1 0.55 0 1 
60 0 1 1 0.59 0.5 1 
61 0 0 1 0.11 0 0 
62 0  1 0.62 0.5 1 
63 0 0 0 0.55 0 0 
64 0 0 0 0.52 0 0 
65 0 0 0 0.31 0 0 
66 25 0 1 0.44 0 1 
67 0 0 0 0.65 0 1 
68 0 0 1 0.54 0.5 1 
69 0 1 0 0.76 0 0 
70 0  1 0.45 0 1 
71 0 1 1 0.62 0 1 
72 0  1 0.59 0 0 
73 0  0 0.49 1 0 
74 0 0 0 0.54 0 0 
75 0 1 1 0.33 0 0 
76 0 0  0.79 0 0 
77 0 1 1 0.59 0 1 
78 0  1 0.51 0.5 1 
79  0 1 0.68 0 0 
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Table B1b: Continued 
80 0 1 1 0.26 1 0 
81 0 0 1 0.51 0 1 
82 0 0 1 0.21 0 1 
83 0 1 1 0.76 0.5 1 
84 0 1 0 0.44 0 1 
85 0 1 0 0.87 0 1 
86 0 0 0 0.44 0.5 0 
87 0 1 1 0.06 0 0 
88 0 0 0 0.11 0.5 0 
89 0 1 1 0.66 0 1 
90 0 0 0 0.27 0.5 0 
91 0 1 0 0.62 0 1 
92 0 1 0 0.60 0 0 
93 0 1 0 0.42 0 1 
94 0 0 0 0.41 0.5 0 
95 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 0 
96 0 0 0 0.64 0 0 
97 0  0 0.64 0 1 
98 0 0 0 0.28 0.5 0 
99 0 1 0 0.46 0 0 
100 0 1 0 0.54 0 0 
101 0  0 0.61 0 1 
102 0 1 1 0.54 0.5 0 
103 0  0 0.58 0 1 
104 0 0 1 0.69 0.5 0 
105 0 0 1 0.40 0.5 0 
106 0 0 0 0.34 0.5 0 
107 0 0 0 0.42 0.5 0 
108 0 1 1 0.62 0 0 
109 0 0 1 0.46 0 0 
110 0 1 0 0.54 1 0 
111 0  1 0.58 0.5 0 
112 0 1 0 0.53 0 0 
113 0 0 0 0.39 0 0 
114 0 0 0 0.21 0 0 
115 0 1 1 0.66 0 1 
116 0  0 0.55 0.5 0 
117 0 0 0 0.54 0 0 
118 0 1 1 0.72 0 1 
119 0  1 0.26 1 0 
120 0 0 0 0.45 1 0 
121 0 1 1 0.60 0 1 
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Table B1b: Continued 
122 0 1 1 0.36 0 1 
123 0 0 1 0.31 0 0 
124 0 1 0 0.64 0 0 
125 0 1 1 0.45 0.5 0 
126 0  0 0.46 0 1 
127 0 0 0 0.35 0 0 
128 0 1 0 0.54 0 1 
129 1   0.32 0 1 
130 0 0 0 0.26 0 0 
131 0 1 1 0.62 0.5 1 
132 0 0 0 0.54 0 0 
133 0 1 0 0.45 0 1 
134 0 1 0 0.29 0 1 
135 0 0 0 0.36 0.5 0 
136 0 0 1 0.14 0.5 0 
137 0 1 1 0.15 0.5 0 
138 0 0 0 0.21 0.5 0 
139 0 0 0 0.31 0 0 
140 0 1 1 0.88 0 1 
141 0  0 0.60 0 1 
142 0 0 0 0.71 0 1 
143 0 1 0 0.91 0 1 
144 0 0  0.78 0 1 
145 0 1 0 0.54 0 0 
146 0 1 1 0.40 0.5 0 
147 0 1 0 0.59 0 0 
148 1 1 0 0.58 0 1 
149 0 1 0 0.53 0.5 1 
150 0 1 0 0.58 1 0 
151  0 0 0.62 0 1 
152 0 1 0 0.31 0 0 
153 0 1 1 0.74 0 1 
154 0 0 0 0.48 0 0 
155 0 0 0 0.51 0.5 1 
156 0 0 1 0.75 0 0 
157 0 0 0 0.59 0 0 
158 0 1 0 0.56 0 1 






Table B2: Truth Table 
Local Organizational Changes All Years 
LHD 
Overall 





1 0 0 0.39 0.5  1 
2 1  0.53 0.5 0 0 
3 1  0.47 0 0 1 
4 0 1 0.41 0.5 1 1 
5 1  0.62 0 1 0 
6 1 1 0.61 0 1 1 
7 0 0 0.11 0.5 0 0 
8 1 1 0.51 0 1 1 
9 1 0 0.58 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0.74 0 1 0 
11 0 0 0.42 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0.52 0.5 0 0 
13 1 1 0.45 0 1 1 
14 0  0.60 0 0 0 
15 0 1 0.55 0 1 0 
16 1 1 0.42 0 1 0 
17 1 0 0.15 0.5 1 0 
18 1 1 0.65 0 1 1 
19 0 0 0.58 0 1 0 
20 0 1 0.40 0 1 0 
21 0  0.54 0 1 0 
22 0 0 0.34 0 0 0 
23 0   0.5 1 0 
24 0  0.60 0 1 0 
25 1 0 0.35 0  0 
26 1 0 0.36 0.5 0 0 
27 1 0 0.40 0 1 0 
28 1 0 0.35 0 1 1 
29 0 1 0.52 0 0 0 
30 1 0 0.71 0 0 0 
31 1  0.42 0 0 0 
32 1  0.34 0 0 1 
33 0 0 0.47 0 0 0 
34 1  0.36 0.5 1 0 
35 0  0.31 0 0 0 
36 1 0 0.09 0 1 0 
37 1 1 0.54 0.5 0 1 
38 0 0 0.49 1 1 0 
39 1 1 0.54 1 1 0 
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Table B2: Continued 
40 0 1 0.68 1 1 1 
41 1 1 0.54 1 1 0 
42 1 1 0.49 1 1 0 
43 0 1 0.67 1 1 0 
44 1 1 0.60 1 1 0 
45 0 1 0.60 1 1 1 
46 1 0 0.53 1 0 0 
47 1 1 0.56 1 1 1 
48 1 1 0.62 1 1 1 
49 0 0 0.61 1 1 0 
50 0 0 0.39 1 1 0 
51 0 0 0.21 0.5 1 1 
52 0 0 0.52 0 1 0 
53 1 1 0.44 0 1 1 
54 1 0 0.51 0 0 0 
55 1 1 0.38   1 
56 1 1 0.64 0 1 1 
57 1 0 0.40 0 1 0 
58 1 1 0.48 0.5 1 0 
59 1 1 0.55 0 1 1 
60 1 1 0.59 0.5 1 1 
61 0 0 0.11 0 1 0 
62 0  0.62 0.5 1 1 
63 0 0 0.55 0 0 0 
64 0 0 0.52 0 0 0 
65 1 0 0.31 0 0 0 
66 0 0 0.44 0 1 1 
67 1 0 0.65 0 0 1 
68 0 0 0.54 0.5 1 1 
69 0 1 0.76 0 0 0 
70 1  0.45 0 1 1 
71 1 1 0.62 0 1 1 
72 1  0.59 0 1 0 
73 0  0.49 1 0 0 
74 1 0 0.54 0 0 0 
75 0 1 0.33 0 1 0 
76 1 0 0.79 0  0 
77 1 1 0.59 0 1 1 
78 0  0.51 0.5 1 1 
79 1 0 0.68 0 1 0 
80 0 1 0.26 1 1 0 
81 1 0 0.51 0 1 1 
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Table B2: Continued 
82 0 0 0.21 0 1 1 
83 0 1 0.76 0.5 1 1 
84 1 1 0.44 0 0 1 
85 1 1 0.87 0 0 1 
86 0 0 0.44 0.5 0 0 
87 0 1 0.06 0 1 0 
88 0 0 0.11 0.5 0 0 
89 1 1 0.66 0 1 1 
90 1 0 0.27 0.5 0 0 
91 1 1 0.62 0 0 1 
92 0 1 0.60 0 0 0 
93 0 1 0.42 0 0 1 
94 1 0 0.41 0.5 0 0 
95 1 0 0.25 0.5 0 0 
96 0 0 0.64 0 0 0 
97 0  0.64 0 0 1 
98 1 0 0.28 0.5 0 0 
99 0 1 0.46 0 0 0 
100 0 1 0.54 0 0 0 
101 0  0.61 0 0 1 
102 1 1 0.54 0.5 1 0 
103 1  0.58 0 0 1 
104 1 0 0.69 0.5 1 0 
105 0 0 0.40 0.5 1 0 
106 0 0 0.34 0.5 0 0 
107 1 0 0.42 0.5 0 0 
108 0 1 0.62 0 1 0 
109 0 0 0.46 0 1 0 
110 0 1 0.54 1 0 0 
111 0  0.58 0.5 1 0 
112 0 1 0.53 0 0 0 
113 0 0 0.39 0 0 0 
114 0 0 0.21 0 0 0 
115 1 1 0.66 0 1 1 
116 0  0.55 0.5 0 0 
117 1 0 0.54 0 0 0 
118 1 1 0.72 0 1 1 
119 0  0.26 1 1 0 
120 0 0 0.45 1 0 0 
121 1 1 0.60 0 1 1 
122 1 1 0.36 0 1 1 
123 1 0 0.31 0 1 0 
139 
 
Table B2: Continued 
124 0 1 0.64 0 0 0 
125 1 1 0.45 0.5 1 0 
126 0  0.46 0 0 1 
127 0 0 0.35 0 0 0 
128 0 1 0.54 0 0 1 
129 1  0.32 0  1 
130 1 0 0.26 0 0 0 
131 1 1 0.62 0.5 1 1 
132 1 0 0.54 0 0 0 
133 1 1 0.45 0 0 1 
134 0 1 0.29 0 0 1 
135 1 0 0.36 0.5 0 0 
136 1 0 0.14 0.5 1 0 
137 1 1 0.15 0.5 1 0 
138 1 0 0.21 0.5 0 0 
139 0 0 0.31 0 0 0 
140 1 1 0.88 0 1 1 
141 1  0.60 0 0 1 
142 0 0 0.71 0 0 1 
143 0 1 0.91 0 0 1 
144 0 0 0.78 0  1 
145 1 1 0.54 0 0 0 
146 1 1 0.40 0.5 1 0 
147 0 1 0.59 0 0 0 
148 1 1 0.58 0 0 1 
149 1 1 0.53 0.5 0 1 
150 0 1 0.58 1 0 0 
151 1 0 0.62 0 0 1 
152 0 1 0.31 0 0 0 
153 1 1 0.74 0 1 1 
154 1 0 0.48 0 0 0 
155 0 0 0.51 0.5 0 1 
156 1 0 0.75 0 1 0 
157 1 0 0.59 0 0 0 
158 0 1 0.56 0 0 1 







Table B2a: Truth Table 
Local Organizational Changes 2010 to 2013 
LHD 
Activity 





1 0 0.08 0 1 1 1 
2 0 0.55 0.5 1 0 0 
3 0 0.56 0 1 0 1 
4 0 0.39 0.5 1 1 1 
5 1 0.66 0 1 1 1 
6 1 0.51 0 1 1 1 
7 0 0.20 0.5 0 0 0 
8 1 0.53 0 1 1 1 
9 0 0.56 1 1 0 1 
10 1 0.44 1 1 1 0 
11 0 0.40 0.5 0 0 0 
12 0 0.47 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0.71 0 0 1 0 
14 0 0.32 0.5 0 1 0 
15 0 0.39 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0.45 0.5 0 0 0 
17 1 0.54 0 1 1 1 
18 1 0.31 0.5 0 1 0 
19 0 0.43 0 0 0 0 
20 1 0.16 0.5 0 0 0 
21 0 0.62 0 1 1 1 
22 1 0.57 0 1 0 1 
23 0 0.31 0 1 1 0 
24 0 0.64 0 0 1 0 
25 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 
26 0 0.20 0 0 0 0 
27 1 0.37 0.5 0 0 0 
28 1 0.55 0 1 1 1 
29 1  0 0 1 1 
30 1 0.57 0 1 1 1 
31 0 0.46 0 1 1 1 
32 0 0.43 0 1 0 0 
33 0 0.62 0 1 1 1 
34 0 0.57 0 1 0 0 
35 1 0.56 0 1 1 0 
36 0 0.53 0 1 1 1 
37 1 0.30 0 0 0 1 
38 1 0.59 0 1 0 1 
39 0 0.62 1 1 1 1 
141 
 
Table B2a: Continued 
40 0 0.47 0 0 0  
41 0 0.49 0 1 0 1 
42 0 0.05 0 0 1 0 
43 0 0.46 0.5 1 0 1 
44 0 0.53 1 1 1 0 
45 0 0.51 1 1 1 1 
46 0 0.25 0.5 0 0 0 
47 1 0.48 0 1 0 1 
48 1 0.47 0 0 0 1 
49 1 0.11  1 1 1 
50 1 0.51 0 1 1 1 
51 1 0.41 0 0 1 0 
52 1 0.34 0.5 1 1 0 
53 1 0.55 0 0 1 1 
54 1 0.55 1 1 1 1 
55 1 0.64 0.5 1 1 1 
56 0 0.11 0 0 1 0 
57 0 0.53 0 0 0 0 
58 0 0.64 0.5 1 1 1 
59 0 0.48 0 0 0 0 
60 1 0.31 0 0 0  
61 0 0.46 0 0 1  
62 1 0.62 0 0 0 1 
63 1 0.57 0 1 1 1 
64 0 0.47 0.5 0 0 1 
65 0 0.76 0 1 0 1 
66 1 0.39 1 0 1 0 
67 1 0.52 0 0 1 1 
68 1 0.62 0 1 1 1 
69 1 0.44 0 1 1 1 
70 0 0.61 0 0 0 0 
71 1 0.51 0 0 0 1 
72 0 0.32 0 1 1 0 
73 1 0.76 0 1 1 1 
74 0 0.52 0 1 1 1 
75 0 0.56 0.5 1  1 
76 0 0.53 0.5 1 1 1 
77 0 0.64 0 0 1 0 
78 1 0.43 0 0 1 1 
79 1 0.36 0 0 0 1 
80 1 0.68 0 . 0  
81 0 0.44 0.5 0 0 0 
142 
 
Table B2a: Continued 
82 0 0.34 0 1 1 1 
83 0 0.47 0 0 0  
84 0 0.61 0 1 1 1 
85 0 0.38 0 0 0 1 
86 1 0.17 0.5 0 0  
87 1 0.60 0 1 0 1 
88 0 0.31 0.5 0 0 0 
89 1 0.40 0.5 0 0 0 
90 1 0.21 0.5 0 0 0 
91 0 0.60 0 1 0 1 
92 0 0.61 0 0 0 1 
93 0 0.52 0.5 0 1  
94 0 0.51 0 1 0 1 
95 0 0.54 0 1 0 1 
96 0 0.70 1 1 1 1 
97 0 0.46 1 0 0 0 
98 0 0.56 0 0 1  
99 0 0.68 0.5 1 1 1 
100 0 0.01 0 . 0  
101 1 0.66 1 1 1 1 
102 1 0.64 1 1 1 1 
103 0 0.23 0 0 0 0 
104 1 0.74 0 1 1 1 
105 1 0.59 0.5 0 0 0 
106 0 0.53 0 1 1  
107 0 0.51 1 0 1 0 
108 0 0.53 1 0 0 0 
109 1 0.59 0 1 1 1 
110 1 0.54 0.5 0 1  
111 0 0.51 1 0 0 0 
112 0 0.22 0.5 0 1  
113 0 0.40 1 0 0 0 
114 1 0.38 0.5 0 0  
115 0 0.57 1 1 1  
116 1 0.49 0.5 0 1  
117 0 0.47 0.5 0 0 1 
118 1 0.46 0 1 0 1 
119 1 0.31 0 0 1 0 
120 0 0.16 0 1 0 0 
121 1 0.49 0.5 1 1  
122 0 0.64 0 . 0 1 
123 0 0.87 0 1 1 1 
143 
 
Table B2a: Continued 
124 0 0.33 0 0 1 1 
125 1 0.17 0 1 0 1 
126 1 0.45 0 0 0  
127 1 0.54 1 0 1 0 
128 0 0.37 0 0 0  
129 0 0.52 0 1 0 1 
130 1 0.37 0.5 0 0 0 
131 0 0.44 0.5 0 1 0 
132 1 0.61 0.5 1 1 1 
133 1 0.20 0.5 0 0 0 
134 0 0.45 0 0 0 1 
135 1 0.55 0 1 1 1 
136 1 0.46 0 1 0  
137 0 0.38 0 0 0  
138 0 0.85 0 1 0 1 
139 0 0.55 0 0 0 1 
140 1 0.56 0 1 0 1 
141 1 0.47 0.5 1 1 0 
142 0 0.71 0 0 0 0 
143 0 0.53 0 1 0 0 
144 1 0.68 0 1 0 1 
145 1 0.47 0.5 1 1  
146 0 0.01 0 0 1  
147 1 0.63 0 0 0 1 
148 0 0.34 0 1 0 1 
149 1 0.51 0.5 0  0 
150 0 0.49 1 1 1 1 
151 0 0.74 0 1 1 1 
152 1 0.44 0 0 0 0 
153 0 0.53 0.5 0 0 1 
154 1 0.51 0 0 1 0 
155 1 0.62 0 1 1 1 
156 0 0.53 0 1 0  








Table B2b: Truth Table 





100k Special Central 
Per Capita 
Expend 
1 0 0  0.388235 0.5 1 
2 1 . 0 0.529412 0.5 0 
3 1 . 0 0.470588 0 1 
4 0 1 1 0.411765 0.5 1 
5 1 1 1 0.611765 0 0 
6 0 . 1 0.623529 0 1 
7 0 0 0 0.105882 0.5 0 
8 0 1 1 0.505882 0 1 
9 1 0 0 0.576471 0 0 
10 1 0 1 0.741176 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0.423529 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0.517647 0.5 0 
13 1 1 1 0.447059 0 1 
14 0 . 0 0.6 0 0 
15 0 1 1 0.552941 0 0 
16 0 1 1 0.423529 0 0 
17 1 0 1 0.152941 0.5 0 
18 1 1 1 0.647059 0 1 
19 0 0 1 0.576471 0 0 
20 0 1 1 0.4 0 0 
21 0 . 1 0.541176 0 0 
22 0 0 0 0.341176 0 0 
23 0 . 1  0.5 0 
24 0 . 1 0.6 0 0 
25 1 0  0.352941 0 0 
26 0 0 0 0.364706 0.5 0 
27 0 0 1 0.4 0 0 
28 0 0 1 0.352941 0 1 
29 0 1 0 0.517647 0 0 
30 1 0 0 0.705882 0 0 
31 1 . 0 0.423529 0 0 
32 1 . 0 0.341176 0 1 
33 0 0 0 0.470588 0 0 
34 0 . 1 0.364706 0.5 0 
35 0 . 0 0.305882 0 0 
36 1 0 1 0.094118 0 0 
37 1 1 0 0.541176 0.5 1 
38 1 0 1 0.529412 1 0 
39 0 0 1 0.611765 1 0 
145 
 
Table B2b: Continued 
40 0 0 1 0.494118 1 1 
41 0 0 1 0.388235 1 0 
42 1 1 1 0.494118 1 0 
43 0 1 1 0.623529 1 0 
44 1 1 1 0.564706 1 0 
45 0 1 1 0.541176 1 1 
46 0 1 0 0.541176 1 0 
47 0 1 1 0.682353 1 1 
48 1 1 1 0.6 1 1 
49 0 1 1 0.670588 1 0 
50 0 1 1 0.6 1 0 
51 0 0 1 0.211765 0.5 1 
52 0 0 1 0.517647 0 0 
53 0 1 1 0.435294 0 1 
54 1 0 0 0.505882 0 0 
55 1 1  0.376471  1 
56 1 1 1 0.635294 0 1 
57 1 0 1 0.4 0 0 
58 1 1 1 0.482353 0.5 0 
59 0 1 1 0.552941 0 1 
60 1 1 1 0.588235 0.5 1 
61 0 0 1 0.105882 0 0 
62 0 0 1 0.552941 0 1 
63 0 . 0 0.623529 0.5 0 
64 0 0 0 0.517647 0 0 
65 0 0 0 0.305882 0 0 
66 0 0 1 0.435294 0 1 
67 1 0 0 0.647059 0 1 
68 0 0 1 0.541176 0.5 1 
69 0 1 0 0.764706 0 0 
70 0 . 1 0.447059 0 1 
71 0 1 1 0.623529 0 1 
72 0 . 1 0.588235 0 0 
73 0 . 0 0.494118 1 0 
74 1 0 0 0.541176 0 0 
75 0 1 1 0.329412 0 0 
76 1 0 1 0.788235 0 0 
77 1 1 1 0.588235 0 1 
78 0 . 1 0.505882 0.5 1 
79 1 0 1 0.682353 0 0 
80 0 1 1 0.258824 1 0 
81 0 0 1 0.505882 0 1 
146 
 
Table B2b: Continued 
82 0 0 1 0.211765 0 1 
83 0 1 1 0.764706 0.5 1 
84 1 1 0 0.435294 0 1 
85 1 1 0 0.870588 0 1 
86 0 0 0 0.435294 0.5 0 
87 0 0 1 0.105882 0.5 0 
88 0 1 0 0.058824 0 0 
89 1 1 1 0.658824 0 1 
90 1 0 0 0.270588 0.5 0 
91 0 1 0 0.623529 0 1 
92 0 1 0 0.423529 0 0 
93 0 1 0 0.6 0 1 
94 1 0 0 0.411765 0.5 0 
95 0 0 0 0.635294 0 0 
96 1 0 0 0.247059 0.5 0 
97 0 . 0 0.635294 0 1 
98 0 1 0 0.458824 0 0 
99 1 0 0 0.282353 0.5 0 
100 0 1 0 0.541176 0 0 
101 0 . 0 0.611765 0 1 
102 1 1 1 0.541176 0.5 0 
103 1 . 0 0.576471 0 1 
104 0 0 1 0.341176 0.5 0 
105 1 0 1 0.423529 0.5 0 
106 0 0 0 0.4 0.5 0 
107 1 0 0 0.694118 0.5 0 
108 0 1 1 0.623529 0 0 
109 0 0 1 0.458824 0 0 
110 0 1 0 0.541176 1 0 
111 0 . 1 0.576471 0.5 0 
112 0 1 0 0.529412 0 0 
113 0 0 0 0.388235 0 0 
114 0 0 0 0.211765 0 0 
115 0 . 1 0.552941 0.5 1 
116 1 1 0 0.658824 0 0 
117 1 0 0 0.541176 0 0 
118 0 0 1 0.447059 1 1 
119 0 1 1 0.6 0 0 
120 0 . 0 0.258824 1 0 
121 1 1 1 0.717647 0 1 
122 0 1 1 0.364706 0 1 
123 1 0 1 0.305882 0 0 
147 
 
Table B2b: Continued 
124 0 1 0 0.635294 0 0 
125 0 0 1 0.352941 0 0 
126 0 1 0 0.447059 0.5 1 
127 0 . 0 0.458824 0 0 
128 1 . 0 0.317647 0 1 
129 0 1  0.541176 0 1 
130 0 0 0 0.258824 0 0 
131 1 1 1 0.623529 0.5 1 
132 1 0 0 0.541176 0 0 
133 1 1 0 0.447059 0 1 
134 0 1 0 0.294118 0 1 
135 1 0 0 0.364706 0.5 0 
136 1 0 1 0.141176 0.5 0 
137 1 1 1 0.152941 0.5 0 
138 1 0 0 0.211765 0.5 0 
139 0 0 0 0.305882 0 0 
140 1 . 1 0.6 0 1 
141 1 1 0 0.882353 0 1 
142 0 0 0 0.705882 0 1 
143 0 1 0 0.905882 0 1 
144 0 0  0.776471 0 1 
145 0 1 0 0.541176 0 0 
146 1 1 1 0.4 0.5 0 
147 0 1 0 0.588235 0 0 
148 1 1 0 0.576471 0 1 
149 1 1 0 0.529412 0.5 1 
150 0 1 0 0.576471 1 0 
151 0 0 0 0.623529 0 1 
152 0 1 0 0.305882 0 0 
153 1 1 1 0.741176 0 1 
154 1 0 0 0.482353 0 0 
155 0 0 0 0.505882 0.5 1 
156 0 0 1 0.752941 0 0 
157 1 0 0 0.588235 0 0 
158 0 1 0 0.564706 0 1 







Table B3: Truth Table 
State Policy Changes All Years 






1 0 1 0.62 0 1 1 
2 0 0 0.37 0 1 0 
3 1 1 0.36 0 0 1 
4 1 1 0.51 1 1 1 
5 1 1 0.37 0 0 1 
6 0 1 0.49 0 0 1 
7 0 0 0.41 0 1 0 
8 1 0 0.41 0 1 1 
9 1 1 0.67 1 0 1 
10 1 0 0.36 0 0 1 
11 0 1 0.52 . 1 0 
12 1 0 0.24 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0.24 0 0 1 
14 1 0 0.24 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0.24 0 1 0 
16 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0.24 0 0 1 
19 1 0 0.24 0 1 0 
20 1 1 0.24 0 0 1 
21 1 1 0.24 0 1 1 
22 0 0 0.24 0 0 1 
23 0 1 0.24 0 1 0 
24 0 1 0.24 1 1 1 
25 0 1 0.24 0 0 1 
26 0 0 0.24 0 1 0 
27 1 0 0.24 0 0 0 
28 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 
29 0 0 0.24 0 1 1 
30 0 1 0.24 0 0 0 
31 1 1 0.24 0 1 1 
32 1 1 0.24 0 0 1 
33 0 0 0.24 0 1 0 
34 1 0 0.24 0 0 1 
35 1 1 0.24 0 1 0 
36 1 0 0.24 0 0 0 
37 1 1 0.24 0 1 1 
38 1 0 0.24 . 1 0 
149 
 
Table B3: Continued 
39  1 0.24 1 0 1 
40 1 0 0.24 0 1 0 
41 0 1 0.24 0 0 1 
42 1 1 0.24 0 1 1 
43 1 0 0.24 0 0 0 
44 0 0 0.24 1 1 0 
45 1 1 0.24 0 0 1 
46 1 1 0.24 0 0 0 
47 1 0 0.24 0 1 0 
48 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 























Table B3a: Truth Table 
State Policy Changes 2010-2012 
State 
Policy 





1 0 0 0.59 1 1 1 
2 0 0 0.35 0 0 1 
3 0 0 0.47 1 1 0 
4 1 1 0.45 1 1 1 
5 1 0 0.29 1 1 1 
6 0 0 0.43 1 0 0 
7 0 0 0.40 0 1 0 
8 1 0 0.38 0 1 1 
9 1 1 0.61 1 1 1 
10 1 0 0.37 0 1 0 
11 0 . 0.53 1 0 1 
12 1 0 0.36 0 0 0 
13 1 0 0.36 0 1 0 
14 1 0 0.45 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0.39 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0.25 0 1 1 
18 0 0 0.54 1 1 0 
19 1 0 0.38 0 0 1 
20 1 0 0.32 1 1 0 
21 1 0 0.75 1 1 1 
22 0 0 0.25 0 1 1 
23 0 0 0.36 1 0 1 
24 0 1 0.63 1 1 1 
25 0 0 0.34 1 1 0 
26 0 0 0.39 0 0 0 
27 1 0 0.37 0 0 1 
28 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
29 0 0 0.37 1 1 1 
30 0 0 0.36 1 0 0 
31 1 0 0.43 1 1 1 
32 1 . 0.40 1 1 0 
33 0 0 0.45 0 0 1 
34 1 0 0.29 0 1 0 
35 1 0 0.52 1 0 1 
36 1 0 0.38 0 0 0 
37 1 0 0.32 1 1 0 
38 1 . 0.59 0 0 1 
39 1 0 0.37 0 0 1 
151 
 
Table B3a: Continued 
40 0 0 0.54 1 1 1 
41 1 0 0.49 1 1 1 
42 1 0 0.41 0 0 0 
43 0 1 0.40 0 0 1 
44 1 0 0.59 1 1 0 
45 0 0 0.33 1 0 0 
46 1 0 0.37 0 0 1 
47 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 

























Table B3b: Truth Table 









1 0 1 0.62 0 1 1 
2 0 0 0.37 0 1 0 
3 1 1 0.36 0 0 1 
4 0 1 0.51 1 1 1 
5 1 1 0.37 0 0 1 
6 0 1 0.49 0 0 1 
7 0 0 0.41 0 1 0 
8 0 0 0.41 0 1 1 
9 1 1 0.67 1 0 1 
10 0 0 0.36 0 0 1 
11 0 1 0.52 . 1 0 
12 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0.28 0 0 1 
14 0 0 0.47 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0.35 0 1 0 
16 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0.29 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0.60 0 0 1 
19 0 0 0.39 0 1 0 
20 1 1 0.21 0 0 1 
21 1 1 0.78 0 1 1 
22 0 0 0.28 0 0 1 
23 0 1 0.38 0 1 0 
24 0 1 0.53 1 1 1 
25 0 1 0.35 0 0 1 
26 0 0 0.32 0 1 0 
27 0 0 0.43 0 0 0 
28 0 0 0.15 0 0 0 
29 0 0 0.34 0 1 1 
30 0 1 0.57 0 0 0 
31 1 1 0.48 0 1 1 
32 0 1 0.34 0 0 1 
33 0 0 0.47 0 1 0 
34 0 0 0.31 0 0 1 
35 0 1 0.58 0 1 0 
36 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
37 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 
38 0 0 0.58 . 1 0 
153 
 
Table B3b: Continued 
       
39  1 0.51 1 0 1 
40 0 0 0.42 0 1 0 
41 0 1 0.59 0 0 1 
42 1 1 0.50 0 1 1 
43 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
44 0 0 0.43 1 1 0 
45 0 1 0.55 0 0 1 
46 1 1 0.43 0 0 0 
47 0 0 0.39 0 1 0 
48 0 0 0.23 0 0 0 























Table B4: Truth Table 
State Organizational Changes All Years 





1 1 1 0.62 0 1 1 
2 0 0 0.37 0 1 0 
3 1 1 0.36 0 0 1 
4 1 1 0.51 1 1 1 
5 1 1 0.37 0 0 1 
6 1 1 0.49 0 0 1 
7 1 0 0.41 0 1 0 
8 1 0 0.41 0 1 1 
9 0 1 0.67 1 0 1 
10 1 0 0.36 0 0 1 
11 1 1 0.52 . 1 0 
12 1 0 0.24 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0.28 0 0 1 
14 1 0 0.47 0 0 0 
15 1 0 0.35 0 1 0 
16 1 0 0.36 0 0 0 
17 1 0 0.29 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0.60 0 0 1 
19 1 0 0.39 0 1 0 
20 1 1 0.21 0 0 1 
21 0 1 0.78 0 1 1 
22 1 0 0.28 0 0 1 
23 1 1 0.38 0 1 0 
24 0 1 0.53 1 1 1 
25 1 1 0.35 0 0 1 
26 1 0 0.32 0 1 0 
27 1 0 0.43 0 0 0 
28 1 0 0.15 0 0 0 
29 1 0 0.34 0 1 1 
30 1 1 0.57 0 0 0 
31 0 1 0.48 0 1 1 
32 1 1 0.34 0 0 1 
33 1 0 0.47 0 1 0 
34 1 0 0.31 0 0 1 
35 1 1 0.58 0 1 0 
36 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 





Table B4: Continued 
38 1 0 0.58 . 1 0 
39 0 1 0.51 1 0 1 
40 1 0 0.42 0 1 0 
41 1 1 0.59 0 0 1 
42 1 1 0.50 0 1 1 
43 1 0 0.37 0 0 0 
44 1 0 0.43 1 1 0 
45 1 1 0.55 0 0 1 
46 1 1 0.43 0 0 0 
47 0 0 0.39 0 1 0 
48 0 0 0.23 0 0 0 























Table B4a: Truth Table 
State Organizational Changes 2010-2012 
State 
Activity 






1 0 0 0.59 1 1 1 
2 0 0 0.35 0 0 1 
3 0 0 0.47 1 1 0 
4 1 1 0.45 1 1 1 
5 1 0 0.29 1 1 1 
6 1 0 0.43 1 0 0 
7 0 0 0.40 0 1 0 
8 1 0 0.38 0 1 1 
9 0 1 0.61 1 1 1 
10 1 0 0.37 0 1 0 
11 1 . 0.53 1 0 1 
12 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 
13 1 0 0.36 0 1 0 
14 1 0 0.45 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 
16 1 0 0.39 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0.25 0 1 1 
18 1 0 0.54 1 1 0 
19 0 0 0.38 0 0 1 
20 0 0 0.32 1 1 0 
21 0 0 0.75 1 1 1 
22 1 0 0.25 0 1 1 
23 1 0 0.36 1 0 1 
24 0 1 0.63 1 1 1 
25 1 0 0.34 1 1 0 
26 1 0 0.39 0 0 0 
27 0 0 0.37 0 0 1 
28 1 0 0.37 0 0 0 
29 0 0 0.37 1 1 1 
30 1 0 0.36 1 0 0 
31 0 0 0.43 1 1 1 
32 1 . 0.40 1 1 0 
33 1 0 0.45 0 0 1 
34 1 0 0.29 0 1 0 
35 0 0 0.52 1 0 1 
36 0 0 0.38 0 0 0 
37 0 0 0.32 1 1 0 
38 1 . 0.59 0 0 1 
157 
 
Table B4a: Continued 
39 0 0 0.37 0 0 1 
40 1 0 0.54 1 1 1 
41 0 0 0.49 1 1 1 
42 1 0 0.41 0 0 0 
43 0 1 0.40 0 0 1 
44 1 0 0.59 1 1 0 
45 1 0 0.33 1 0 0 
46 0 0 0.37 0 0 1 
47 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 
























Table B4b: Truth Table 
State Organizational Changes 2013-2016 
State 
Activity 





1 1 1 0.62 0 1 1 
2 0 0 0.37 0 1 0 
3 1 1 0.36 0 0 1 
4 1 1 0.51 1 1 1 
5 1 1 0.37 0 0 1 
6 1 1 0.49 0 0 1 
7 1 0 0.41 0 1 0 
8 1 0 0.41 0 1 1 
9 0 1 0.67 1 0 1 
10 0 0 0.36 0 0 1 
11 1 1 0.52 . 1 0 
12 1 0 0.24 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0.28 0 0 1 
14 0 0 0.47 0 0 0 
15 1 0 0.35 0 1 0 
16 1 0 0.36 0 0 0 
17 1 0 0.29 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0.60 0 0 1 
19 1 0 0.39 0 1 0 
20 1 1 0.21 0 0 1 
21 0 1 0.78 0 1 1 
22 1 0 0.28 0 0 1 
23 1 1 0.38 0 1 0 
24 0 1 0.53 1 1 1 
25 1 1 0.35 0 0 1 
26 0 0 0.32 0 1 0 
27 1 0 0.43 0 0 0 
28 1 0 0.15 0 0 0 
29 1 0 0.34 0 1 1 
30 0 1 0.57 0 0 0 
31 0 1 0.48 0 1 1 
32 1 1 0.34 0 0 1 
33 1 0 0.47 0 1 0 
34 1 0 0.31 0 0 1 
35 1 1 0.58 0 1 0 
36 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
37 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 
38 1 0 0.58 . 1 0 
39 0 1 0.51 1 0 1 
159 
 
Table B4b: Continued 
40 1 0 0.42 0 1 0 
41 0 1 0.59 0 0 1 
42 1 1 0.50 0 1 1 
43 1 0 0.37 0 0 0 
44 1 0 0.43 1 1 0 
45 1 1 0.55 0 0 1 
46 0 1 0.43 0 0 0 
47 0 0 0.39 0 1 0 
48 0 0 0.23 0 0 0 
























APPENDIX C: BOTTOM-UP TRUTH TABLES 
 
 
Table C1: Truth Table 










1 0 0 0.40 1 0 1 
2 0 0 0.64 1 0 0 
3 0 0.5 0.42 1 0 1 
4 1 0 0.60 1 1 1 
5 0 0 0.44 . 1   
6 0 0 0.60 0 0 1 
7 0 0.5 0.21 0 0   
8 1 0 0.56 1 0 1 
9 0 1 0.52 1 1 0 
10 0 1 0.50 1 1 0 
11 0 0.5 0.53 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0.58 0 1 0 
13 0 0 0.55 0 1 1 
14 0 0 0.41 0 0   
15 0 0.5 0.56 0 0   
16 1 0 0.60 1 1 0 
17 0 0.5 0.28 1 0 0 
18 0 0.5 0.44 0 1 1 
19 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0.57 0 1 0 
21 0 0 0.65 0 0 0 
22 0 0.5 0.21 0 0   
23 0 0 0.60 1 1 0 
24 0 0 0.80 1 0   
25 1 0 0.50 1 1 0 
26 0 0 0.33 1 0 0 
27 0 0 0.66 0 1 0 
28 0 0 0.35 0 0 1 
29 0 0.5 0.30 1 0 0 
30 0 0 0.60 1 0 0 
31 0 0 0.19 .   0 
32 0 0.5 0.43 0 0 1 
33 0 0 0.60 1 0 0 
161 
 
Table C1: Continued 
34 1 0 0.78 1 1   
35 0 0 0.65 1 0   
36 0  0.53 . 1   
37 0 0 0.50 0 0 1 
38 0 0 0.56 1 0 0 
39 0 1 0.65 1 1 0 
40 0 0 0.44 0 0 1 
41 0 0 0.58 1 1 0 
42 1 0 0.05 0 1 0 
43 1 0 0.10 0 1 0 
44 0 0.5 0.50 1 0 0 
45 0 0.5 0.24 0 0 1 
46 0 0 0.63 1 1 0 
47 0 0 0.53 0 1 1 
48 0 0 0.58 1 0 1 
49 0 0 0.23 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0.42 0 1 0 
51 0 0.5 0.55 1 0 1 
52 0 0 0.52 1 0 0 
53 0 1 0.50 . 1 1 
54 0 0.5 0.57 1 0   
55 0 0 0.21 0 1 1 
56 0 0 0.53 0 0 1 
57 0 0.5 0.57 1 0 0 
58 0 0 0.49 0 0 0 
59 0 0 0.42 0 0 1 
60 0 0 0.41 0 0 1 
61 0 0 0.45 0 1   
62 0 0 0.43 1 1 1 
63 0 0.5 0.58 0 1 0 
64 0 0 0.72 1 0   
65 0 1 0.41 0 0 0 
66 0 0 0.51 1 1 1 
67 0 0 0.71 . 1 1 
68 0 0 0.58 1 0 1 
69 0 0 0.55 0 1   
70 0 0 0.50 0 0 1 
71 0 0 0.38 . 1 1 
72 0 0 0.72 1 1   
73 0 0 0.50 1 0 0 
74 0 0.5 0.65 1 1 0 
75 0 0.5 0.59 1 1 0 
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Table C1: Continued 
76 1 1 0.50 1 1   
77 0 0 0.70 0 1 1 
78 0 0 0.44 0 1 1 
79 0 0.5 0.49 1 1 0 
80 0 0 0.64 0 0 0 
81 0 0.5 0.40 0 0 1 
82 1 0 0.49 1 0 1 
83 0 0 0.22 0 0 1 
84 0 0 0.48 1 0 1 
85 1 0 0.45 1 1 1 
86 0 0.5 0.34 0 0 0 
87 1 0 0.64 1 1   
88 0 0.5 0.31 0 0   
89 0 0.5 0.19 0 0 1 
90 0 0.5 0.34 0 0   
91 0 0 0.51 1 1 1 
92 0 0 0.52 0 1   
93 0 0.5 0.47 0 1 1 
94 0 0 0.62 1 0   
95 0 0 0.64 1 0   
96 0 1 0.70 . 0 0 
97 0 1 0.71 1 0 1 
98 0 1 0.45 0 1   
99 0 0 0.23 0 1 0 
100 1 0.5 0.63 1 1 0 
101 0 0 0.37 1 0 1 
102 0 1 0.67 1 1   
103 0 1 0.40 0 1 1 
104 0 0 0.59 . 1 0 
105 1 0 0.56 1 1   
106 0 0.5 0.58 . 0   
107 1 0 0.74 1 0   
108 0 1 0.44 0 0 0 
109 0 1 0.00 . 1   
110 0 0 0.69 1 1 0 
111 0 1 0.31 0 1   
112 0 0.5 0.40 0 1 0 
113 0 1 0.42 1 0   
114 0 0.5 0.72 0 1 0 
115 0 1 0.44 1 1 1 
116 0 0.5 0.57 0 1   
117 0 1 0.55 1 1 0 
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Table C1: Continued 
118 0 0.5 0.38 0 1 1 
119 0 1 0.31 1 0   
120 0 0.5 0.35 0 0   
121 0 0 0.55 1 1 1 
122 0 0 0.38 1 1 1 
123 0 0 0.62 0 0 0 
124 0 0 0.57 1 0 0 
125 0 0.5 0.47 1 1 0 
126 0 0 0.64 . 1 1 
127 0 0 0.94 1 0 0 
128 0 0 0.29 0 1 1 
129 0 0 0.47 1 0 1 
130 1 0 0.31 1 0 0 
131 0 0 0.27 0 0 1 
132 0 1 0.48 0 0 0 
133 0 0 0.50 0 0 1 
134 0 0 0.48 . 0 1 
135 0 0.5 0.22 . 1   
136 1 0.5 0.24 0 1   
137 0 0.5 0.48 1 0   
138 0 0.5 0.37 0 1   
139 0 0 0.45 0 0   
140 0 0 0.76 1 1 1 
141 0 0 0.33 0 1 1 
142 1 0 0.88 1 1 1 
143 0 0 0.65 . 1 1 
144 0 0.5 0.40 1 1 1 
145 0 0 0.62 1 0 0 
146 0 0 0.70 . 1 0 
147 0 0.5 0.59 0 1 0 
148 0 0 0.20 0 0 1 
149 0 0 0.77 0 0 1 
150 0 0.5 0.19 0 0 0 
151 0 0 0.53 0 1 1 
152 0 0.5 0.43 0    
153 0 1 0.66 . 0 1 
154 0 0 0.51 1 0 0 
155 0 0 0.44 0 0 1 
156 0 0.5 0.60 . 1 0 
157 1 0 0.44 . 1   
158 1 0 0.60 1 1 1 
159 0 0 0.53 0 1 0 
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Table C2: Truth Table 
State Policy Changes All Years 
State 
Trans-






1 0 1 0.62 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0.37 0 0 1 
3 0 1 0.36 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0.51 1 1 1 
5 1 1 0.37 0 0 0 
6 1 1 0.50 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0.41 0 0 1 
8 1 0 0.41 0 1 1 
9 0 1 0.67 1 1 0 
10 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 
11 0 1 0.52 . 0 1 
12 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0.28 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0.48 0 1 0 
15 0 0 0.35 0 1 1 
16 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0.29 0 1 0 
18 0 0 0.60 0 1 0 
19 0 0 0.39 0 0 1 
20 0 1 0.21 0 1 0 
21 0 1 0.78 0 0 1 
22 0 0 0.28 0 1 0 
23 0 1 0.38 0 0 1 
24 0 1 0.53 1 1 1 
25 0 1 0.35 0 1 0 
26 0 0 0.32 0 0 1 
27 0 0 0.43 0 0 0 
28 0 0 0.15 0 0 0 
29 0 0 0.34 0 1 1 
30 0 1 0.57 0 1 0 
31 0 1 0.49 0 1 1 
32 0 1 0.34 0 0 0 
33 1 0 0.48 0 0 1 
34 0 0 0.31 0 1 0 
35 0 1 0.58 0 1 1 
36 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
37 1 1 0.38 0 1 1 
38 0 0 0.58 . 1 1 
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Table C2: Continued 
39 0 1 0.51 1 1 0 
40 0 0 0.42 0 1 1 
41 0 1 0.59 0 1 0 
42 0 1 0.5 0 1 1 
43 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
44 0 0 0.43 1 1 1 
45 0 1 0.55 0 0 0 
46 0 1 0.43 0 0 0 
47 0 0 0.39 0 1 1 
48 0 0 0.23 0 0 0 























Table C3: Truth Table 
Local Activity Changes All Years 
LHD 
Activity 







1 0 0.5 0.39 0 1 1 
2 0 0.5 0.53  1 0 
3 0 0 0.47  0 1 
4 1 0.5 0.41 1 0 1 
5 1 0 0.62  1   
6 1 0 0.61 1 1 1 
7 0 0.5 0.11 0 1   
8 1 0 0.51 1 0 1 
9 1 0 0.58 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0.74 0 1 0 
11 1 0 0.42 0 0 0 
12 1 0.5 0.52 0 0 0 
13 1 0 0.45 1 1 1 
14 0 0 0.60  0   
15 1 0 0.55 1 0   
16 1 0 0.42 1 1 0 
17 1 0.5 0.15 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0.65 1 0 1 
19 0 0 0.58 0 1 0 
20 0 0 0.40 1 0 0 
21 1 0 0.54  1 0 
22 0 0 0.34 0 0   
23 1 0.5   1 0 
24 1 0 0.60  0   
25 1 0 0.35 0 0 0 
26 1 0.5 0.36 0 0 0 
27 1 0 0.40 0 0 0 
28 1 0 0.35 0 1 1 
29 0 0 0.52 1 0 0 
30 1 0 0.71 0 0 0 
31 1 0 0.42  0 0 
32 1 0 0.34  0 1 
33 1 0 0.47 0 0 0 
34 1 0.5 0.36  0   
35 1 0 0.31  1   
36 0 0 0.09 0 1   
37 1 0.5 0.54 1 0 1 
38 1 1 0.49 0 1 0 
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Table C3: Continued 
39 0 1 0.54 1 0 0 
40 0 1 0.68 1 1 1 
41 1 1 0.54 1 1 0 
42 1 1 0.49 1 0 0 
43 1 1 0.67 1 1 0 
44 1 1 0.60 1 1 0 
45 1 1 0.60 1 0 1 
46 1 1 0.53 0 1 0 
47 1 1 0.56 1 1 1 
48 1 1 0.62 1 1 1 
49 1 1 0.61 0 1 0 
50 0 1 0.39 0 1 0 
51 0 0.5 0.21 0 0 1 
52 0 0 0.52 0 0 0 
53 1 0 0.44 1 1 1 
54 1 0 0.51 0 1   
55 1  0.38 1 1 1 
56 1 0 0.64 1 0 1 
57 0 0 0.40 0 1 0 
58 1 0.5 0.48 1 1 0 
59 1 0 0.55 1 0 1 
60 0 0.5 0.59 1 1 1 
61 0 0 0.11 0 1   
62 1 0.5 0.62  0 1 
63 0 0 0.55 0 0 0 
64 1 0 0.52 0 0   
65 0 0 0.31 0 0 0 
66 1 0 0.44 0 0 1 
67 1 0 0.65 0 1 1 
68 1 0.5 0.54 0 1 1 
69 0 0 0.76 1 0   
70 0 0 0.45  1 1 
71 1 0 0.62 1 1 1 
72 0 0 0.59  0   
73 1 1 0.49  0 0 
74 1 0 0.54 0 1 0 
75 1 0 0.33 1 0 0 
76 0 0 0.79 0 1   
77 1 0 0.59 1 0 1 
78 1 0.5 0.51  1 1 
79 1 0 0.68 0 0 0 
80 0 1 0.26 1 1 0 
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Table C3: Continued 
81 1 0 0.51 0 1 1 
82 0 0 0.21 0 0 1 
83 1 0.5 0.76 1 1 1 
84 0 0 0.44 1 0 1 
85 1 0 0.87 1 0 1 
86 1 0.5 0.44 0 0 0 
87 1 0 0.06 1 0   
88 0 0.5 0.11 0 0   
89 1 0 0.66 1 0 1 
90 1 0.5 0.27 0 1   
91 1 0 0.62 1 1 1 
92 0 0 0.60 1 0   
93 1 0 0.42 1 0 1 
94 1 0.5 0.41 0 0   
95 1 0.5 0.25 0 0   
96 1 0 0.64 0 0 0 
97 1 0 0.64  0 1 
98 0 0.5 0.28 0 1   
99 1 0 0.46 1 1 0 
100 0 0 0.54 1 1 0 
101 1 0 0.61  1 1 
102 1 0.5 0.54 1 1   
103 0 0 0.58  1 1 
104 0 0.5 0.69 0 0 0 
105 1 0.5 0.40 0 1   
106 1 0.5 0.34 0 1   
107 0 0.5 0.42 0 0   
108 1 0 0.62 1 0 0 
109 1 0 0.46 0 1   
110 0 1 0.54 1 1 0 
111 1 0.5 0.58  1   
112 0 0 0.53 1 0 0 
113 0 0 0.39 0 0   
114 1 0 0.21 0 1 0 
115 1 0 0.66 1 0 1 
116 1 0.5 0.55  0   
117 0 0 0.54 0 0 0 
118 1 0 0.72 1 0 1 
119 1 1 0.26  0   
120 0 1 0.45 0 1   
121 1 0 0.60 1 1 1 
122 1 0 0.36 1 1 1 
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Table C3: Continued 
123 1 0 0.31 0 1 0 
124 1 0 0.64 1 0 0 
125  0.5 0.45 1 1 0 
126 1 0 0.46  1 1 
127 0 0 0.35 0 1 0 
128 1 0 0.54 1 0 1 
129 0 0 0.32  0 1 
130 1 0 0.26 0 1 0 
131 0 0.5 0.62 1 1 1 
132 0 0 0.54 0 0 0 
133 1 0 0.45 1 0 1 
134 1 0 0.29 1 0 1 
135 1 0.5 0.36 0 1   
136 0 0.5 0.14 0 1   
137 1 0.5 0.15 1 1   
138 1 0.5 0.21 0 1   
139 0 0 0.31 0 0   
140 0 0 0.88 1 1 1 
141 1 0 0.60  0 1 
142 1 0 0.71 0 1 1 
143 1 0 0.91 1 1 1 
144 1 0 0.78 0 1 1 
145 1 0 0.54 1 1 0 
146  0.5 0.40 1 0 0 
147 0 0 0.59 1 0 0 
148 1 0 0.58 1 1 1 
149 1 0.5 0.53 1 1 1 
150 0 1 0.58 1 0 0 
151 0 0 0.62 0 0 1 
152 1 0 0.31 1 0   
153 1 0 0.74 1 0 1 
154 0 0 0.48 0 0 0 
155 1 0.5 0.51 0 1 1 
156 0 0 0.75 0 1 0 
157 1 0 0.59 0 1   
158  0 0.56 1 1 1 






Table C3a: Truth Table 
Local Activity Changes 2008-2010 
LHD 
Activity 







1 0 0 0.52 1 0 1 
2 0 0 0.53 1 1 1 
3 1 0 0.43 1 1 1 
4 0 0.5 0.20 0 0  
5 1 0 0.56 1 0 1 
6 0 1 0.49 0 1 0 
7 0 1 0.48 1 1 0 
8 0 0.5 0.47 0 0 0 
9 1 0 0.67 0 1 0 
10 0 0 0.49 0 1 0 
11 0 0 0.40 0 0 0 
12 0 0.5 0.52 0 1 0 
13 0 0 0.48 1 1 1 
14 0 0.5 0.37 1 0 0 
15 0 0 0.62 0 1 1 
16 1 0 0.68 1 0 1 
17 0 0 0.61 1 1 0 
18 1 0.5 0.16 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0.60 1 1 1 
20 1 0 0.69 1 0 1 
21 0 0 0.48 0 1 0 
22 0 0 0.32 1 0 0 
23 1 0 0.49 0 1 0 
24 1 0.5 0.83 0 0 0 
25 1 0 0.78 1 0 0 
26 1 0 0.18 0 0 0 
27 0 0.5 0.39 0 0 0 
28 1 0 0.68 0 0 1 
29 1 0 0.66 1 1 1 
30 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
31 1 0 0.56 1 0 1 
32 0 1 0.63 1 1 1 
33 1 0 0.64 0 0 0 
34 1 0 0.36 1 0  
35 1 0 0.40 0 0 0 
36 1 0 0.52 1 1 1 
37 0 0 0.00 0 1 0 
38 0 0 0.09 0 1 0 
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Table C3a: Continued 
39 0 0.5 0.46 1 0 1 
40 0 0.5 0.28 0 0 0 
41 1 0 0.62 1 1 1 
42 0 0 0.49 1 0 0 
43 0 0 0.49 0 1  
44 1  0.33 1 1 1 
45 0 0 0.74 1 0 1 
46 0 0 0.40 0 0 0 
47 1 0.5 0.48 1 1 1 
48 0 0 0.51 0 1 0 
49 0 1 0.55 1 1 0 
50 0 0.5 0.63 1 1 1 
51 0 0 0.20 0 1 0 
52 1 0.5 0.45 1 0 1 
53 0 0 0.56 0 0 0 
54 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
55 0 0 0.38 0 0 0 
56 1 0 0.45 0 0 1 
57 0 0 0.43 0 1 0 
58 1 0 0.63 0 1 1 
59 1 0.5 0.54 0 1 1 
60 0 0 0.77 1 0 1 
61 1 1 0.37 0 0 0 
62 0 0 0.44 1 1 1 
63 1 0 0.78 1 1 1 
64 0 0 0.61 1 0 0 
65 0 0 0.53 0 1 0 
66 0 0 0.61 0 0 0 
67 1 0 0.31 1 1 0 
68 0 0 0.67 . 1 1 
69 1 0 0.48 1 0 1 
70 0 0.5 0.63 1 1 1 
71 1 1 0.54 1 1 0 
72 1 0 0.61 0 1 0 
73 0 0 0.41 0 1 1 
74 0 0.5 0.60 1 1 1 
75 0 0 0.45 0 0 1 
76 0 0 0.56 . 0  
77 1 0.5 0.47 0 0 0 
78 0 0 0.37 1 0 1 
79 0 0.5 0.10 0 0  
80 0 0 0.20 0 0  
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Table C3a: Continued 
81 1 0 0.60 1 0 1 
82 0 0 0.43 . 1 1 
83 0 0.5 0.26 0 0 0 
84 1 0 0.54 1 1 1 
85 0 0 0.47 0 0 1 
86 1 0 0.63 0 0 1 
87 0 0 0.43 1 0 1 
88 1 0.5 0.29 0 0  
89 0 0.5 0.21 0 0 0 
90 1 0 0.53 1 1 1 
91 0 0 0.41 1 1 0 
92 1 0 0.63 0 1 1 
93 0 0.5 0.44 0 1 0 
94 0 0 0.53 1 0 1 
95 1 0 0.64 1 0 1 
96 1 1 0.62 1 0 1 
97 0 0.5 0.25 0 1 0 
98 0 0.5 0.15 0 1 0 
99 0 1 0.70 1 0 1 
100 1 1 0.55 0 1 0 
101 0 0 0.28 0 1 0 
102 0 0.5 0.44 0 1 0 
103 0 0.5 0.31 0 0  
104 0 0.5 0.68 1 1 1 
105 0 0 0.46 1 0 0 
106 0 1 0.66 1 1 1 
107 0 1 0.64 1 1 1 
108 0 0 0.29 0 1 0 
109 0 0 0.56 1 1 0 
110 0 0.5 0.54 0 0 0 
111 1 0 0.68 1 1 1 
112 0 0 0.78 1 0 1 
113 0 1 0.29 0 1 0 
114 0 0.5 0.46 . 0  
115 0 1 0.57 1 0 0 
116 1 1 0.47 1 1  
117 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 
118 0 0.5 0.32 0 1 1 
119 0 0.5 0.56 0 0  
120 0 1 0.55 1 0 0 
121 0 0.5 0.39 0 0 1 
122 0 0 0.52 1 1 0 
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Table C3a: Continued 
123 0 0 0.31 0 1  
124 0 0 0.57 1 0 0 
125 0 0.5 0.47 1 0 0 
126 0 0 0.70 1 1 1 
127 0 0 0.87 1 0 1 
128 0 0 0.31 0 1 0 
129 1 0 0.75 . 0  
130 1 0 0.64 1 0 1 
131 0 0 0.40 1 0 1 
132 1 0 0.30 0 0 0 
133 0 1 0.47 0 0 0 
134 0 0.5 0.57 1 1 1 
135 0 0 0.44 0 0 0 
136 1 0 0.69 1 0 1 
137 1 0.5 0.59 1 0 0 
138 0 0 0.45 0 0 1 
139 0 0 0.56 1 1 1 
140 1 0 0.47 1 0 1 
141 0 0 0.34 0 1 1 
142 0 0 0.80 1 1 1 
143 0 0 0.59 0 1 1 
144 0 0.5 0.40 1 1 0 
145 0 0 0.43 0 1 0 
146 0 0 0.52 1 0 0 
147 1 0 0.64 . 1 1 
148 0 0.5 0.48 0 1 1 
149 0 0 0.31 0 1 0 
150 0 0 0.66 0 0 0 
151 1 0 0.38 0 0 1 
152 0 0.5 0.48 0 0 0 
153 1 1 0.49 1 0 1 
154 1 0 0.76 1 0 1 
155 0 0 0.48 0 0 0 
156 1 0.5 0.53 0 1 1 
157 0 0 0.31 0 1 0 
158 1 1 0.48 0 0 0 
159 0 0 0.74 1 1 1 






Table C3b: Truth Table 
Local Activity Changes 2010-2013 
LHD 
Activity 






1 0 0.08 0 1 1 0 
2 0 0.55 0.5 1 0 1 
3 0 0.56 0 1 1 0 
4 0 0.39 0.5 1 1 0 
5 1 0.66 0 1 1 1 
6 0 0.51 0 1 1 1 
7 0 0.20 0.5 0 0 0 
8 0 0.53 0 1 1 0 
9 0 0.56 1 1 1 1 
10 0 0.44 1 1 0 1 
11 0 0.40 0.5 0 0 0 
12 1 0.47 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0.71 0 0 0 1 
14 0 0.32 0.5 0 0 1 
15 1 0.39 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0.45 0.5 0 0 0 
17 0 0.54 0 1 1 1 
18 0 0.31 0.5 0 0 0 
19 0 0.43 0 0 0 0 
20 0 0.16 0.5 0 0 0 
21 0 0.62 0 1 1 0 
22 1 0.57 0 1 1 0 
23 0 0.31 0 1 0 0 
24 0 0.64 0 0 0 1 
25 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 
26 0 0.20 0 0 0   
27 1 0.37 0.5 0 0 0 
28 0 0.55 0 1 1 0 
29 1  0 0 1 1 
30 0 0.57 0 1 1 1 
31 0 0.46 0 1 1 0 
32 1 0.43 0 1 0 0 
33 0 0.62 0 1 1 0 
34 0 0.57 0 1 0 0 
35 0 0.56 0 1 0 0 
36 0 0.53 0 1 1 0 
37 0 0.30 0 0 1 0 
38 1 0.59 0 1 1 0 
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Table C3b: Continued 
39 0 0.62 1 1 1 1 
40 0 0.47 0 0  0 
41 0 0.49 0 1 1 1 
42 0 0.05 0 0 0 1 
43 0 0.46 0.5 1 1 0 
44 0 0.53 1 1 0 1 
45 0 0.51 1 1 1 1 
46 0 0.25 0.5 0 0 0 
47 0 0.48 0 1 1 1 
48 0 0.47 0 0 1 1 
49 1 0.11  1 1 1 
50 1 0.51 0 1 1 0 
51 0 0.41 0 0 0 0 
52 1 0.34 0.5 1 0 0 
53 1 0.55 0 0 1 0 
54 1 0.55 1 1 1 1 
55 0 0.64 0.5 1 1 0 
56 0 0.11 0 0 0 1 
57 0 0.53 0 0 0 0 
58 1 0.64 0.5 1 1 0 
59 0 0.48 0 0 0 0 
60 0 0.31 0 0  0 
61 1 0.46 0 0  0 
62 0 0.62 0 0 1 1 
63 0 0.57 0 1 1 1 
64 0 0.47 0.5 0 1 1 
65 0 0.76 0 1 1 0 
66 0 0.39 1 0 0 1 
67 0 0.52 0 0 1 1 
68 1 0.62 0 1 1 1 
69 0 0.44 0 1 1 0 
70 0 0.61 0 0 0 1 
71 0 0.51 0 0 1 0 
72 0 0.32 0 1 0 1 
73 0 0.76 0 1 1 1 
74 1 0.52 0 1 1 0 
75 0 0.56 0.5 1 1 1 
76 1 0.53 0.5 1 1 1 
77 1 0.64 0 0 0 1 
78 0 0.43 0 0 1 1 
79 0 0.36 0 0 1 0 
80 1 0.68 0 .  0 
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Table C3b: Continued 
81 1 0.44 0.5 0 0 0 
82 1 0.34 0 1 1 0 
83 1 0.47 0 0  0 
84 0 0.61 0 1 1 0 
85 0 0.38 0 0 1 1 
86 0 0.17 0.5 0  0 
87 1 0.60 0 1 1 1 
88 1 0.31 0.5 0 0 0 
89 0 0.40 0.5 0 0 0 
90 0 0.21 0.5 0 0 1 
91 0 0.60 0 1 1 1 
92 1 0.61 0 0 1 1 
93 1 0.52 0.5 0  1 
94 0 0.51 0 1 1 0 
95 0 0.54 0 1 1 1 
96 0 0.70 1 1 1 0 
97 0 0.46 1 0 0 1 
98 0 0.56 0 0  1 
99 0 0.68 0.5 1 1 1 
100 0 0.01 0 .  0 
101 0 0.66 1 1 1 1 
102 1 0.64 1 1 1 1 
103 0 0.23 0 0 0 1 
104 1 0.74 0 1 1 1 
105 0 0.59 0.5 0 0 0 
106 1 0.53 0 1  0 
107 0 0.51 1 0 0 0 
108 0 0.53 1 0 0 1 
109 1 0.59 0 1 1 1 
110 0 0.54 0.5 0  0 
111 0 0.51 1 0 0 1 
112 0 0.22 0.5 0  0 
113 0 0.40 1 0 0 1 
114 0 0.38 0.5 0  1 
115 0 0.57 1 1  0 
116 0 0.49 0.5 0  0 
117 0 0.47 0.5 0 1 0 
118 0 0.46 0 1 1 1 
119 1 0.31 0 0 0 1 
120 0 0.16 0 1 0 0 
121 0 0.49 0.5 1  1 
122 1 0.64 0 . 1 1 
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Table C3b: Continued 
123 0 0.87 0 1 1 0 
124 0 0.33 0 0 1 1 
125 0 0.17 0 1 1 0 
126 1 0.45 0 0  0 
127 0 0.54 1 0 0 0 
128 0 0.37 0 0  0 
129 1 0.52 0 1 1 0 
130 0 0.37 0.5 0 0 1 
131 0 0.44 0.5 0 0 1 
132 1 0.61 0.5 1 1 0 
133 1 0.20 0.5 0 0 1 
134 0 0.45 0 0 1 0 
135 0 0.55 0 1 1 1 
136 0 0.46 0 1  0 
137 1 0.38 0 0  1 
138 0 0.85 0 1 1 1 
139 0 0.55 0 0 1 1 
140 1 0.56 0 1 1 1 
141 0 0.47 0.5 1 0 0 
142 1 0.71 0 0 0 1 
143 0 0.53 0 1 0 0 
144 1 0.68 0 1 1 1 
145 0 0.47 0.5 1  1 
146 0 0.01 0 0  0 
147 0 0.63 0 0 1 0 
148 0 0.34 0 1 1 0 
149 0 0.51 0.5 0 0   
150 0 0.49 1 1 1 1 
151 1 0.74 0 1 1 0 
152 0 0.44 0 0 0 0 
153 0 0.53 0.5 0 1 1 
154 0 0.51 0 0 0 1 
155 1 0.62 0 1 1 1 
156 0 0.53 0 1  1 








Table C3c: Truth Table 
Local Activity Changes 2013-2016 
LHD 
Activity 






1 0 0.5 0.39 0 1 1 
2 0 0.5 0.53 1 1 0 
3 0 0 0.47 1 0 1 
4 0 0.5 0.41 1 0 1 
5 1 0 0.62 1 1   
6 0 0 0.61 1 1 1 
7 0 0.5 0.11 0 1   
8 0 0 0.51 1 0 1 
9 1 0 0.58 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0.74 0 1 0 
11 1 0 0.42 0 0 0 
12 1 0.5 0.52 0 0 0 
13   0 0.45 1 1 1 
14 0 0 0.60 1 0   
15 0 0 0.55 1 0   
16 1 0 0.42 1 1 0 
17 0 0.5 0.15 0 0 0 
18 0 0 0.65 1 0 1 
19 0 0 0.58 0 1 0 
20 0 0 0.40 1 0 0 
21 1 0 0.54 1 1 0 
22 0 0 0.34 0 0   
23 0 0.5  1 1 0 
24 1 0 0.6 1 0   
25 0 0 0.35 0 0 0 
26 1 0.5 0.36 0 0 0 
27 0 0 0.40 0 0 0 
28 0 0 0.35 0 1 1 
29 0 0 0.52 1 0 0 
30 0 0 0.71 0 0 0 
31 1 0 0.42 1 0 0 
32 0 0 0.34 1 0 1 
33 0 0 0.47 0 0 0 
34 1 0.5 0.36 1 0   
35 0 0 0.31 1 1   
36 0 0 0.09 0 1   




Table C3c: Continued 
38 1 1 0.49 0 1 0 
39 0 1 0.54 1 0 0 
40 0 1 0.68 1 1 1 
41 1 1 0.54 1 1 0 
42 1 1 0.49 1 0 0 
43 0 1 0.67 1 1 0 
44 1 1 0.60 1 1 0 
45 1 1 0.60 1 0 1 
46 1 1 0.53 0 1 0 
47 1 1 0.56 1 1 1 
48 0 1 0.62 1 1 1 
49 1 1 0.61 0 1 0 
50 0 1 0.39 0 1 0 
51 0 0.5 0.21 0 0 1 
52 0 0 0.52 0 0 0 
53 0 0 0.44 1 1 1 
54 0 0 0.51 0 1   
55 0  0.38 1 1 1 
56 1 0 0.64 1 0 1 
57 0 0 0.40 0 1 0 
58 0 0.5 0.48 1 1 0 
59 0 0 0.55 1 0 1 
60 0 0.5 0.59 1 1 1 
61 0 0 0.11 0 1   
62 0 0.5 0.62 1 0 1 
63 0 0 0.55 0 0 0 
64 0 0 0.52 0 0   
65 0 0 0.31 0 0 0 
66 0 0 0.44 0 0 1 
67 1 0 0.65 0 1 1 
68 0 0.5 0.54 0 1 1 
69 0 0 0.76 1 0   
70 0 0 0.45 1 1 1 
71 0 0 0.62 1 1 1 
72 0 0 0.59 1 0   
73 1 1 0.49 1 0 0 
74 1 0 0.54 0 1 0 
75 0 0 0.33 1 0 0 
76 0 0 0.79 0 1   
77 1 0 0.59 1 0 1 
78 0 0.5 0.51 1 1 1 
79 0 0 0.68 0 0 0 
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Table C3c: Continued 
80 0 1 0.26 1 1 0 
81 0 0 0.51 0 1 1 
82 0 0 0.21 0 0 1 
83 1 0.5 0.76 1 1 1 
84 0 0 0.44 1 0 1 
85 0 0 0.87 1 0 1 
86 0 0.5 0.44 0 0 0 
87  0 0.06 1 0   
88 0 0.5 0.11 0 0   
89 0 0 0.66 1 0 1 
90 0 0.5 0.27 0 1   
91 0 0 0.62 1 1 1 
92 0 0 0.60 1 0   
93 0 0 0.42 1 0 1 
94 0 0.5 0.41 0 0   
95 1 0.5 0.25 0 0   
96 1 0 0.64 0 0 0 
97 1 0 0.64 1 0 1 
98 0 0.5 0.28 0 1   
99 1 0 0.46 1 1 0 
100 0 0 0.54 1 1 0 
101 0 0 0.61 1 1 1 
102 0 0.5 0.54 1 1   
103 0 0 0.58 1 1 1 
104 0 0.5 0.69 0 0 0 
105  0.5 0.40 0 1   
106 0 0.5 0.34 0 1   
107 0 0.5 0.42 0 0   
108 0 0 0.62 1 0 0 
109 0 0 0.46 0 1   
110 0 1 0.54 1 1 0 
111 1 0.5 0.58 1 1   
112 0 0 0.53 1 0 0 
113 0 0 0.39 0 0   
114 1 0 0.21 0 1 0 
115 1 0 0.66 1 0 1 
116 0 0.5 0.55 1 0   
117 0 0 0.54 0 0 0 
118 0 0 0.72 1 0 1 
119 0 1 0.26 1 0   
120 0 1 0.45 0 1   
121 0 0 0.60 1 1 1 
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Table C3c: Continued 
122 1 0 0.36 1 1 1 
123 0 0 0.31 0 1 0 
124 0 0 0.64 1 0 0 
125  0.5 0.45 1 1 0 
126  0 0.46 1 1 1 
127 0 0 0.35 0 1 0 
128 1 0 0.54 1 0 1 
129 0 0 0.32 1 0 1 
130 0 0 0.26 0 1 0 
131 0 0.5 0.62 1 1 1 
132 0 0 0.54 0 0 0 
133 0 0 0.45 1 0 1 
134 0 0 0.29 1 0 1 
135 0 0.5 0.36 0 1   
136 0 0.5 0.14 0 1   
137  0.5 0.15 1 1   
138 0 0.5 0.21 0 1   
139 0 0 0.31 0 0   
140 0 0 0.88 1 1 1 
141 0 0 0.60 1 0 1 
142 0 0 0.71 0 1 1 
143 0 0 0.91 1 1 1 
144 1 0 0.78 0 1 1 
145 0 0 0.54 1 1 0 
146  0.5 0.40 1 0 0 
147 0 0 0.59 1 0 0 
148 0 0 0.58 1 1 1 
149 0 0.5 0.53 1 1 1 
150 0 1 0.58 1 0 0 
151 0 0 0.62 0 0 1 
152 0 0 0.31 1 0   
153 0 0 0.74 1 0 1 
154 0 0 0.48 0 0 0 
155 0 0.5 0.51 0 1 1 
156 0 0 0.75 0 1 0 
157 0 0 0.59 0 1   
158  0 0.56 1 1 1 






Table C4: Truth Table 
State Activity Changes All Years 
State 
Activity 
Change FTE Special 
Coronary 
Death Rate Central 
Per Capita 
Expend 
1 0 1 0.62 0 0.5 1 
2 0 0 0.37 0 0.5 1 
3 0 1 0.36 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0.51 1 1 1 
5 0 1 0.37 0 0 0 
6 0 1 0.49 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0.41 0 0 1 
8 0 0 0.41 1 0 1 
9 0 1 0.67 1 1  
10 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 
11 0 1 0.52 0 . 1 
12 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 
13 0 1 0.28 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0.47 1 0 0 
15 0 0 0.35 1 0 1 
16 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0.29 1 0 0 
18 1 0 0.60 1 0.5  
19 0 0 0.39 0 0.5 1 
20 0 1 0.21 1 0 0 
21 0 1 0.78 0 0 1 
22  0 0.28 1 0 0 
23 0 1 0.38 0 0 1 
24 0 1 0.53 1 1 1 
25 0 1 0.35 1 0 0 
26 1 0 0.32 0 0 1 
27 0 0 0.43 0 0 1 
28 0 0 0.15 0 0.5 0 
29 0 0 0.34 1 0 1 
30 1 1 0.57 1 0.5  
31 1 1 0.48 1 0 1 
32 0 1 0.34 0 0 0 
33 0 0 0.47 0 0 1 
34 0 0 0.31 1 0 0 
35 0 1 0.58 1 0.5 1 
36 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
37 0 1 0.38 1 0.5 1 
38 1 0 0.58 1 . 1 
39 0 1 0.51 1 1 0 
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Table C4: Continued 
40 1 0 0.42 1 0.5 1 
41 1 1 0.59 1 0.5 0 
42 0 1 0.50 1 0.5 1 
43 1 0 0.37 0 0  
44 0 0 0.43 1 1 1 
45 0 1 0.55 0 0.5 0 
46 0 1 0.43 0 0 0 
47 0 0 0.39 1 0 1 
48 0 0 0.23 0 0 0 
























Table C4a: Truth Table 
State Activity Changes 2008 to 2010 
State 
Activity 






1 0 1 0.5 0 0.57 1 
2 0 0 0.5 0 0.42 1 
3 0 1 0 1 0.42 1 
4 0 1 1 1 0.54 1 
5 0 1 0 1 0.38 0 
6   0 
 
0 0 0.54 1 
7 0 0 0 0 0.46 0 
8   0 0 1 0.59 1 
9 0 1 1 1 0.52 1 
10 0 0 0 0 0.40 0 
11  1  0 0.51 1 
12 0 0 0 0 0.34 0 
13 0  0 1 0.27 0 
14 0 0 0 1 0.39 0 
15 0 0 0 1 0.36 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0.43 0 
17 0 0 0 1 0.29 1 
18 1 1 0.5 1 0.66 0 
19 0 0 0.5 0 0.35 0 
20  1 0 1 0.43 1 
21 0 1 0 0 0.80 1 
22 0 0 0 1 0.30 0 
23 0 1 0 0 0.46 1 
24 0 1 1 1 0.65 1 
25 0 1 0 1 0.36 0 
26 0 0 0 0 0.45 0 
27 0 0 0 0 0.57 1 
28 0  0.5 0 0.46 0 
29 0 0 0.5 0 0.43 0 
30 0 1 0 1 0.37 0 
31 0 1 0.5 0 0.44 1 
32 0 1 0 1 0.48 0 
33  1 0 1 0.36 0 
34 0 0 0 0 0.46 1 
35 0 0 0 1 0.39 1 




Table C4a: Continued 
37 0 0 0 1 0.36 0 
38 0 1 0.5 0 0.32 0 
39 1 0  1 0.73 0 
40 0 1 1 0 0.57 1 
41   0 0.5 1 0.37 0 
42 1 1 0.5 1 0.38 0 
43  1 0.5 1 0.55 1 
44 0 0 0 0 0.54 1 
45 0 0 1 0 0.60 0 
46 0 1 0.5 0 0.45 1 
47 0 1 0 0 0.46 1 
48 0 0 0 1 0.56 0 
49 0 0 0 0 0.49 0 





















Table C4b: Truth Table 
State Activity Changes 2010 to 2013 






1 0 0.59 0 1 1 0.5 
2 0 0.35 0 0 1 0.5 
3 0 0.47 1 1 0 0 
4 0 0.45 1 1 1 1 
5 0 0.29 1 1 1 0 
6 0 0.43 0 1 0 0 
7 0 0.40 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0.38 1 0 1 0 
9 0 0.61 1 1 1 1 
10 0 0.37 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0.53 0 1 1 . 
12 0 0.36 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0.36 1 0 0 0 
14 0 0.45 1 0 0 0 
15 0 0.33 1 0 0 0 
16 0 0.39 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0.25 1 0 1 0 
18 1 0.54 1 1 0 0.5 
19 0 0.38 0 0 1 0.5 
20 0 0.32 1 1 0 0 
21 0 0.75 0 1 1 0 
22 0 0.25 1 0 1 0 
23 0 0.36 0 1 1 0 
24 0 0.63 1 1 1 1 
25 0 0.34 1 1 0 0 
26 1 0.39 0 0 0 0 
27 0 0.37 0 0 1 0 
28 0 0.37 0 0 0 0.5 
29 0 0.37 1 1 1 0 
30 0 0.36 0 1 0 0.5 
31 0 0.43 1 1 1 0 
32 0 0.40 0 1 0 . 
33 0 0.45 0 0 1 0 
34 0 0.29 1 0 0 0 
35 0 0.52 1 1 1 0.5 
36 0 0.38 0 0 0 0 
37 0 0.32 1 1 0 0.5 
38 1 0.59 1 0 1 . 
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Table C4b: Continued 
39 1 0.37 1 0 1 0.5 
40 1 0.54 1 1 1 0.5 
41 0 0.49 1 1 1 0.5 
42 1 0.41 0 0 0 0 
43 0 0.40 0 0 1 1 
44 0 0.59 0 1 0 0.5 
45 0 0.33 0 1 0 0 
46 0 0.37 1 0 1 0 
47 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 
























Table C4c: Truth Table 
State Activity Changes 2013 to 2016  
State 
Activity 







1 0 1 0.62 0 0.5 1 
2 0 0 0.37 0 0.5 1 
3 0 1 0.36 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0.51 1 1 1 
5 0 1 0.37 0 0 0 
6 0 1 0.49 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0.41 0 0 1 
8 0 0 0.41 1 0 1 
9 0 1 0.67 1 1   
10 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 
11 0 1 0.52 0 . 1 
12 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 
13 0 1 0.28 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0.47 1 0 0 
15 0 0 0.35 1 0 1 
16 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0.29 1 0 0 
18 0 0 0.60 1 0.5   
19 0 0 0.39 0 0.5 1 
20 0 1 0.21 1 0 0 
21 0 1 0.78 0 0 1 
22 0 0 0.28 1 0 0 
23 0 1 0.38 0 0 1 
24 0 1 0.53 1 1 1 
25 0 1 0.35 1 0 0 
26 1 0 0.32 0 0 1 
27 0 0 0.43 0 0 1 
28 0 0 0.15 0 0.5 0 
29 0 0 0.34 1 0 1 
30 1 1 0.57 1 0.5   
31 0 1 0.48 1 0 1 
32 0 1 0.34 0 0 0 
33 0 0 0.47 0 0 1 
34 0 0 0.31 1 0 0 
35 0 1 0.58 1 0.5 1 
36 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 
37 0 1 0.38 1 0.5 1 
38 0 0 0.58 1 . 1 
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Table C4c: Continued 
39 0 1 0.51 1 1 0 
40 0 0 0.42 1 0.5 1 
41 0 1 0.59 1 0.5 0 
42 0 1 0.50 1 0.5 1 
43 1 0 0.37 0 0   
44 0 0 0.43 1 1 1 
45 0 1 0.55 0 0.5 0 
46 0 1 0.43 0 0 0 
47 0 0 0.39 1 0 1 
48 0 0 0.23 0 0 0 
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